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Foreword 
 
Over a year ago I was asked by the then Prime Minister and Home Secretary to 
undertake a review into integration and opportunity in isolated and deprived 
communities. The integration I wanted to look at was not just about how well we get 
on with each other but how well we all do compared to each other.  
 
I wanted to consider what divides communities and gives rise to anxiety, prejudice, 
alienation and a sense of grievance; and to look again at what could be done to fight 
the injustice that where you are born or live in this country, your background or even 
your gender, can affect how you get on in modern Britain. 
 
I wanted to be honest about how much harder life is for some and to think about 
what we can do to resolve this and build more cohesive communities. 
 
I approached this task hoping that by improving integration and the life chances of 
some of the most disadvantaged and isolated communities, we could also inject 
some resilience against those who try to divide us with their extremism and hate.   
 
I went where the evidence took me, talking to community groups, officials and 
academics as well as teachers, pupils and faith leaders.  Some of the meetings and 
conversations I had were very challenging and the stories hard to hear, but none of 
the 800 or more people that we met, nor any of the two hundred plus written 
submissions to the review, said there wasn’t a problem to solve.  
 
No review starts from a blank piece of paper, and I was grateful to all whose 
research and opinion I could call upon to help guide the work. This review takes and 
builds on all that expertise, and I hope that it does service to all those who took part.  
 
At the start of this review, I had thought that I knew what some of the problems might 
be and what I might report on.  Discrimination and disadvantage feeding a sense of 
grievance and unfairness, isolating communities from modern British society and all 
it has to offer.  
 
I did find this. Black boys still not getting jobs, white working class kids on free school 
meals still doing badly in our education system, Muslim girls getting good grades at 
school but no decent employment opportunities; these remain absolutely vital 
problems to tackle and get right to improve our society.  
 
But I also found other, equally worrying things including high levels of social and 
economic isolation in some places and cultural and religious practices in 
communities that are not only holding some of our citizens back but run contrary to 
British values and sometimes our laws.  Time and time again I found it was women 
and children who were the targets of these regressive practices.  And too often, 
leaders and institutions were not doing enough to stand up against them and protect 
those who were vulnerable. 
 
I know that for some, the content of this review will be hard to read, and I have 
wrestled with what to put in and what to leave out, particularly because I know that 
putting some communities under the spotlight – particularly communities in which 
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there are high concentrations of Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage – will 
add to the pressure that they already feel.  However, I am convinced that it is only by 
fully acknowledging what is happening that we can set about resolving these 
problems and eventually relieve this pressure.  
 
None of this is easy.  But too many leaders have chosen to take the easier path 
when confronted with these issues in the past – sometimes with good intent – and 
that has often resulted in problems being ducked, swept under the carpet or allowed 
to fester.   
 
I approached this review with an absolute belief that we are a compassionate, 
tolerant and liberal country.  But social cohesion and equality are not things we can 
take for granted; they require careful tending, commitment and bravery from us all.  
 
In fact some of our most treasured national institutions are built on that belief; a 
health service that is free for all who need it, a media that exposes corruption and 
injustice whoever you are, and a legal system that treats everybody as innocent until 
proved otherwise. 
So I hope that this review will be read in the same spirit with which I have tried to 
write it; with honesty and not shying away from the difficult and uncomfortable 
problems that we face.   
A failure to talk about all this only leaves the ground open for the Far Right on one 
side and Islamist extremists on the other. These groups are ideologically opposed to 
each other but actually share the same goal: to show that diversity and modern 
Britain or Islam and modern Britain are somehow incompatible. But of course they 
are wrong.   
We have always been at our strongest when most united. We are better for being 
open and inclusive as a society. Every person, in every community, in every part of 
Britain, should feel a part of our nation and have every opportunity to succeed in it.  
There can be no exceptions to that by gender, colour or creed. Those are our rights. 
Those are our values. That is our history. It must be our future too.  
My overriding hope is that we can work together in a spirit of unity, compassion and 
kindness to repair the sometimes fraying fabric of our nation.  
 
 
 
Dame Louise Casey DBE CB 
 
December 2016 
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1. Summary 
1.1. In July 2015, the then Prime Minister and Home Secretary asked Dame 
Louise Casey to conduct a review to consider what could be done to boost 
opportunity and integration in our most isolated and deprived communities.   
 
1.2. Despite the long-standing and growing diversity of our nation, and the sense 
that people from different backgrounds get on well together at a general level, 
community cohesion did not feel universally strong across the country.  
 
1.3. The unprecedented pace and scale of population change has been having an 
impact, particularly in deprived areas, at a time when Britain has been recovering 
from a recession and concerns about terrorism, immigration, the economy and the 
future of public services have been running high.  Problems of social exclusion have 
persisted for some ethnic minority groups and poorer White British communities in 
some areas are falling further behind.  As the initial fieldwork for this review 
concluded, the EU referendum posed another question about our unity as a nation, 
sparking increased reports of racist and xenophobic hatred. 
 
1.4. So it has been timely and right to step back, take stock and consider what 
more could be done to bring our nation together.  
 
1.5. This report reflects what Dame Louise and the review team believe to be the 
best, most recent data to illustrate what we have seen and heard in our fieldwork.  It 
summarises what has been drawn during the review from meetings, visits and 
discussions up and down the country with more than 800 members of the public, 
community groups, front-line workers, academics, faith leaders, politicians and 
others; over 200 written submissions; and a wide range of research, data and other 
evidence about the population and how it has changed. 
 
1.6. In many cases, the report acknowledges that the available data are already 
feeling out of date (for example where we rely on the Census which, while 
comprehensive and rich, is only conducted every decade, with the most recent 
results coming from 2011).  In others, data are not available at a sufficiently granular 
level to pick out trends that might exist or be emerging in smaller or newer groups in 
society.  In general, better data and research are needed across a range of issues 
relating to integration. 
 
1.7. The report considers immigration and patterns of settlement; the extent to 
which people from different backgrounds mix and get on together; how different 
communities – considering ethnic and faith groups in particular – have fared 
economically and socially; and some of the issues that are driving inequality and 
division in society; and it makes recommendations on what we should do next in a 
new programme to help unite Britain.   
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Why promoting integration and tackling social exclusion matters 
 
1.8. In this country we take poverty, social exclusion, social justice and social 
mobility seriously and we do so across political divides.  Creating a just, fair society 
where everyone can prosper and get on is a cornerstone of Britain’s values.   
 
1.9. This is, in part, because we know that the consequences of economic 
exclusion and poverty are wide-ranging and long-lasting.  Children from low income 
families are less likely to do well in school, are more likely to suffer ill-health and face 
pressures in their lives that can be associated with unemployment and criminality.   
 
1.10. The less integrated we are as a nation, the greater the economic and social 
costs we face – estimated as approximately £6 billion each year in one study.   
 
1.11. We know that where communities live separately, with fewer interactions 
between people from different backgrounds, mistrust, anxiety and prejudice grow.  
 
1.12. Conversely, social mixing and interactions between people from a wider range 
of backgrounds can have positive impacts; not just in reducing anxiety and prejudice, 
but also in enabling people to get on better in employment and social mobility.  
 
1.13. Resilience, integration and shared common values and behaviours – such as 
respect for the rule of law, democracy, equality and tolerance – are inhibitors of 
division, hate and extremism.  They can make us stronger, more equal, more united 
and able to stand together as one nation.  
 
Our population today 
 
1.14. We consider some key trends in the population and factors which indicate and 
affect levels of integration.  
 
1.15. There were an estimated 65.1 million people living in the United Kingdom in 
June 2015, with the population having risen by 4.1 million between 2001 and 2011.  
More than half of this growth was due to immigration.  Some key trends stand out 
over that decade: 
 
 We are an ageing population, with increased life expectancy and the impact of 
a ‘baby boomer’ generation with higher birth rates moving into older age 
groups, but with ethnic minority groups generally having a younger age profile. 
 
 We are increasingly ethnically diverse.  Although eight out of ten of us identified 
ourselves as White British in the 2011 Census, the White British population 
reduced by 0.4 million people, while all other ethnic minority groups grew - with 
the largest numerical growth among ‘other’ White (most notably Polish, up by 
0.5 million) and Asian (most notably Indian and Pakistani, each increasing by 
0.4 million) ethnic groups. 
 
 We remain predominantly religious, with nearly 7 out of 10 of us belonging to a 
religion.  Christians remain a majority, while a quarter of the population holds 
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no religion.  But the proportion of Christians fell from 70% to 59%, while the 
proportion holding no religion grew from 17% to 26%. 
 
 The number of people belonging to the other main religions grew, with the 
exception of the Jewish population which remained around the same size. 
 
 Among faith groups the number of people identifying themselves as Muslim 
grew most significantly, by 1.2 million people.  This 72% increase is higher than 
for any other religious group and Muslims make up the largest non-Christian 
religious population in the UK at 2.8 million in total, compared with 0.8m 
Hindus, 0.4m Sikhs, 0.3m Jews and 0.3m Buddhists. 
 
 We have a significant lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender population, with an 
increase of self-identification within these groups over recent years.  
 
1.16. As a nation, we are getting older, more secular and more open about our 
sexuality, while the growing ethnic minority population is younger and more likely to 
identify as religious (particularly among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups). 
 
Immigration  
 
1.17. Many of these changes in our population are due to immigration and higher 
birth rates in some communities.  
 
1.18. Britain is an increasingly diverse nation with a long history of immigration but it 
has changed dramatically in recent years.  By 2011, 13% of us were foreign born 
and nearly 20% of us identified ourselves as belonging to ethnic minorities 
(compared with 9% and 12% respectively a decade earlier).   
 
1.19. Over the last two decades, total immigration to the UK has doubled, from 
around 300,000 people per year prior in 1997 to more than 600,000 in 2015. 
 
1.20. Significant immigration from Asia and other non-European countries has 
continued year-on-year over the last four or five decades, with much of this 
characterised by permanent settlement through marriage and family ties.  
 
1.21. Rates of integration in some communities may have been undermined by high 
levels of transnational marriage – with subsequent generations being joined by a 
foreign-born partner, creating a ‘first generation in every generation’ phenomenon in 
which each new generation grows up with a foreign-born parent.  This seems 
particularly prevalent in South Asian communities.  We were told on one visit to a 
northern town that all except one of the Asian Councillors had married a wife from 
Pakistan.  And in a cohort study at the Bradford Royal Infirmary, 80% of babies of 
Pakistani ethnicity in the area had at least one parent born outside the UK. 
 
1.22. There has been an unprecedented increase in European migration over the 
last decade, largely for work and shorter-term stays, although there are signs that 
growing numbers of EU migrants are settling permanently. 
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1.23. In the year ending December 2015, the ‘net’ immigration figure was 333,000 – 
but emigration does not really ‘cancel out’ immigration; it is the total churn in 
population that can alter the characteristics of a neighbourhood and the net figure of 
333,000 reflected almost a million people in total arriving in or leaving the country 
over 12 months.  Additionally, the placement of asylum seekers across the country – 
often in poorer communities – and the presence of an unknown number of illegal 
immigrants, adds to the level of change being experienced. 
 
1.24. Higher birth rates among foreign born parents are also contributing to the 
growing diversity of the UK - while foreign born residents made up 13% of the 
population in 2011, 27% of births in 2014 were to mothers born outside the UK 
(predominantly to Polish, Pakistani and Indian mothers). 
 
1.25. The impact of these changes is far reaching.   
 
1.26. We were told on a visit to Sheffield that more than 6,000 people of Roma or 
Eastern European heritage (of which more than half are under the age of 17) live 
predominantly in one ward.  The impact on schools was evident with the number of 
EU nationals’ children having increased from 150 to 2,500 in five years.  
 
1.27. At a national level, 18% of homelessness acceptances in 2015-16 were 
foreign nationals – more than double the number in 2009-10 – with implications for 
who gets priority for social housing.  
 
1.28. In a situation where the country has been through an economic downturn, it is 
understandable that the pace and scale of immigration has felt too much for some 
communities.  
 
Settlement and segregation  
 
1.29. Minority ethnic groups have tended to settle more in urban and industrial 
areas, often reflecting labour market gaps which immigrant communities came to fill 
in the 20th Century.  As the diversity of the nation has increased another dynamic is 
also clear – people from minority groups have become both more dispersed and in 
some cases more concentrated and segregated:  
 
 50% of the British population lives in areas with relatively high migration flows.  
 
 Half of all minority ethnic citizens in Britain live in London, Birmingham and 
Manchester. 
 
 Similar patterns of urban concentration of ethnic minorities exist in Scotland 
and Wales. 
 
1.30. People of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity tend to live in more residentially 
segregated communities than other ethnic minority groups.  South Asian 
communities (people of Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi ethnicity) live in higher 
concentrations at ward level than any other ethnic minority group.  These 
concentrations at ward level are growing in many areas.  In 2011 there were: 
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 24 wards in 12 local authority areas where more than 40% of the population 
identified themselves as being of Pakistani ethnicity; up from 12 wards in 7 
local authorities in 2001. 
 
 20 wards in 8 local authority areas where more than 40% of the population 
identified themselves as being of Indian ethnicity; up from 16 wards within 6 
local authorities in 2001.  
 
1.31. Compared to other minority faith groups, Muslims tend to live in higher 
residential concentrations at ward level.  In 2011: 
 
 Blackburn, Birmingham, Burnley and Bradford included wards with between 
70% and 85% Muslim populations.  
 
1.32. The school age population is even more segregated when compared to 
residential patterns of living.  A Demos study found that, in 2013, more than 50% of 
ethnic minority students were in schools where ethnic minorities were the majority, 
and that school segregation was highest among students from Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds relative to other ethnic groups. 
 
1.33. In January 2015, there were 511 schools across 43 local authority areas with 
50% or more pupils from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds. 
 
1.34. Residential and school concentrations of ethnic minorities are a consequence 
of a range of factors, including the pull of particular labour market gaps that have 
attracted immigrants in the past, a desire on the part of immigrants to live near to kin 
and others from similar backgrounds who might help them navigate life in a new 
country, cultural connections and, in some cases, a lack of social mobility resulting 
from relative socio-economic disadvantage.  Rates of social mobility among 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups (who are the groups most concentrated in 
deprived areas) are significantly lower than rates for White groups. 
 
1.35. In the case of schools, parental choice and wanting to go to a school close by, 
to be among pupils from a similar background, or to attend a school with a particular 
faith or cultural perspective, can also be important factors. 
 
1.36. The Government had attempted to alter the segregation of pupils in faith 
schools by introducing admissions criteria for new faith-based Free Schools.  But 
these did not seem to be having an impact on the diversity of minority faith schools 
and Government has now proposed replacing them with a wider set of integration 
tests.  
  
1.37. Taken together, high ethnic minority concentration in residential areas and in 
schools increases the likelihood of children growing up without meeting or better 
understanding people from different backgrounds.  One striking illustration of such 
segregation came from a non-faith state secondary school we visited where, in a 
survey they had conducted, pupils believed the population of Britain to be between 
50% and 90% Asian, such had been their experience up to that point.  
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1.38. Research examined during the review suggests that concentrations of ethnic 
communities can have both positive and negative effects, and that outcomes do not 
appear to be uniform for all groups.  Ethnic concentration can improve bonding 
between people from similar backgrounds, particularly when they are new to an 
area, but it can also: 
 
 limit labour market opportunities, notably for Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups 
– although it appears to improve employment opportunities for Indian ethnic 
groups; 
 
 reduce opportunities for social ties between minority and White British 
communities; and 
 
 lead to lower identification with Britain and lower levels of trust between ethnic 
groups, compared to minorities living in more diverse areas. 
 
1.39. Youth programmes that engage young people in altruistic activities seem to 
be having some success in enabling teenagers from different backgrounds to mix, 
leading to greater understanding and tolerance, and reduced prejudice and anxiety.  
Evaluation of the National Citizen Service found that 84% of young people on the 
2013 programme felt more positive towards people from different backgrounds 
following participation.  But these are not yet on a scale that is sufficient to reach as 
many young people in our most isolated communities as we need to. 
 
How do people feel about these changes?  
 
1.40. The impact of these changes and the challenges they present all of us are 
complex.  Generally, measures of national sentiment show a strong sense of 
community cohesion and belonging.  In 2015-16, 89% of people thought their 
community was cohesive and a similar proportion felt a sense of belonging to Britain.  
 
1.41. However, other research reflects a different position, suggesting that the 
much more significant scale of immigration since the 1990s had affected public 
attitudes by 2011, with negative judgments about the cultural and economic impact 
of migration growing and 60% rating the settlement of migrants overall as negative. 
 
1.42. Poorer groups felt even more negatively.  But unease about immigration is not 
limited to traditional White British communities.  In one northern town we visited, the 
long-standing Pakistani ethnic community felt very unsettled by an increase in the 
Roma population. 
 
1.43. While there has been a range of polling that suggests British Muslims feel 
positive about Britishness and life in Britain, polls also highlight differences in 
attitudes, with some Muslims and some other minority faith groups or indeed other 
minority sections of society expressing less progressive views, for example towards 
women’s equality, sexuality and freedom of speech.   
 
1.44. Polling in 2015 also showed that more than 55% of the general public agreed 
that there was a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society, 
while 46% of British Muslims felt that being a Muslim in Britain was difficult due to 
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prejudice against Islam.  We found a growing sense of grievance among sections of 
the Muslim population, and a stronger sense of identification with the plight of the 
‘Ummah’, or global Muslim community. 
 
Social and economic exclusion 
 
1.45. Successive Governments have focussed on and at times achieved progress 
with social and economic exclusion, worklessness, poverty and disadvantage.  
Historical attainment gaps for many of the most disadvantaged groups in society are 
narrowing; but there is still a long way to go.  
  
1.46. Some minority groups have fared better over time than others.  Those 
(particularly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity) with higher levels of residential 
and school segregation appear to be disadvantaged across a wider range of socio-
economic factors.  At the same time, some White British communities – particularly 
in areas of industrial decline – experience significant disadvantage and are 
increasingly being left behind.  And Gypsies and Irish Travellers, while small in 
number relative to other ethnic groups (at 58,000 people or 0.1% of the population in 
the 2011 Census) also face persistent socio-economic disadvantage. 
 
1.47. There are 13.2 million people across the UK living on relative low income.  
People living in households headed by someone from an ethnic minority background 
are more likely than their White counterparts to live on a ‘relative low income’, with 
41% to 51% of households of Black, Pakistani, Chinese and Bangladeshi ethnicity 
on relative low income compared with 19% of White households.  
 
1.48. Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations live disproportionately in the 
most deprived areas in England compared with other groups– with the most deprived 
10% of areas of England home to 31% of Pakistani ethnic groups and 28% of 
Bangladeshi ethnic groups.  
 
1.49. While children from many ethnic minorities are increasingly matching or out-
performing White British pupils in education, there is growing evidence of poorer 
White British boys, in particular, falling behind.  White British pupils on Free School 
Meals are less than half as likely to achieve five or more good GCSEs as pupils who 
are not eligible for Free School Meals.  
 
1.50. Students eligible for Free School Meals are half as likely as all other students 
to go to the top third of higher education institutions, and less than half as likely to go 
to a Russell Group institution. 
 
1.51. People from Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are three times 
more likely than White British people to be unemployed.  And there are more 
concerning aspects of disadvantage relating to gender and age in particular groups: 
 
 For young Black men, aged 16-24, the unemployment rate is 35%, compared 
with 15% for young White men. 
 
 Where they are in work, men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity tend to be 
in low status employment – one in four Pakistani men are employed as taxi-
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drivers and two in five Bangladeshi men work in restaurants (although a 
number of these will be in family-owned businesses). 
 
 Economic inactivity levels remain unusually high among women from Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi ethnic groups – 57.2% are inactive in the labour market 
compared with 25.2% of White women and 38.5% of all ethnic minority women.  
 
1.52. English language is a common denominator and a strong enabler of 
integration.  But Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups have the lowest levels of 
English language proficiency of any Black or Minority Ethnic group – and women in 
those communities are twice as likely as men to have poor English. 
 
1.53. The range of socio-economic exclusion suffered by some groups must be 
given greater attention.  The persistent disadvantage experienced by young Black 
men in employment, the falling behind of poorer White British communities in some 
areas needs to be addressed if we are to prevent cracks and divisions in society 
from growing.   
 
1.54. But in relation to social and economic integration in particular, there is a 
strong correlation of increased segregation among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic 
households in more deprived areas, with poorer English language and poorer labour 
market outcomes, suggesting a negative cycle that will not improve without a more 
concerted and targeted effort.   
 
Equality and division 
 
1.55. Equality is another important factor of successful integration.  Britain has 
developed some of the strongest equalities legislation in the world, and provided 
greater freedoms to be different; but there is more still to be done.  
 
1.56. This review has highlighted worrying levels of segregation and socio-
economic exclusion in different communities across the country and a number of 
inequalities between groups; one of the most striking of which is the inequality of 
women.  
 
1.57. We continue to make great strides in gender equality.  But in many areas of 
Britain the drive towards equality and opportunity across gender might never have 
taken place.  Women in some communities are facing a double onslaught of gender 
inequality, combined with religious, cultural and social barriers preventing them from 
accessing even their basic rights as British residents.  And violence against women 
remains all too prevalent – in domestic abuse but also in other criminal practices 
such as female genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based 
crime. 
 
1.58. A similar picture is seen for lesbian, gay and bisexual groups – who suffer 
discrimination in mainstream society, but are affected twice over when they also 
belong to a community that can be culturally intolerant of non-heterosexual 
identification. 
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1.59. Growing concerns exist for the safeguarding of children in some communities.  
Ofsted has raised concerns about the well-being of children in segregated, 
supplementary and unregistered, illegal faith schools, which we witnessed ourselves 
during the review – where pupils are not getting opportunities to mix with children 
from different backgrounds or gain from a properly rounded education, where squalid 
and unsafe conditions exist and where staff have not been vetted to work with 
children.   
 
1.60. In too many cases, the educational circumstances of children are not known 
to local authorities and Ofsted has been concerned that some people might be using 
the right to home education and its relatively lax regulation to place their children in 
unregistered and illegal schools.   
 
1.61. Concerns raised with us throughout our engagement suggest that these 
inequalities and divisions are persisting.  And they appear to be worsening in some 
more isolated communities where segregation, deprivation and social exclusion are 
combining in a downward spiral with a growth in regressive religious and cultural 
ideologies.  
 
1.62. The prevalence and tolerance of regressive and harmful practices has been 
exploited by extremists, both ‘Islamists’ and those on the far right, who highlight 
these differences and use them to further their shared narrative of hate and division. 
These extreme ideologies feed on fear and suspicion, peddle hatred and prejudice, 
and seek to turn communities against each other in a vicious circle.  
 
1.63. Incidents of hate crime are also on the rise.  In 2015-16, there were 62,518 
hate crimes (based on race, sexual orientation, religion, disability and transgender) 
recorded by the police – up 19% on the previous year.  The Crime Survey for 
England and Wales suggests that the actual level of hate crime experienced – 
including anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks – is more than four times the 
number of recorded incidents.  And there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
incidents increase following ‘trigger’ events, such as the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby 
or conflict in Israel and Gaza.  Following the EU referendum, reported incidents of 
hate crime rose again, possibly reflecting another such spike, with perpetrators 
feeling emboldened by the result. 
 
1.64. We all have a responsibility to counteract hate in any form, and to undermine 
those seeking to divide us, whoever they are and however uncomfortable it may be.  
 
Leadership  
 
1.65. For generations we have welcomed immigrants to the UK but left them to find 
their own way in society while leaving host communities to accommodate them and 
the growing diversity of our nation.  
 
1.66. As some communities have become more segregated, the increased pace of 
immigration has added new pressures, leaving long-standing communities struggling 
to adjust to the changes around them.  Too few leaders in public office have dealt 
with this key issue, perhaps hoping it might change or worrying about being labelled 
racist; or indeed fearing that they will lose the support of minority communities.  
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1.67. Too many public institutions, national and local, state and non-state, have 
gone so far to accommodate diversity and freedom of expression that they have 
ignored or even condoned regressive, divisive and harmful cultural and religious 
practices, for fear of being branded racist or Islamophobic.   
 
1.68. This accommodation can range from relatively trivial issues such as altering 
traditional cultural terms to avoid giving offence, to the department responsible for 
integration policy spending more in 2011-12 and 2012-13 promoting the Cornish 
language than the English language, or some trade unions challenging a strategy for 
all public sector workers to speak English.  At its most serious, it might mean public 
sector leaders ignoring harm or denying abuse.  
 
1.69. This has not helped the communities which many well-intentioned people in 
those institutions have wanted to protect; more often it has played straight into the 
hands of extremists.  As a nation we have lost sight of our expectations on 
integration and lacked confidence in promoting it or challenging behaviours that 
undermine it.  
 
1.70. For the last fifteen years Governments have commissioned many reviews of 
community cohesion and developed strategies to improve it.  But these cohesion or 
integration plans have not been implemented with enough force or consistency, they 
have been allowed to be diluted and muddled, they have not been sufficiently linked 
to socio-economic inclusion, and communities have not been engaged adequately.   
 
1.71. Programmes and projects have followed the easier paths, talking up the 
‘positives’ but not addressing the ‘negatives’.  We have relied on inter-faith groups 
and faith leaders to take the initiative in dealing with many of the challenges but 
lacked the courage to set the values and standards we want the nation as a whole to 
uphold and unite around.  
 
1.72. Some public institutions have stepped back and let groups attempt to 
undermine efforts to prevent terrorism and further alienate the communities we need 
to engage and protect – whether that is from terrorist radicalisers, perpetrators of 
violence and hate, criminal gangs or groomers intent on exploiting and abusing 
vulnerable people. 
 
1.73. We need leaders at all levels – in Government, in public sector and faith 
institutions, and in communities – to stand up and be more robust on this.   
 
The future 
 
1.74. Against this backdrop, we have considered what more could be done to 
promote opportunity and integration.  We recognise that this review raises some 
difficult issues which many would prefer to ignore.  But we believe it is only by 
identifying and acknowledging the problems and harms that derive from a lack of 
integration that we can move on to solutions that will unite us. 
 
1.75. We hope that this review will stimulate a national conversation and debate, 
and greater consideration of the steps that everyone can take to improve integration 
and opportunity.  But we have also identified some initial recommendations, set out 
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in chapter 12 and summarised below, which we hope the Government will accept 
and take forward through a new communities programme to complement and 
underpin existing work to tackle extremism, hate crime and violence against women.  
Some of these will require local action, some require the Government to act.  They 
are based around the themes of this review and are designed to: 
 
Build local communities’ resilience in the towns and cities where the greatest 
challenges exist, by: 
 
(1) Providing additional funding for area-based plans and projects that will 
address the key priorities identified in this review, including the promotion of 
English language skills, empowering marginalised women, promoting more social 
mixing, particularly among young people, and tackling barriers to employment for 
the most socially isolated groups. 
 
(2) Developing a set of local indicators of integration and requiring regular 
collection of the data supporting these indicators. 
 
(3) Identifying and promoting successful approaches to integration. 
 
Improve the integration of communities in Britain and establish a set of values 
around which people from all different backgrounds can unite, by: 
 
(4) Attaching more weight to British values, laws and history in our schools. 
 
(5) Considering what additional support or advice should be provided to 
immigrants to help them get off to the best start in understanding their rights and 
obligations and our expectations for integration. 
 
(6) Reviewing the route to British citizenship and considering the introduction of 
an integration oath on arrival for immigrants intending to settle in Britain. 
 
Reduce economic exclusion, inequality and segregation in our most isolated 
and deprived communities and schools, by: 
 
(7) Working with schools providers and local communities to promote more 
integrated schools and opportunities for pupils to mix with others from different 
backgrounds. 
 
(8) Developing approaches to help overcome cultural barriers to employment. 
 
(9) Improving English language provision through funding for community-based 
classes and appropriate prioritisation of adult skills budgets. 
 
(10) Improving our understanding of how housing and regeneration policies could 
improve integration or reduce segregation. 
 
(11) Introducing stronger safeguards for children who are not in mainstream 
education, including those being home schooled. 
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Increase standards of leadership and integrity in public office, by: 
 
(12) Ensuring that British values such as respect for the rule of law, equality and 
tolerance are enshrined in the principles of public life and developing a new oath 
for holders of public office. 
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2. Why conduct an integration review?  
2.1.  This review was commissioned following a general election that brought a 
new government into power at a time when Britain was recovering from a recession, 
but with concerns about terrorism, immigration and the economy running high. 
 
2.2. Despite the growing diversity of our nation and the general sense that people 
from different backgrounds got on well together, community cohesion did not feel 
universally strong across the country.  Numerous reports on community cohesion 
and integration had been produced in the preceding fifteen years but the 
recommendations they had made were difficult to see in action.  Opinion polls 
revealed growing concern about race relations, and extremism – often conflated with 
terrorism – was attracting increasing attention.   
 
2.3. In 2011, the Coalition Government had 
promised a stronger integration strategy, in part to 
clarify and separate its ‘Prevent’ programme to 
tackle terrorism from wider efforts to promote 
community cohesion.  But Prevent, while clearly 
focused on terrorism, continued to attract some 
controversy, not least because attempts to promote 
integration had not fulfilled their stated ambition. 
 
2.4. So it felt right to step back, take stock and consider what should follow to unite 
the nation.  
 
2.5. Integration is a nebulous concept which resists a single definition or 
description.  These vary with political and research focus; and often appear to refer 
to very separate processes and goals.  Of some of the many definitions and 
descriptions in submissions to this review: 
 
 Professor Ted Cantle puts forward the idea of “‘living together’ – in which we 
share a sense of belonging; build acceptance of (most) common values and 
behaviours; use a common language to communicate: develop our personal 
intercultural confidence/competence and religious literacy; and become 
comfortable with difference and plurality”.  
 
 Professor Eric Kaufmann (Birkbeck College, University of London) promotes a 
concept of “multivocalism, something qualitatively distinct from both 
multiculturalism and the current policy of civic nationalism. This recognises that 
in allowing diverse people to attach to Britain in their own way, we strengthen, 
rather than weaken, British identity”.  
 
 The Runnymede Trust focuses on economic development, suggesting that 
government policies on integration should give “priority to tackling the 
concentration of poverty in both people and places”. 
  
…community cohesion 
did not feel universally 
strong across the 
country. 
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2.6. These are all useful perspectives.  Drawing on what we have seen and heard 
during the review, we suggest integration is the extent to which people from all 
backgrounds can get on – with each other, and in enjoying and respecting the 
benefits that the United Kingdom has to offer, such as:  
 
 our values of democracy, fairness, the rule of 
law, freedom of speech, inclusiveness, tolerance 
and equality between citizens regardless of 
gender, ethnicity, religion or sexuality; 
 
 the opportunities and security that come from a 
good education, access to a strong labour 
market with a guaranteed minimum wage, and a 
welfare state that includes the National Health 
Service and support for people when they fall on 
hard times or are vulnerable; and 
 
 our institutions, norms and idiosyncrasies – from 
the Monarchy and the BBC to queuing and 
talking about the weather, loving and hating all 
these things at once - which, while identifiable as quintessentially British, we 
refuse to have written down, fixed or imposed on us but in which we take great 
pride. 
 
2.7. Research for the Social Integration Commission in 2015 estimated that the 
cost to the UK of a lack of integration is approximately 
£6 billion each year, specifically through long-term 
unemployment (£1.5 billion), recruitment and career 
progression (£0.7 billion) and, in areas relating to 
community health and well-being, costs to the UK 
economy including suicide (£1.7 billion), 
cardiovascular diseases (£1.2 billion) and health and 
social care among the isolated (£0.7 billion)1. 
 
2.8. A paper for the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs in 2008 summarised the impacts of a lack of integration: 
 
“Institutionalized inequalities in rights and responsibilities mean that individuals 
from particular social groups are more likely to be poor.  Groups that are 
discriminated against, either in legislation and policies or through service provider 
practices and self-exclusion, are unable to access services and resources on the 
same terms as others.  This leaves them disadvantaged in relation to economic 
opportunities and consequent income.2” 
 
2.9. Academic research (discussed in chapter 4) reveals the benefits that 
relationships across traditional boundaries can bring: social mixing reduces anxiety 
and prejudice but also enables people to get on better in employment and to improve 
their social mobility.  
 
…the cost to the UK of a 
lack of integration is 
approximately £6 billion 
each year… 
…we suggest 
integration is the extent 
to which people from all 
backgrounds can get on 
– with each other, and in 
enjoying and respecting 
the benefits that the 
United Kingdom has to 
offer… 
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2.10. Social mixing is not always a straightforward 
matter.  The Demos Integration Hub highlights the 
complicated relationship between segregation and 
economic prosperity, and the benefits of social 
clustering for some new immigrants and young 
communities.3   
 
2.11. It is nevertheless the case that the less 
integrated we are as a nation, the greater the social 
and economic costs we face as a whole.  Mistrust, 
anxiety and prejudice grow where communities live separately.  That allows people 
with extremist agendas to step in and spread fear, hatred and division.   
 
2.12. Long-standing – and worsening – divisions in our society are being exploited 
by extremists, predators, and those seeking excuses to legitimise their hate.  In 
recent years we have seen a growth in the reporting of religiously and racially 
motivated hate crimes. These issues are too significant to be acted on only in the 
aftermath of incidents because of the vicious circle they set in motion.  We must 
move from cure to prevention, and drive integration to build our nation’s prosperity, 
opportunity and resilience against all social shocks.  
  
Mistrust, anxiety and 
prejudice grow where 
communities live 
separately. 
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3. Our population today  
Chapter Summary 
 
 The population of the United Kingdom grew by more than 4 million people 
between 2001 and 2011 and has become older, more secular but also much 
more diverse in its ethnicity, beliefs and sexuality, with ethnic minority groups 
more likely to be religious and to have a younger age profile. 
 
 Migration has been the most significant factor in the growth of our population in 
recent years, with significant long-term immigration from former Commonwealth 
countries (particularly India and Pakistan) continuing, and with a more significant 
increase in immigration from other EU countries, most notably Poland. 
 
 More than 8 out of 10 identify themselves as “White British” and much of the 
country reflects this, but many more people in the United Kingdom are now 
experiencing high migration flows and the impact of migration in their 
communities – in schools, housing and other services. 
 
 As the population’s diversity has increased, people from minority ethnic 
backgrounds have become more widely dispersed across the country, although 
ethnic minority groups remain more heavily concentrated in urban areas. 
 
 People from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds and people of 
Muslim faith live in increasing and greater concentrations (relative to other 
minority ethnic and faith groups) in particular local electoral wards in certain 
areas in the north, the Midlands and London.    
 
 There are high levels of segregation in our schools and these mirror residential 
patterns, being highest among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups relative 
to other ethnic minority groups. 
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How our population is changing 
 
3.1. In order to consider integration, it is important 
to understand the make-up of our population and 
how it has changed in recent years.   
 
3.2. In 2015, there were 65.1 million people living 
in the United Kingdom:  54.8 million (84%) in 
England, 5.4 million (8%) in Scotland, 3.1 million 
(5%) in Wales and 1.9 million (3%) in Northern 
Ireland4.  The population of the United Kingdom rose 
by 4.1 million between 2001 and 20115, with more 
than half of this growth due to immigration6.  We are a multi-racial and multi-faith 
society and have changed across a range of demographic factors, becoming older 
and more secular as a whole but also even more diverse. 
 
Gender 
 
3.3. We are almost evenly distributed across the genders, with 50.7% of the 
population in the UK in 2015 female and 49.3% male.  The historical predominance 
of women due to longevity is evening out as men’s life expectancy improves.  Since 
mid-2005, the number of men aged 85 and over in the UK has increased by 54%, 
compared to a 21% increase in the number of women in that age range7. 
 
Age 
 
3.4. As a whole, we are an ageing population, with 
increased life expectancy and the impact of the ‘baby 
boomer’ generation with high birth rates (following 
the Second World War and up to the early 1960s) 
moving into higher age groups.   
 
Ethnicity  
 
3.5. We are becoming more ethnically diverse, 
although more than 8 out of 10 regard themselves as White British.  At the 2011 
Census, across Great Britain8: 
 
 81.5% were White British (50.0 million) 
 
 7.1% were Asian (4.4 million) 
 
 5.4% were White Other, including Irish and Gypsy/Irish Traveller (3.3 million) 
 
 3.1% were Black (1.9 million) 
 
 2.0% were Mixed (1.2 million) 
 
 0.9% were from any other ethnic group (0.6 million). 
The population of the 
United Kingdom rose by 
4.1 million between 2001 
and 2011, with more than 
half of this growth due to 
immigration.   
We have changed across 
a range of demographic 
factors, becoming older 
and more secular as a 
whole but also even 
more diverse. 
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Population of Great Britain, 2011 
 
Source: 2011 Census 
3.6. Between 2001 and 2011 the White British population in Great Britain shrank 
by 0.4 million people and from just over 88% to just under 82% of the total 
population.  Ethnic minority groups grew with the 
largest numerical growth in England and Wales 
among other White (most notably Polish, up by 0.5 
million – a nine-fold increase) and Asian/Asian 
British (most notably Indian and Pakistani, each 
increasing by 0.4 million) groups9.  
 
3.7. Over that same period: 
 
 the number of people living in England and 
Wales who were born outside the UK 
increased from 4.6 million (9%) to 7.5 million (13%)10; 
 
 the number of people in Britain classifying themselves as belonging to a 
minority ethnic group (including White non-British) increased from 6.7 million 
(12%) to 11.4 million (19%)11 and while not officially recorded, many more of us 
have immigrant ancestry. 
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Religion  
 
3.8. We remain a largely religious country, with nearly 7 out of 10 of us across 
Great Britain in 201112 saying we belonged to a religion.  Christians remain a 
majority, while just over a quarter of the population holds no religion.  
 
 58.8% were Christian (36.1 million) 
 
 26.1% were of no religion (16.0 million) 
 
 4.5% were Muslim (2.8 million) 
 
 1.4% were Hindu (0.8 million) 
 
 0.7% were Sikh (0.4 million) 
 
 0.4% were Jewish (0.3 million) 
 
 0.4% were Buddhist (0.3 million) 
 
 0.4% were of other religions (0.3 million) 
 
 7.2% of people did not answer this Census question (4.4 million) 
 
3.9. Different ethnic and religious groups have very different age population 
profiles.  This has a significant impact on a whole raft of socio-economic measures 
and the dynamics within and between communities.  The chart below demonstrates 
this difference by religion, with a notably younger age profile among Muslims. 
 
Median age by religion, England and Wales, 2011 
 
Source: 2011 Census 
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saying we belonged to a 
religion. 
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3.10. We discuss religion in more detail in chapter 8 but there are three significant 
changes in the religiosity of the British population to note in the period 2001 to 
201113: 
 
 An increase in secularity – the percentage of people reporting that they had no 
religion grew from 16.8% to 26.1% (9.7 million up to 16.0 million). 
 
 A decline in Christianity – the percentage of people identifying as Christian 
reduced from 70.1% to 58.8% (40.2 million down to 36.1 million). 
 
 A growth in minority faith communities, particularly Muslims – the percentage of 
people in all the other main non-Christian religions except the Jewish 
population grew, with the number of Muslims growing most, by 72% (from 2.8% 
to 4.5% of the population or 1.6 million up to 2.8 million), illustrated below. 
 
Non-Christian religions in Great Britain, changes between 2001 and 2011 
 
Source: Census 2011 and 2001 
3.11. It is important to note, as many have pointed out to us, that while the 72% 
growth in the Muslim population in Great Britain 
between 2001 and 2011 has been the most 
significant increase in any faith community, Muslims 
are religiously and ethnically diverse, including 
people from Sunni, Shia and Ahmadi 
denominations and originating from South Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa, among many other regions 
and countries – and with just under half of British 
Muslims born in the UK.  The majority of Muslims in 
the UK belong to the Sunni denomination, while the 
two largest ethnic groups within the overall Muslim 
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population in England and Wales are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins, 
accounting for around 38% and 15% of Muslims in England and Wales 
respectively14.  
 
Sexuality 
 
3.12. There has been an increase in self-identification as lesbian, gay or bisexual 
over time.  
 
3.13. There are well known difficulties with surveys of sexuality, with many thought 
to be reluctant to acknowledge their own sexuality in a survey if they are not open 
about it with friends or family.  So while Treasury actuaries have estimated that 
around 6% of the population is gay lesbian or bisexual, the Office for National 
Statistics’ Integrated Household Study in 2014 produced a survey figure of just 1.6% 
for the UK population.  Within this, there were differences in identification levels 
between age groups; with only 0.6% of over 65s identifying as gay, lesbian or 
bisexual compared to 2.6% of 16-24 year olds, and 2.2% of 25 – 35 year olds15.  
While survey figures have remained relatively stable at around 1.5% since 201016, 
the comparatively higher figure among the under-50s suggests that open 
identification might increase over the foreseeable future.    
 
Sexual Identity by age, UK 2014 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics Integrated Household Survey, 2014 
3.14. Highlighting the trend towards non-heterosexual identification, a 2015 YouGov 
poll17 measured the scale of identification between hetero- and homo-sexual, 
suggesting that 49% of people aged 18-24 identified as ‘something other than 100% 
heterosexual’, compared to 23% of the general population (across all ages).  
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Immigration 
 
3.15. Immigration is undoubtedly a key factor influencing many of the demographic 
changes we are seeing in our population today and the scale and pace of change 
has increased in recent years. 
 
3.16. Britain is, of course, used to immigration.  It has a long history of immigration 
through the Roman Empire and subsequent Anglo-Saxon, Viking and Norman 
invasions and migrations.  Since the end of the Second World War, immigration 
patterns have been driven mainly by British nationality law – in particular from the 
Republic of Ireland and from former colonies and territories of the British Empire 
such as the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and parts of Africa - together 
with labour market gaps.  More recently, other migrants have come as asylum 
seekers under refugee conventions or from member states of the expanding 
European Union under rights of free movement.   
 
3.17. For much of the 20th century, the number of people leaving the UK and the 
number of immigrants arriving were roughly in balance.  Over the last two decades, 
however, total immigration (people coming to live in the UK) has doubled - from 
around 300,000 per year prior to 1997 to just over 
600,000 in 2014-15.  Emigration (those leaving) 
has fluctuated to a greater extent since the 1990s 
but has remained significantly lower than 
immigration, which has meant a net immigration 
figure (adding to the population) of just under or 
just over 200,000 each year since 2004, rising to 
more than 300,000 in 2014 and 201518. 
 
3.18. A focus on the net migration figure can, 
however, obscure the total impact of migration on population change, or the extent to 
which the public may notice such change.  For example, in the year ending 
December 2015, we experienced a net addition to our population through migration 
of 333,000 people – around 0.5% of the UK population.  But this net figure reflected 
630,000 people arriving intending to live here for more than a year, and at the same 
time around 297,000 leaving to live abroad for more than a year19.  Taken together, 
927,000 people arrived or left the country in a 
year.  Therefore, the impact on the population of 
this total ‘churn’ is and can feel considerably 
greater than a net figure of 333,000 or 0.5% of 
the population might suggest.  
 
3.19. Of the 630,000 arriving, 270,000 were from 
the European Union and 277,000 came from non-
EU countries.  A further 83,000 were British 
nationals returning to the UK having lived abroad 
for more than a year.  While of the 297,000 
leaving, 123,000 were British citizens, 85,000 
were EU citizens and 89,000 were non-EU 
citizens20. 
 
Over the last two 
decades, however, total 
immigration has doubled. 
A focus on the net 
migration figure can, 
however, obscure the 
total impact of 
migration… the impact on 
the population of this 
total ‘churn’ is and can 
feel considerably 
greater… 
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3.20. The nation is experiencing both net emigration of British citizens (higher 
numbers of British citizens leaving each year than are returning) and net immigration 
of EU and non-EU citizens (higher numbers arriving each year than leaving).  It is not 
just the arrival of immigrants, but the churn of both British citizens leaving and EU 
and non-EU citizens arriving (together with demographic changes such as ageing in 
the existing population) that plays through into changing characteristics of our 
population. 
 
Total migration in the UK in year ending December 2015 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Quarterly report: May 2016 
 
3.21. Over the last four years, the number of EU immigrants has increased 
significantly, while the number of non-EU immigrants has decreased slightly – 
although there remained a higher number of non-EU immigrants than EU immigrants 
arriving each year. 
 
3.22. According to Home Office research21 (2012), 
migration of EU citizens had up to that point tended to 
be more circular than that of non-EU citizens – in 
other words, EU nationals  tended to come to Britain 
but then return home to a greater extent (reflecting 
greater ‘freedom of movement’ rights and lower 
distances and travel costs).   
 
3.23. Conversely, non-EU nationals coming to Britain 
other than for study were more likely than Europeans 
to settle permanently.  And among non-Europeans 
coming to Britain between 1991 and 2010, those from 
the ‘New Commonwealth’ countries, particularly India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, were much more likely to stay permanently compared to 
migrants from ‘Old Commonwealth’ countries such as Australia and New Zealand. 
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3.24. Of the 125,653 people granted citizenship in 201422, the five largest 
nationalities were Indian, Pakistani, Nigerian, South African and Bangladeshi.  Indian 
and Pakistani nationalities accounted for around a quarter of all people granted 
citizenship, while all five nationalities accounted for nearly half.  In 2015, the top four 
nationalities remained unchanged, while Polish overtook Bangladeshi as the fifth 
largest23. 
 
3.25. While this rise in Polish people granted citizenship might result simply from a 
growing number who have been in Britain long enough to qualify for citizenship, it 
also supports a growing view that the ‘circularity’ of EU migration (people coming to 
work for a few years then returning) may be 
reducing, with a growing number of eastern 
European workers now settling in the UK with 
families.  Professor Louise Ryan of Middlesex 
University has been conducting qualitative 
research among Polish communities in London 
and has found that while most migrants initially 
arrive intending to stay only for a short period, an 
increasing number are choosing to stay for 
longer periods (initially on an ‘another year and 
another year’ basis) and often settle more 
permanently after establishing relationships or putting children into school24.  Our 
visits during the review to areas experiencing high levels of EU immigration - for 
example in Boston, Lincolnshire – leant weight to this pattern.  
 
Immigration for family/marriage reasons 
 
3.26. There is a variety of reasons why people come to the UK, and differences in 
how long they stay in the country, with those coming to join family far more likely to 
settle permanently.   
 
 There are large numbers of students arriving each year (192,000 in the year to 
June 2015)25 but analysis of administrative records for migrants granted visas 
in 2009 shows that only 17% of those granted student visas had achieved 
permanent settlement or valid leave to remain after five years, while just 1% did 
so within five years.   
 
 Of those who originally came to the UK on a skilled work visa, 25% had 
achieved permanent settlement, while a further 10% had valid leave to 
remain26.  
 
3.27. In contrast with these more temporary forms of immigration for study and 
work, 81% of those granted family visas appeared to have legal leave to remain five 
years after arrival, with 77% having achieved permanent settlement27. 
 
3.28. Pakistan, India, the United States, Bangladesh and China have accounted for 
the highest numbers of spouse/partner visas issued in recent years.  The data for 
2013 shows a predominance of wives or fiancées by nearly 3 to 1 over husbands or 
fiancés entering via spouse/partner visas28.  
 
…the ‘circularity’ of EU 
migration (people coming 
to work for a few years 
then returning) may be 
reducing… 
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3.29. David Goodhart from Policy Exchange has highlighted the creation of a ‘first 
generation in every generation’ phenomenon 
resulting from the high number of transnational 
marriages – with second, third and subsequent 
generations being joined by a foreign born 
partner, and children in each new generation 
growing up with a foreign born parent29, which 
may be acting as a bar to integration in some 
communities.  It came up regularly in meetings in 
some areas as a reason for the strong 
perpetuation of foreign cultural practices and 
lower levels of English language proficiency.   We 
were told in a review visit that in one northern 
town all except one of the Councillors of Asian ethnicity (all men) had married a wife 
from Pakistan. 
 
3.30. A number of estimates have been made around the prevalence of 
transnational marriages among the Pakistani ethnic community in particular: 
 
 A study by Bristol University found that half of British Pakistanis married back in 
Pakistan, and that most of these marriages were between cousins or other 
members of extended kin groups30. 
 
 In a cohort study, ‘Born in Bradford’, at the Bradford Royal Infirmary, 80% of 
babies of Pakistani ethnicity born in the area had at least one parent born 
outside the United Kingdom, 63% of mothers of Pakistani ethnicity were 
married to cousins and these mothers were less likely to be educated or in 
employment compared with mothers of Pakistani descent who had not married 
cousins31. 
 
3.31. In 2012, the Government introduced a new requirement that British citizens 
and permanent residents should meet an income threshold of £18,600 (higher if 
there are accompanying children) before being allowed to bring a partner into the UK 
from outside the EU, which it expected to result in fewer partners coming to the 
United Kingdom. The number of migrants being given leave to enter the United 
Kingdom to join family has decreased in recent years (from 70,119 in 2006 to 37,859 
in 2015)32.  
 
3.32. While this reduction is seen as a policy success, challenges remain – for 
example, there are concerns that some British citizens get around the restrictions by 
moving to a European country where they meet up with a foreign (non-EU) born 
spouse and, after living in Europe for a short period, return together to Britain under 
European Union rights of free-movement.  There are also concerns about sham 
marriages and use of false or misrepresentative documents to demonstrate co-
habitation. 
 
Asylum seekers 
  
3.33. The UK also accommodates a varying number of asylum seekers each year.  
Following the introduction of new border controls and restrictions on appeals from 
…a ‘first generation in 
every generation’ 
phenomenon… may be 
acting as a bar to 
integration in some 
communities. 
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applicants from some countries, the number of asylum claims in the UK fell from a 
peak of 84,132 in 2002 to a 20-year low of 17,916 in 2010, but has been rising again 
since then, reaching 32,414 in 201533. 
 
3.34. Asylum seekers are generally not eligible to work, and have no access to 
public funds or services, while awaiting a decision on their claim for asylum. 
However, if they are destitute and/or homeless, they can apply for financial 
subsistence (£36.95 per person per week) and/or accommodation on a no-choice 
dispersal basis34 to areas where housing costs are cheaper.  
 
3.35. The length of time that an individual remains an asylum seeker varies 
depending on the complexity of the case. The Home Office suggests that applicants 
should be able to expect a decision within six months35; although more complex 
cases may take longer.  The result is a concentration of asylum seekers in less 
affluent areas of the country.   
 
Illegal immigration 
 
3.36. While difficult to estimate, the presence of illegal immigrants also has an 
impact on communities and on public attitudes towards immigration. 
 
3.37. Illegal immigrants are generally non-EU 
nationals who have either entered the country 
illegally (for example being smuggled in a lorry) or 
entered legally (for example through a short term 
visa or as an asylum applicant) but who have 
remained after the expiry of a visa or a decision to 
reject an asylum claim.  EU migrants do not have 
an unconditional right to be in the UK and can 
become illegal immigrants if, after three months, 
they are not exercising treaty rights. 
 
3.38. Estimates of the illegal immigrant population in the UK range from 460,000 
(an estimate produced for the Home Office using a ‘residual method’ adapted from 
the United States, in which an estimated number of foreign born residents in the UK 
legally is deducted from the total number of foreign born residents recorded in the 
2001 Census36) to 1.1 million (Migration Watch, 2010).  The reintroduction of exit 
checks for all scheduled commercial international air, sea and rail routes from April 
2015 might improve future attempts to estimate levels of illegal immigration. 
 
3.39. Enforcement action is taken to remove illegal immigrants, although the 
number returned each year to their home countries using public funds is relatively 
low (just over 16,000 per year on average between 2008 and 2012).  Out of a total of 
88,865 illegal immigrants returned to 180 different countries between January 2008 
and June 2013, more than half were returned to just ten countries: India (8,570), 
Pakistan (8,180), China (6,085), Afghanistan (6,035), Nigeria (5,610), Brazil (5,905), 
Bangladesh (3,705), Vietnam (3,105), Jamaica (2,960) and Iraq (2,800)37.   
 
 
 
Estimates of the illegal 
immigrant population in 
the UK range from 
460,000 to 1.1 million. 
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Birth rates  
 
3.40. Birth rates among foreign-born residents are higher proportionately than those 
of UK-born residents.  Office for National Statistics data on live births in England and 
Wales in 201438 show a growing percentage of 
births to mothers born outside the UK (up 1.4% 
from 2013) and a decrease in the percentage 
born to UK-born mothers (down 1.1%), as well as 
a higher fertility rate for foreign-born mothers 
(2.09 compared with 1.76 for UK-born mothers).  
More than a quarter (27%) of births in 2014 were 
to mothers born outside the UK – the highest 
percentage since this information was first 
collected in 1969.  Poland was the most common 
country of birth for foreign-born mothers between 
2010 and 2014, followed by Pakistan and India, while Pakistan was the most 
common country of birth for foreign-born fathers between 2008 and 2014, followed 
by Poland and India.  In the London Borough of Newham, more than three quarters 
(76.7%) of births were to foreign-born mothers in 2014 (the highest percentage for 
any local authority in the UK). 
 
Overall population change 
 
3.41. So, when birth rates are taken into account, the total impact of migration has 
altered the make-up and diversity of our population even more significantly between 
2001 and 2011, with:  
 
 the total population of the United Kingdom increasing by 4.1 million39; 
 
 the White British population shrinking40; 
 
 ethnic minority groups growing (most notably, Polish, Indian and Pakistani)41; 
 
 an increase in people not belonging to any religion42; 
 
 the Christian population reducing and the Jewish population staying the same 
size, while other main religions, most notably the Muslim population, grew43; 
and 
 
 the population aging as a whole but with the growing ethnic minority population 
generally having a younger age profile44. 
 
3.42. With such notable and rapid change, it is not surprising that many 
communities are feeling the impact of immigration to a greater extent and that this is 
playing out in wider public attitudes towards immigration.  
 
  
…when birth rates are 
taken into account, the 
total impact of migration 
has altered the make-up 
and diversity of Britain 
even more significantly. 
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Impact on communities of higher immigration 
 
3.43. Historically, most migration to the UK has been to England.  This remains the 
case today, with 88% of the 632,000 immigrants in 2014 arriving in England, 6% in 
Scotland, 4% in Wales and 2% in Northern Ireland (roughly in line with existing 
proportions of the UK population across the four countries)45. 
 
3.44. Post-war immigration from Commonwealth and other countries was 
encouraged to fill labour market shortages and settlement often reflected this – 
tending towards major cities and towns where industry needed workers.  
 
3.45. Recent immigration has been on a more significant scale, albeit less 
organised or encouraged, with immigrants (apart from asylum seekers and refugees) 
making their own arrival and settlement arrangements, and communities and local 
authorities and services adapting to the changes going on in their areas.  While there 
is plenty of evidence and plenty to say about the 
positive impact of immigration to the economy 
and culture of Great Britain, these aspects were 
not what responses to the review questions 
brought out. 
 
3.46. Changes in immigration, particularly the 
significant increase in migrants from the EU, are 
changing the picture of settlement of migrants in 
the UK.  In 2014, most migrants arrived in 
London (178,000) but the next most significant 
areas for migrant arrival were the East and South 
East (70,000 in each), ahead of the North West 
(55,000)46.  Analysis by the Home Office 
suggests that 50% of the population of England 
and Wales is now living in areas that are 
experiencing relatively high migration flows47. 
 
3.47. Some areas such as Herefordshire and 
East Cambridgeshire have seen large numbers of migrants from countries that have 
joined the EU more recently settling due to the availability of manufacturing and 
agricultural jobs.     
 
3.48. The drive to provide cheaper accommodation for asylum seekers being 
supported by taxpayers has led to larger proportions being dispersed in poorer 
areas, resulting in some places such as Middlesbrough and Glasgow taking higher 
numbers than other towns and cities48.  In turn, we heard during the review that this 
increases local feelings of unfairness over pressure on housing and other resources 
and can exacerbate community tensions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent immigration has 
been on a more 
significant scale, albeit 
less organised or 
encouraged, with 
immigrants making their 
own arrival and 
settlement arrangements, 
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local authorities and 
services adapting to the 
changes going on in their 
areas. 
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Typology of migration clusters for local authorities in England & Wales, 2013
 
3.49. In submissions to the review and during our visits, a number of local 
authorities raised integration issues related to the relatively sudden emergence of 
new communities in their areas, particularly Polish and other Eastern Europeans, for 
which they had not been prepared and for which they did not feel resourced.  A few 
also cited the pressures they faced in their communities as a result of high numbers 
of asylum seeker placements and refugees.  Others were concerned with highly 
concentrated mono-religious and/or mono-ethnic communities becoming increasingly 
separated from the existing or wider community. 
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3.50. In a review visit to Sheffield, we saw the issues faced by the local authority 
and the community following a sudden growth in a Roma community in the city.  The 
Council estimated that around 6,000 Roma and 
other Eastern European people now reside in 
Sheffield, predominantly in the Page Hall area of 
the city, with 53% under 17 years old.  This is 
creating pressure on schools, with an estimated 
increase in Eastern European children from 150 
to almost 2,500 in the space of four to five years.  
A head teacher told us that educational 
attainment gaps against the Sheffield average are 
huge, with only 8.9% of Roma children reading 
and 3.5% writing at Key Stage 1, compared to 
80.1% reading and 70.3% writing among the 
general population.  Community tensions are also 
arising over alleged practices such as fly tipping 
and benefit fraud.  Clive Betts, MP for Sheffield South East, described to the House 
of Commons in 2014 how many Roma immigrants are themselves scammed on 
arrival. He said: 
 
“They are given a package: they are offered a deal whereby when they obtain 
jobs, which are mostly unskilled and low paid, those who give them the jobs take 
money from their pay packets and use it to pay the rents for the often grossly 
overcrowded housing they are given…. That scam is going on…49” 
 
Social housing and homelessness 
 
3.51. Analysis of Core social housing lettings data, set out below, suggests that 
lettings to new tenants slightly under-represent foreign nationals (which might be 
expected given eligibility restrictions for foreign nationals’ access to social housing), 
and slightly over-represent non-White households: 
 
Proportion of new social rent lettings1 by nationality and ethnicity, 07/08 -14/15 
 
 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 % of total 
population 
in 
England 
in 2011 
UK Nationals 93% 93% 92% 91% 91% 90% 89% 89% 86% 
Foreign 
nationals 
7% 7% 8% 9% 9% 10% 11% 11% 14% 
White 84% 83% 84% 82% 82% 82% 83% 83% 85% 
Non White 16% 17% 16% 18% 18% 18% 17% 17% 15% 
 
Source: Social housing lettings in England, 2014/15: COntinuous REcording (CORE) data, 2011 
Census, 1 New social rent lettings includes General Needs Social rent lettings 
3.52. There has been some debate about the impact of choice-based lettings, 
introduced in most local authority areas over the last 15 to 20 years, with a study 
undertaken by the Centre for Housing Research at the University of St Andrews in 
…local authorities raised 
integration issues related 
to the relatively sudden 
emergence of new 
communities in their 
areas, particularly Polish 
and other Eastern 
Europeans… 
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201150 finding that choice based lettings had led to greater segregation of ethnic 
minority communities in deprived areas.   
 
3.53. On the ground, people in established 
communities see more housing being allocated to 
‘newcomers’ from different backgrounds.  Some 
local authorities have responded to these concerns 
by strengthening prioritisation criteria around ‘local 
connection’ to the area when allocating social 
housing.  But this is only one of a range of criteria 
and the vulnerability of applicants (assessed 
against ‘reasonable preference’ categories such as 
homelessness or overcrowding) will often outweigh 
local connection.  The feeling of unfairness over 
who gets priority for housing can also be fed by:  
 
 the use of former council housing (sold under the Right to Buy and 
subsequently turned into privately rented housing, but probably still regarded by 
local communities as social housing) being let to immigrant and ethnic minority 
households who themselves might not be eligible or have sufficient priority for 
social housing, and who are unable to buy their own homes; 
 
 use of former social or private sector housing that has been contracted to 
accommodate asylum seekers or statutorily homeless households; or 
 
 the illegal sub-letting of social housing.   
 
3.54. People from ethnic minorities and foreign nationals are disproportionately 
represented, and increasingly so, in homelessness cases dealt with by local 
authorities, which have implications for who gets priority for social housing.  Ethnic 
minority households made up 34% of all statutory homelessness acceptances by 
local authorities in England in 2015-16 (up from 25% in 2008-09) and 18% of 
homelessness acceptances were foreign nationals – around half from European 
Economic Area countries51, more than double the number in 2009-1052.  
 
3.55. The number of people sleeping on the streets of the UK has been increasing 
in recent years, particularly in London.  The number of rough sleepers in the Capital 
from Central and Eastern European countries has risen from 6% of all people 
sleeping rough (104 individuals) in 2005-0653 to 36.8% (2,924 individuals) in 2015-
1654.  Pressures exist in other parts of the country too, including Manchester, 
Derbyshire and Peterborough.   
 
3.56. Rough sleeping impacts on communities and places significant pressures on 
local authorities and other agencies.  The longer these individuals spend sleeping 
rough, the more likely they are to develop complex needs (such as substance 
misuse) and face increased difficulties in finding suitable accommodation or 
returning home.   
 
 
 
…people in established 
communities see more 
housing being allocated 
to ‘newcomers’ from 
different backgrounds. 
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Funding for local services 
 
3.57. The rate of change of immigration is not factored in to local authority funding 
allocations from the Department for Communities and Local Government.  
 
3.58. Funding for local authorities comes from a mix of central government grants, 
council tax and business rates.  The Government’s policy has been to move towards 
greater self-sufficiency for local government, with less reliance on central grant, and 
more incentives for economic growth and house building.  The assessment of 
relative needs and local resources that underlies the calculation of the grant and 
redistribution of business rates was fixed in 2013-14 as part of this objective, with an 
expectation that there would be a ‘reset’ of this system in 2020.  Some of the data 
that this assessment was based on, including population, is based only on 
projections from the 2011 Census.   
 
3.59. In February 2016, the Government announced the Fair Funding Review.  This 
will consider what the needs assessment formula should be in a world in which local 
government spending is funded by local resources not central grant from the end of 
the current Parliament.  It will look at how needs could be measured differently, and 
how often they should be reassessed.  A discussion paper on this was published in 
July 2016, alongside a consultation on the overall local government finance 
reforms55. 
 
3.60. We recognise that there is a balance to be struck between giving local 
authorities long-term certainty about their finances and their being able to respond to 
unexpected spending pressures.  We hope that this, and the particular impact of 
immigration in some areas, will be considered as part of the Government’s Fair 
Funding Review and would urge local authorities to engage with this process.  Better 
and more timely information about local population change feels an essential factor.  
We also note that, although relatively small in size, the new Controlling Migration 
Fund will have a role to play here. 
 
3.61. Education funding could be seen as more adaptable to changes in population 
size.  Local authorities are under a statutory duty to provide sufficient school places, 
and they retain autonomy over forecasting for this.  Forecasts are reported annually 
through the School Capacity Survey (SCAP) and are used as the basis for capital 
allocations.  
 
3.62. However, the Department for Education’s understanding of the impact of 
immigration on education appears inconclusive56.  They do not make explicit 
assessment of changes to school populations or resource implications for individual 
schools; although a study submitted by the Department to this review did note that:  
 
 the population of non-UK born children was increasing, though the exact figure 
was unknown; 
 
 any additional strain on education services is difficult to quantify; but might 
include a need for extra classroom resources, teacher training, administrative 
resources, and school places;  
 
The rate of change of 
immigration is not 
factored in to local 
authority funding 
allocations 
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 benefits of migration on education are similarly under-researched but could 
include boosting pupil numbers in under-subscribed schools, enriching cultural 
experiences, and attracting extra school investment; and 
  
 slightly lower attainment levels may be apparent in immigrant children, but 
these appear to level out by the age of 16. 
 
3.63. So while rapid change is evident to local communities and services who 
experience it, the data and evidence available to central and local government to 
influence funding and policy decisions often feels out of date and insufficient.  More 
needs to be done to connect the up-to-date evidence and views held by local 
communities and service providers with central Government decision-making, 
including projections of demands and impacts on services at a much more 
sophisticated level. 
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Settlement patterns and segregation 
 
3.64. Immigration and a growing ethnic minority population are inevitably leading to 
a greater dispersal of people from ethnic minority 
groups across the country, creating more diverse 
areas and less segregation over the population as 
a whole.  At the same time, however, there are a 
number of local areas where minority ethnic and 
faith communities are increasing in both 
concentration and segregation.  In this context, 
concentration is the total proportion of a particular 
faith or ethnic group living within a wider area, 
regardless of the degree to which they are 
distributed in relation to other groups; while 
segregation is the extent to which households from 
a particular ethnic or faith group live side by side 
with others from the same background within an area. 
 
3.65. Historical patterns of immigration and settlement can still be seen strongly in 
the geographical spread of ethnic minority populations across the country today.  
 
Map: Percentage population in electoral wards from an ethnic minority 
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3.66. Ethnic minorities are predominantly urban: 
 
 In 2011, 79% of White British people lived in urban areas compared to 99% of 
the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations, 98% of Black African, Black 
Caribbean and Arab and 97% of the Indian ethnic population57.  
 
 Half of Britain’s ethnic minority population 
lived in three English cities – London, 
Birmingham and Manchester58.   
 
 In Glasgow, 12% of the population was from a 
minority ethnic group, in Edinburgh and 
Aberdeen it was 8%, and in Dundee it was 6% 
(compared to 4% for Scotland as a whole).  
These areas also saw the largest increases in 
Scotland between 2001 and 2011 in the 
proportion of their population who are from 
minority ethnic groups59.   
 
 In Wales, ethnic minority groups are more heavily concentrated in Cardiff 
(15%), Newport (10%) and Swansea (6%), compared to 4% across Wales as a 
whole60. 
 
Smaller area concentration 
 
3.67. Between the 2001 and 2011 Census, people from ethnic and faith minority 
groups represented a substantial proportion of the population in an increasing 
number of local authority areas, with:  
 
 Ethnicity:  around 10% (32 out of 326) of local authorities in England in 2011 
comprising a 40% or more non-White British population, up from 6% of local 
authorities in 200161; and 
 
 Faith:  5 local authorities in 2011 with more than 40% of the population 
belonging to a minority faith, compared to 1 local authority in 200162. 
 
3.68. While it is not possible to make exact comparisons between ward populations 
over time – because of frequent boundary changes – there seems to be a growing 
concentration of ethnic and faith minority groups at that more local spatial level: 
 
 Ethnicity:  In 2011, 682 electoral wards within 88 local authorities in England 
comprised more than 40% non-White British residents; up from 404 wards in 58 
local authorities in 200163.  
 
 Ethnicity:  In 17 of these wards, 90% of the population was non-White British, 
compared to just 1 ward in 200164.  
 
Half of Britain’s 
ethnic minority 
population lived in 
three English cities – 
London, Birmingham 
and Manchester. 
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 Faith:  There were 178 electoral wards within 44 local authorities in which more 
than 40% of the population belonged to a minority religion in 2011, compared to 
107 wards within 31 local authorities in 200165. 
 
 Faith:  In 4 of those wards the proportion belonging to a minority religion in 
2011 was more than 80%; no wards had such high concentrations in 200166. 
 
3.69. Analysis of Census data using the Index of 
Dissimilarity (a demographic measure of the 
evenness of distribution of ethnic groups across 
neighbourhoods within a larger geographical area) 
indicates more spreading out and less residential 
segregation overall of ethnic minority populations, 
reflecting the growing diversity of the nation as a 
whole67.  The exceptions to this are the Chinese 
population (likely to be explained by student 
migration into University towns and cities)68.  The 
analysis also identifies the relative levels of 
segregation between ethnic groups, as set out in the graph below69.  This shows 
that: 
 
 levels of residential segregation are highest for Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
ethnic populations relative to other ethnic groups; 
 
 while Pakistani ethnic groups’ segregation levels as a whole declined between 
1991 and 2001, there has been no reduction since 2001; 
 
 Black African ethnic groups’ segregation reduced the most compared to other 
ethnic groups between 2001 and 2011. 
 
Ethnic group residential segregation in England and Wales, for wards, 1991-2011  
 
 
Source: Catney, 2015 
White, 60 
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Indian, 64 
Indian, 57 
Pakistani, 74 
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Bangladeshi, 73 
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Black African, 59 
Black Caribbean, 68 
Black Caribbean, 62 
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1991 2001 2011
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3.70. Despite the overall decreases in residential segregation suggested by this 
analysis, there are a notable number of wards where high concentrations of ethnic 
and faith minority groups have increased since 2001, even accepting that there 
would be some impact from boundary changes.   
 
3.71. The most significant increases in minority ethnic ward-level concentrations 
have been among Pakistani and Indian ethnic 
groups.  In 2011 there were: 
 
 24 wards in 12 local authority areas 
where more than 40% of the population 
were of Pakistani ethnicity; up from 12 
wards within 7 authorities in 200170. 
 
 20 wards in 8 local authorities where 
more than 40% of the population were of 
Indian ethnicity; up from 16 wards within 
6 authorities in 200171.  
 
3.72. The greatest increases for minority faith ward level concentrations have been 
among Muslim faith groups.  In 2011 there were: 
 
 69 wards in 24 local authorities where more than 40% of the population 
identified as Muslim; up from 36 wards within16 authorities in 200172.  
 
 9 wards in 4 local authorities where more than 70% of the population identified 
as Muslim, with one ward over 85%, up from 2001 when just two wards in one 
authority were over 70% Muslim73.  
 
3.73. In total, by 2011 there were 42 wards across 16 local authorities where a 
minority faith or ethnic community had become a local majority of more than 50%, 
with the ten areas of highest concentration listed below: 
 
Ward Local authority Predominant 
faith/ethnic 
groups 
Percentage 
concentrations 
Bastwell Blackburn with 
Darwen 
Muslim/Pakistani 85.3 / 46.3 
Latimer Leicester Indian/Hindu 79.2 / 70.9 
Shear Brow Blackburn with 
Darwen 
Muslim/Indian 77.7 / 54.7 
Washwood Heath Birmingham Muslim/Pakistani 77.3 / 57.0 
Daneshouse with 
Stone 
Burnley Muslim/Pakistani 76.3 / 48.8 
Toller Bradford Muslim/Pakistani 76.1 / 72.3 
Manningham Bradford Muslim/Pakistani 75.0 / 60.3 
Bordesley Green Birmingham Muslim/Pakistani 73.9 / 50.9 
Bradford Moor Bradford Muslim/Pakistani 72.8 / 63.9 
Whitefield Pendle Pakistani/Muslim 70.3 / 69.8 
Source: 2011 Census 
The most significant increases in 
minority ethnic ward-level 
concentrations have been among 
Pakistani and Indian ethnic 
groups… greatest increases for 
minority faith ward-level 
concentrations have been among 
Muslim faith groups. 
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3.74. There were no wards in which any other single minority ethnic or faith group 
other than Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi ethnic groups or Muslim or Hindu faith 
groups exceeded 50% of the ward population, and only 1 where such concentration 
exceeded 40% (Kersal in Salford, with 41% of the population of Jewish faith).  It 
should be noted that this analysis is based on Census data, the most recent of which 
come from 2011.  So, while the analysis picks out the areas with the largest minority 
group concentrations in the 2011 data, it is possible that these and other groups will 
have grown in size since then at local levels.  While the predominance of Pakistani, 
Indian, Bangladeshi ethnic and Muslim faith concentrations was evident in many 
areas we visited during the review, the growth of newer Eastern European 
communities also stood out in a number of areas, mentioned earlier.  
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Segregation in schools 
 
3.75. Schools vary in the extent to which they are representative of local 
populations in terms of different characteristics such as social class, ethnicity or 
religion.  In its 2012 report, Education at a Glance, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), found that the UK had unusually high levels 
of segregation with poorer and immigrant pupils concentrated in the same schools 
rather than being more evenly distributed.  Among the children of immigrant families, 
80% were in schools with high concentrations of other immigrant or disadvantaged 
pupils (based on 2010 data)74. 
 
3.76. In Britain, the ethnic minority population generally has a younger age profile 
than the wider population.  So, while we know from the Census that, in 2011, 19% of 
the population as a whole were from an ethnic minority background, the Department 
for Education’s census of “Schools, pupils and their characteristics: January 2016” 
found that 31.4% of primary pupils, and 27.9% of secondary pupils, came from 
ethnic minority origins75.  
 
3.77. Demos76 found that, in 2013, more than 50% of ethnic minority students were 
in schools where ethnic minorities were the majority.  Demos looked at segregation 
between White British pupils and all other ethnic groups and found wide variation by 
local area, using the Index of Dissimilarity.  Like the residential index mentioned in 
the preceding section of this chapter, this measures the percentage of White British 
or ethnic minority pupils in an area who would have to move schools in order for the 
ethnic make-up of each school in the area to represent the overall population of 
pupils in the area.  Using this index, Demos77 found the top ten areas in which the 
ethnicity of school populations were most out of kilter with the overall population of 
school aged children in the area (in other words, with disproportionately high levels 
of ethnic concentration in particular schools) were: 
 
Local Authority Dissimilarity Index Score 
Blackburn with Darwen 63.6% 
Birmingham 58.9% 
Haringey 57.4% 
Bradford 57.0% 
Rochdale 56.4% 
Kirklees 53.3% 
Leicester 52.8% 
Oldham 52.5% 
Rotherham 51.5% 
Manchester 51.1% 
 
Source: Demos Integration hub 
 
3.78. The Demos78 study found that children from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic 
backgrounds were more segregated in their schooling than other ethnic minorities.  
In their study, Demos also found that: 
 
“Levels of school segregation relative to all other ethnic minorities tend to be 
highest among Bangladeshi (ID=0.74) and Pakistani students (ID=0.74). Black 
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Caribbeans also have a high level of segregation (0.71). For Indians, the level of 
segregation at year 11 stands at 0.66 which is roughly the same score for Black 
Africans. For Chinese and White Others it stands at 0.59 and 0.45.79” 
 
3.79. Several of the local authority areas identified by Demos as having high levels 
of segregation in schools (in the table above) include electoral wards with high 
concentrations of residents from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups: 
 
 72% of residents in Toller (Bradford), 59% of residents of Milkstone and 
Deeplish (Rochdale), 58% of residents of Washwood Heath (Birmingham) and 
57% of Bordesley Green (Birmingham), identified as being of Pakistani ethnicity 
in 201180.  
 
 60% of residents in Coldhurst (Oldham) identified as being of Bangladeshi 
ethnicity81.   
 
3.80. Further evidence from the Department for Education showed that in January 
2015: 
 there were 390 state funded primary schools with 50% or more pupils of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and 36 with 90% or more82; 
 
 there were 81 state funded secondary schools with 50% or more pupils of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and 4 with 90% or more83. 
 
3.81. These 511 schools are distributed across 43 local authority areas, many of 
which overlap with the same areas Demos have identified as having high levels of 
segregation.   
 
Causes and consequences 
 
3.82. The degree of segregation or ethnic concentration in schools appears to be a 
product of where people live, family size, parental and pupil choice and admissions 
policies: 
 
 Most children do not travel very far to school.  At primary schools, the average 
distance travelled by pupils is 1.6 miles, while at secondary schools, it is 3.4 
miles84.   
 
 People from similar backgrounds may make similar choices and there is some 
evidence that people look for alternatives to their nearest schools if their child 
would be in a minority.  There is a school in the north of Oldham with a large 
majority of pupils of Bangladeshi ethnicity, despite the area having a majority 
White British population, with Bangladeshi pupils travelling to it from more 
central parts of Oldham and White British children travelling elsewhere. 
 
 It is hard to disentangle admissions policies from parental choice but, where 
faith schools are over-subscribed and where children of faith come from 
particular groups (usually minority faith groups including Muslim, Sikh and 
Hindu), admission policies do seem to play a role in reinforcing ethnic 
concentrations. 
…over 50% of ethnic 
minority students were in 
schools where ethnic 
minorities were the 
majority. 
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3.83. Because there is varying performance across schools it is difficult to identify 
the impact that segregation in schools might be 
having on educational attainment at GCSE level, 
and the data available does not capture attainment 
levels for children who are being educated outside 
the school system – for example those being home 
educated or in unregistered, illegal ‘schools’.  There 
is, however, evidence – discussed in chapter 4 – 
that contact with young people from different 
backgrounds promotes better understanding and 
more positive views, leading to less anxiety, fear, 
prejudice and discrimination between people from 
different backgrounds; and that inter-ethnic contact 
and networks can improve employment outcomes. 
 
3.84. Local authorities (for example, in Luton, Preston and Slough) who felt schools 
in their area already had high levels of ethnic, faith and/or gender segregation sought 
to resist applications for new schools that they felt would worsen this.  They reported 
poor success in the past in influencing decisions by the Department for Education to 
approve such new applications.  Although local authorities are playing less of a role 
in running individual schools, there remains an important strategic role they should 
be able to play in shaping provision in their areas. 
 
Free schools policy and segregation 
 
3.85. The Free Schools programme is the main route through which public funding 
can now be sought to increase school provision and 
the Government has an ambitious programme to 
support 500 new Free Schools over the life of the 
current Parliament.  More restrictive admissions criteria 
have been applied to new faith-based Free Schools 
than are applied to non-religious Free Schools.  Under 
these rules, where a new faith-based Free School was 
over-subscribed, only 50% of pupils could be selected 
directly on the grounds of their faith.   
 
3.86. The Department for Education does not record 
data on the faith of pupils.  Nevertheless, ethnicity data 
for Free Schools suggests that the criteria have not been having the effect on 
diversity they were intended to, with the use of other admissions policies based on 
siblings or catchment areas, combined with parental choice, allowing more-or-less 
the same selection as 100% faith admissions would have, particularly in minority 
faith schools. 
 
3.87. Analysis of Free Schools’ ethnicity relative to ethnicity in the surrounding area 
(local authority and ward levels) carried out for the review by the Department for 
Education85 showed that: 
 
 Sikh, Muslim and Hindu Free Schools do not seem to be very ethnically diverse 
despite the 50% faith admissions rule – although many are located in wards 
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with a high proportion of minority ethnic pupils and are therefore relatively close 
to the overall ethnic make-up of the local ward. 
 
 Christian Free Schools tend to be close to the ethnicity average for their wards 
and, on this measure, are more ethnically 
diverse than minority faith schools. This does 
not necessarily mean that they are religiously 
diverse – it may reflect the ethnic diversity of 
Christians. 
 
 Church of England and Roman Catholic schools 
were near the average for their localities on 
both proportions of White British pupils and 
Asian pupils, but some ‘other’ minority Christian 
schools had fewer than average Asian pupils. 
 
3.88. When children being educated in segregated 
schools are also growing up in an area where all of 
their neighbours are from the same ethnic and/or 
faith background, it vastly reduces opportunities for 
them to mix with others from different backgrounds.  
It deprives them of the benefits – individually and to 
society as a whole – that are known to derive from mixing with people from different 
backgrounds.   
 
3.89. We were particularly struck by the results of a survey of pupils in a non-faith 
secondary school with a high Asian population which we were told about on a review 
visit.  Pupils had been asked to identify the percentage Asian population of Britain 
and their estimates ranged from 50% to 90% (the actual figure is 7%), presumably 
reflecting their experience in the local community, and a relative lack of knowledge 
about the country as a whole.    
 
3.90. We were presented with a range of strong views on the Free Schools 
admissions cap for faith schools.  These ranged from the abolition of the cap to the 
abolition of faith schools.   
3.91. The New Schools Network recommended abolishing the 50% rule and 
replacing it with a more effective approach which would not deter new provision from 
high-quality groups wishing to establish new schools.  It noted the popularity of faith 
schools among parents, with faith schools receiving more applications per place than 
schools without a religious character and pointed out that faith secondary schools 
are 10% more popular than those that are not based on faith.  The New Schools 
Network’s concern was that the 50% rule did not appear to have succeeded in what 
it set out to achieve.  Free Schools are no more segregated than other state funded 
faith schools which can select up to 100% of pupils on the basis of faith but they are 
not much more integrated either. 
3.92. The Catholic Education Service pointed out to the review that the Catholic 
Church, a long-standing major provider of schools in the UK, has declined to develop 
new schools under the Free Schools programme because of the faith admissions 
criteria, while arguing that it has, traditionally, attracted a more ethnically and socially 
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diverse school population, which aids integration.  They emphasised that the cap 
would impact on Catholic schools more severely than other faith schools:  Catholic 
Schools are popular for Catholic faith as well as other faith and non-faith parents – 
they are likely to be over-subscribed and therefore more often in a position where the 
cap would apply compared to other minority faith schools.   
3.93. The admissions cap also placed pressure on existing Catholic provision.  As 
the Catholic Church felt unable to open new schools, there is increased competition 
for existing Catholic places according to the Catholic Education Service.  This makes 
it harder for those who are not Catholic to gain a place in an existing Catholic school.  
If the Catholic Church was able to participate in the Free Schools programme, it 
would open schools which would meet the increasing demand.  
 
3.94. The British Humanist Association (BHA) and Accord support the abolition of 
state funding for faith schools altogether, saying that such schools play a negative 
role in promoting a cohesive and tolerant society and act as drivers for segregation.  
They view the cap, although imperfect, as sending the right signal from government 
to faith schools on the importance of encouraging integration in the education 
system.  The BHA sees religious selection in the 
school system as contributing to socio-economic 
segregation in society, and recommends that the 
extent to which schools are able to employ it in 
their admission arrangements should be 
gradually reduced until it is phased out 
altogether. 
 
3.95. On the face of these submissions and the 
Department for Education’s analysis for the 
review, the Free Schools policy on admissions 
appears not to have been having a positive effect 
on integration, with new minority faith schools 
being set up and the proportion of minority faith 
schools in areas with existing high levels of 
segregation in schools being allowed to grow.    
 
3.96. And while the admissions cap might send a policy signal about the importance 
of integration and diversity in faith schools, the importance and power of parental 
choice on applications, combined with residential patterns of segregation, means 
that the admissions cap policy was not by itself creating diverse applications or 
admissions in faith schools.  Nor does the policy have any impact on the wider 
number of existing schools in which high levels of segregation are apparent.   
 
3.97. Taking account of all the submissions and evidence we have seen, we 
consider the popularity of faith schools with parents to mean that the abolition of 
state funding for faith schools would be unproductive.  Segregation appears to be at 
its most acute in minority ethnic and minority faith communities and schools, so 
ending state support for all faith schools would be disproportionate. 
 
3.98. The Department for Education is consulting on its intention to remove the 50% 
admissions cap for new faith schools and to replace it with new integration 
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measures.  It is clear to us that radical change and a new approach across all 
schools is required, not just in relation to admissions but also to the fundamentals of 
what is taught in schools to grow tolerant, resilient pupils, capable of reflective, 
critical thinking.  If we can tackle the harmful effects of segregation in schools and 
help build greater resilience in our children today, we can go a long way towards 
breaking the cycle of wider segregation in our communities of tomorrow. 
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4. Social interaction 
Chapter Summary 
 
 Social interactions between people from different backgrounds play a significant 
part in enabling integration and social mobility. 
 
 Where high concentrations of any ethnic or faith group are also segregated, with 
a lack of mixing, there are higher levels of prejudice, greater perceived threat and 
fewer inter-ethnic friendships. 
 
 Despite the benefits of social interactions between people from different 
backgrounds, many groups in society remain relatively segregated, with the 
Social Integration Commission finding that we have fewer social interactions than 
our population mix would suggest we should across ethnicity, age and social 
grade. 
 
 This places a premium on social mixing among young people in schools and in 
wider youth social action initiatives, with evidence that programmes such as the 
National Citizen Service are having a positive impact in improving understanding 
and relationships between young people from different backgrounds. 
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The benefits of meaningful contact and interaction 
 
4.1. In the previous chapter we highlighted the changing nature of the population 
in Britain, becoming more diverse and with an increasing proportion of people from 
ethnic minority backgrounds.  It showed that, as the population and proportion of 
ethnic minorities has increased, they have also become spread more widely across 
the country.  At the same time, however, there has continued to be a concentration 
of some ethnic and faith minority groups in particular areas.  This is evident in the 
schools in those areas and more prevalent among people from Pakistani, Indian and 
Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds and people from Muslim faith backgrounds than 
among people from other ethnic or faith minority groups.   
 
4.2. A relative lack of social mobility may be at play here.  A Centre on Dynamics 
of Ethnicity report86 in 2013 found that 43% of White men and 45.6% of White 
women moved up to a higher socio-economic class than their father.  In contrast, 
first generation men of Black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity had 
significantly lower upward mobility rates. Just 34.3% of first generation men of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and 27.6% of women of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnicity moved up from the socio-economic class of their father.  We 
consider socio-economic factors in more detail later in this report but social 
interactions also have a significant part to play in enabling social mobility. 
 
4.3. There is strong evidence around the benefits that can derive from high levels 
of meaningful contact between people from different backgrounds.  Analysis of the 
academic evidence base and a number of case studies conducted for the review 
suggests that social mixing can: 
 
 reduce prejudice; 
 
 increase trust and understanding between groups (with a knock on effect that 
allows negative perceptions of other groups to be challenged); 
 
 lead to a greater sense of togetherness and common ground; and 
 
 promote resilience to extremist ideologies 
and provide a challenge to dangerous world 
views. 
 
4.4. Whereas, a lack of mixing can: 
 
 reinforce ethnic segregation, even in diverse 
areas; and 
 
 increase community tensions and risk of 
conflict. 
 
4.5. High concentrations of particular ethnic or 
faith groups (and the lower levels of opportunity 
they imply for social mixing between people from different backgrounds) are 
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therefore a cause for concern where they exacerbate disadvantage and lack of 
social mobility, or where they have a negative impact on community cohesion. 
 
4.6. In his submission to the review, James Laurence at the University of 
Manchester drew our attention to new research he is conducting with Professor 
Miles Hewstone to consider how segregation affects community cohesion.  He notes 
that communities with equally high concentrations of minority groups can be either 
highly integrated (where individuals from different groups are evenly distributed 
across the community) or highly segregated (where individuals from groups are 
concentrated in their own areas) and that simply looking at the size of a minority 
group in a community gives no indication of how segregated they are.   
 
4.7. By looking at a random sample of 
individuals drawn from England and designed to 
be representative of the population of England as 
a whole, Laurence and Hewstone have examined 
prejudice, inter-ethnic friendships and perceived 
threat and conclude that relations between ethnic 
groups are at their most fraught in communities 
that contain a high minority concentration that are 
also segregated.  As such, high concentrations of 
minorities alone do not appear to be problematic 
for social cohesion between groups, but where this 
is accompanied by segregation, the research 
found higher levels of prejudice, greater perceived 
threat and fewer inter-ethnic friendships. 
 
4.8. A submission from Anthony Heath and 
Magda Borkowska at the Centre for Social Investigation at the Nuffield College, 
Oxford, suggests that living close to people of the same ethnic or faith background is 
a positive choice for many people, particularly for those who have recently arrived in 
Britain and who lack fluent English.  Support from people from the same background 
can be vital in finding housing, employment and in negotiating life in a strange 
environment.  A number of negative and positive consequences can arise from 
ethnic or faith concentrations but the effects are not uniform for all groups.  Their 
review of research suggests that ethnic concentration: 
 
 limits labour market opportunities for some groups, notably women of Pakistani 
or Bangladeshi background (probably because concentration reinforces 
traditional norms) – although it can improve labour market opportunities for 
some minority groups such as people of Indian ethnicity; 
 
 reduces opportunities for ‘bridging’ social ties between minorities and the White 
British majority, which may also limit job opportunities – although segregated 
communities might benefit from bonding social ties which provide support and 
protection from psychological difficulties; 
 
 leads to lower identification with Britain compared with minorities in more 
diverse areas and has negative effects on inter-ethnic trust – although bonding 
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ties within segregated ethnic communities may also facilitate political 
engagement and participation. 
 
4.9. Evidence shows that, for immigrants, having an indigenous friend or partner 
(compared to being single) can improve employment outcomes and occupational 
status87.   
 
4.10. The likelihood of having an inter-ethnic 
friendship increases in time across the UK, with 
46% of first generation migrants having only friends 
of the same ethnicity, reducing to 28% in the 
second generation88.  Close inter-ethnic friendship 
is more likely for people who are younger, more 
educated, have a higher income and are proficient 
in English. 
   
4.11. Despite the apparent wider distribution of 
ethnic minority groups across Britain, White British and Irish ethnic groups are least 
likely to have ethnically mixed social networks, while people of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnicity are least likely to have friends from outside their 
neighbourhood.  Black African and Mixed ethnicity groups, on the other hand, are 
most likely to have friends from outside their neighbourhood89.  
 
4.12. People from Mixed and multiple ethnic groups are most likely to be in an inter-
ethnic relationship (85%), while White British (4%) are least likely, followed by 
Bangladeshi (7%), Pakistani (9%) and Indian (12%) ethnic groups90.  The prevalence 
on transnational marriage among Asian communities in Britain (particularly within 
Pakistani communities) as discussed in chapter 3, is likely to be a factor in reducing 
the likelihood of inter-ethnic relationships for these groups. 
 
4.13. According to the Citizenship Survey for 2010-11, 82% of people said they 
mixed socially at least once a month with people from different ethnic or religious 
backgrounds, with similar levels of mixing reported in the prior two years91.  But the 
same survey illustrated that a lack of social mixing was felt to be a key barrier to 
getting on with people from different backgrounds, with 1 in 4 people who disagreed 
that they lived in a cohesive area citing lack of social contact and mixing as the 
reason92. 
 
4.14. The Social Integration Commission conducted a nationwide survey in 201493 
and found that we have fewer social interactions with people who are different to us 
than if there was no segregation, with the average Briton: 
 
 14% less integrated by social grade 
 
 42% less integrated by age; and 
 
 48% less integrated by ethnicity. 
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4.15. The Commission also found that: 
 
 Londoners, despite socialising more with people of different ethnic groups were 
proportionately less integrated by social grade, ethnicity and age than the rest 
of Britain – suggesting that greater diversity does not automatically lead to 
stronger integration; 
 
 people aged 18 to 34 where there are high levels of mobility or involvement in 
further and higher education institutions were the most ethnically integrated 
group, with levels of segregation rising from 35% to 56% for those aged 35 to 
54 – suggesting that moving away from the home environment is a positive 
factor for integration; 
 
 those under 17 years old had 53% fewer interactions with other ethnicities than 
would be expected if there was no segregation – suggesting that young people 
are even more segregated ethnically than adults. 
 
4.16. While the benefits of social mixing are clear, the evidence on the extent to 
which different groups are integrated socially and getting on with each other is a 
cause for concern and stronger action, especially among young people.  
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Young people 
 
4.17. The Social Integration Commission’s findings as well as many contributors to 
the review have stressed the importance of social mixing among young people from 
different backgrounds and the positive impact this can have for society as a whole.  If 
our children grow up playing and learning with people from different backgrounds, 
they will be less prejudiced, more understanding of difference, more confident and 
more resilient living in a globalised and 
connected society.  Parents and families are 
undoubtedly key to ensuring this and should see 
social mixing as an important part of their role in 
raising children. 
 
4.18. Schools provide an important opportunity 
for children and young people to meet and work 
with those from different backgrounds to 
themselves.  This interaction, together with 
access to a broad curriculum, can help build a 
shared understanding and respect for others’ 
perspectives, just as segregated schooling and 
narrow teaching can limit it.  A study in Oldham94 
has tracked changes in attitude where a 
predominantly white British and a predominantly 
Asian school were merged to create a new 
school with a more balanced pupil population.  This found a consistent reduction 
over time in the anxiety the Asian and White British pupils felt about contact with the 
other group.   
 
4.19. Another approach sometimes pursued where there are segregated schools is 
to bring pupils from different schools together to pursue joint activities.  One 
approach to this, the Schools Linking programme, was evaluated by the National 
Foundation for Educational Research in 2011, which found it had a positive impact 
on pupils’ skills, attitudes, perceptions and behaviours, including their respect for 
others95.  We examined school segregation in more detail in chapter 3 but turn here 
to wider youth programmes and their potential to improve social mixing and 
integration. 
 
Youth social action 
 
4.20. The positive effects of youth volunteering were shown by a randomised 
control trial conducted by the Government's Behavioural Insights Team into projects 
funded in 2013 by the Youth Social Action Fund96.  It found significant increases in 
employability skills and character traits for adulthood such as empathy, community 
mindedness and grit and resilience.  There were also recorded increases in the 
number of participants intending to volunteer later on in adult life.  
 
4.21. Ipsos MORI research97 shows that while White and Black and Minority Ethnic 
participation in youth social action is proportionately almost exactly equal, females 
are more likely than males to take part (by 46% to 35%) and those from more 
affluent ABC1 families are more likely to take part than those from less affluent 
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C2DE families (by 45% to 34%).  The same research also shows that those who 
identify with a religion are more likely to participate in youth social action than those 
who do not (by 43% to 37%). 
 
4.22. A range of recent programmes was brought to our attention during the review 
with contributors highlighting their potential to improve positive social interactions 
between young people: 
 
 The Youth Social Action Fund supports the Step Up to Serve campaign with 
around £1 million of funding.  Step Up to Serve aims to get 1.5 million more 10-
20-year olds involved in social action between 2013 and 2020, with an 
emphasis on targeting under-served areas and communities.  
 
 In recent years, ‘uniformed’ Youth Groups have come together under the 'Youth 
United' banner, bringing together the Scouts, the Girl Guides, the Army, Air, 
Sea, Fire and Rescue, Police and St John Ambulance Cadets, the Boys 
Brigade, the Girls Brigade and the Jewish Lads and Girls Brigade. Between 
them, they currently have around 1.5 million members in the UK, which is 
around 10% of the 4 to 25-year-old population.  Evaluations of the Youth United 
programme point to very positive impacts on factors such as wellbeing, 
confidence, communication and willingness to volunteer in the future98. 
 
4.23. While such programmes are generally best provided by voluntary sector 
organisations, we would like to see more Government support for guiding them into 
the areas of most need and an onus on public sector bodies to support participation. 
 
The Prince’s Trust 
 
4.24. There is a place for providing extra support for young people to ensure that 
those who are most vulnerable – such as care leavers, those facing homelessness 
or mental health problems, or those who have been in trouble with the law – get the 
support they need to access work and education or training.  For over 40 years, the 
Prince’s Trust has developed programmes that support 13 to 30-year-olds, providing 
the practical and financial support needed to stabilise their lives.  Three in four young 
people supported by The Prince’s Trust move into work, education or training.  
 
National Citizen Service 
 
4.25. The National Citizen Service (NCS) programme for 15 to 17-year-olds is the 
main source of Government activity in the area of youth services.  It provides mixed 
groups of young people with an out-of-school programme that includes at least one 
residential stay away from home at an activity centre, soft skills training and 
participation in a social action scheme.  Underpinning all three strands is an 
emphasis on social mixing, character and resilience building, confidence and 
employability. 
 
4.26. Evaluation of NCS reports very positive outcomes across a range of 
measures.  In particular, evaluation of the programme in 201399 found that following 
participation in the programme: 
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 84% of National Citizen Service participants felt more positive towards people 
from different backgrounds; 
 
 48% of parents said their child definitely had more friends from different 
backgrounds; 
 
 89% of parents said their child had better 
understanding of people from different 
backgrounds; 
 
 79% of parents said their child returned 
with a better understanding of the local 
people and organisations that have 
influence in their community; 
 
 72% of participants said that they were 
more likely to help out locally; and 
 
 there was a 7 percentage point increase in the number of participants who said 
they were absolutely certain to vote. 
 
4.27. NCS is doing well at engaging young people from a wide range of social 
backgrounds.  The tables below show the proportion of participants from different 
ethnic and disadvantaged groups compared to comparable proportions of the 
population: 
 
 16-17 year-olds 2011* NCS participants 2014 
White groups 81.7% 69.2% 
Black groups 4.4% 9.1% 
Mixed/Multiple groups 3.9% 6.1% 
Asian groups 8.8% 15.5% 
 
 
16 year olds* 17 year olds* NCS participants 2014 
% of people claiming 
free school meals 8.7% 7.4% 16.4% 
  
*Data from 2011 Census  
  
4.28. NCS is currently being rapidly scaled up.  From 39,000 young people taking 
part in 2013, its first full year, 80,000 were expected to have done so in 2015.  Over 
the course of the current parliament it is planned to expand almost ten-fold from its 
starting point, with 360,000 places being available by 2020-21, meeting a manifesto 
pledge to offer a place to every young person who wants one.  This compares to the 
approximately 600,000 young people that become eligible for the programme each 
year. 
 
Duke of Edinburgh Award 
 
4.29. The Duke of Edinburgh Awards scheme gives many thousands of 14 to 24 
year olds a chance each year to have fun and face a challenge.  More than 1,800 
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organisations across the UK including schools, colleges and youth clubs help run 
more than 13,200 Duke of Edinburgh centres.  These types of awards are also 
recognised in universities and other onward activities as a positive achievement. 
 
Funding 
 
4.30. Youth services have traditionally been provided by the voluntary sector and 
local government, and local education authorities have a statutory duty to secure 
services and activities for young people to improve their wellbeing.  While the 
national picture is unclear, several submissions to the review highlighted that these 
services have been under particular strain and many have closed altogether as a 
result of the spending squeeze in place on council budgets since 2010.  Cabinet 
Office research in 2013100 showed councils were making sharp budget reductions to 
youth work and other activities for young people in both targeted and universal 
services, but especially the latter (which lost around £90 million, or a third of funding, 
between 2011/12 and 2013/14).   
 
4.31. It is clear that new approaches need to be found to expand the reach and 
impact of youth social action, building on the strong network of voluntary and 
community sector organisations (including faith groups and uniformed groups) and 
ensuring greater prioritisation and promotion by public bodies and private sector 
businesses. 
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5. Public attitudes and the media 
Chapter Summary 
 
 Attitudinal research can be important in assessing levels of integration and we 
have referred here to results which reflect many of the views and issues we 
found in our fieldwork. 
 
 There is a concern, however, that insufficient research is conducted at a level or 
rate that keeps pace with what is happening in our communities, or that is brave 
enough to explore more difficult issues. 
 
 Large scale population surveys have suggested that feelings of community 
cohesion and Britishness are high, but there is also evidence of growing concern 
about immigration, racial and religious tensions, and a divergence of attitudes 
and values among minority communities. 
 
 While there has been much attention in surveys on the attitudes of British 
Muslims in particular, which do reveal divergences, not enough research or 
engagement has been done to fully understand the factors at play. 
 
 The news media plays an important role in influencing attitudes and levels of 
integration, both through investigative reporting and through fair and accurate 
portrayal of difficult issues. 
 
 Digital media also has an important part to play.  While it can be seen as a risk 
for radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, it could also play a protective role and 
be important in better engaging increasingly diverse communities across the UK. 
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Public attitudes 
 
5.1. Measuring the attitudes of the general population and of particular 
communities can be helpful in assessing many issues, including how integrated we 
are as a nation and how levels of integration change over time.  There is a wide 
range of polling on attitudes relevant to this Review. These vary in their ‘robustness’ 
and are based on different population sample sizes, 
some of which are too small to be relied upon as 
representative, or are conducted at points in time 
when opinions might ‘spike’ as a result of major 
events.  Nevertheless, the attitudinal research 
highlighted in this report reflects many of the issues 
and views we found in our fieldwork.   
 
5.2. A number of the polling companies that we 
met suggested that, to date, academic and 
government research has either sought to highlight 
and demonstrate positive trends, or focused on 
specific, more quantifiable issues such as socio-
economic disadvantage.  Very little reliable research has been done into more 
controversial questions related to integration, which might include views around: 
 
 the acceptability of different sexualities, abortion, drug use; 
 
 rigidity of gender roles; 
 
 tolerance of views which directly contradict your own;  
 
 conflicts between tradition and values such as equality; and 
 
 grievances among non-immigrant communities in poor and traditionally working 
class areas.  
 
5.3. This resonated with our feelings in conducting the review, where very little 
research seemed to capture the mood of 
communities we met and listened to.  Too often, 
research and data analysis seems to be conducted 
at a level that is so high or general that no 
meaningful conclusions or policy decisions can be 
reached.  This risks creating further disengagement 
by the general public and may increase perceptions 
that their views and opinions are being ignored and 
difficult issues swept under the carpet.   
 
5.4. With increasing focus on integration as a 
sharing of values, and not just of space, it may be 
that a shift of research focus is needed.  
Understanding opinions on specific social and ethical 
issues could give an insight into fundamental 
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divergences in opinion which are driving integration – or segregation – within the 
population. 
 
Community cohesion and belonging 
 
5.5. National measurement of levels of community cohesion and sense of 
belonging (to the local neighbourhood and to Britain) has been in place since 2003 
through the Citizenship Survey until 2010-11 and in the Community Life Survey 
subsequently.  Generally, these show a strong sense of community cohesion and 
belonging101. 
 
 In 2015-16, 89% of people thought their 
community was cohesive, agreeing that 
their local area is a place where people 
from different backgrounds get on well 
together.  This feeling of cohesiveness has 
risen slowly from 80% in 2003.   
 
 When this question was asked in the 
localised Place Survey102, up until 2009, it revealed significant differences in 
feelings of cohesion at the local level.  People from ethnic minority groups or 
those expressing a religious affiliation were slightly more likely to think their 
area was cohesive than White people or those with no religious affiliation. 
   
 89% of people in 2015-16 felt that they belonged very or fairly strongly to 
Britain, with this level of belonging having been fairly constant since 2009.   
 
Immigration, race and religion 
 
5.6. NatCen Social Research’s report on British Social Attitudes to immigration103 
has examined longer term trends and suggests that the much more significant scale 
of immigration since the 1990s had affected public attitudes by 2011.  The report 
found that, between 2002 and 2011, public demands for a reduction in overall 
immigration increased, while views about the economic and cultural impact of 
immigration had grown more negative: 
 
 the proportion who viewed the economic impact of migrants negatively 
increased from 43% to 52%; 
 
 negative judgments about the cultural impact of migration grew from 33% to 
48%; 
 
 in 2011, 60% rated the settlement of migrants overall as negative and only 24% 
held a positive view, and many of those who held positive views about the 
economic or cultural impacts of migration still felt negatively about migration 
overall; 
 
 more than half of those rating the economic and cultural impacts of immigration 
as good still wanted to see inflows reduced; and 
…89% of people thought 
their community was 
cohesive… 
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 more economically threatened groups, such as poorer and working class 
Britons, gave more negative assessments of both the economic and cultural 
impacts of migration than economically secure groups. 
 
5.7. Attitudes towards race relations and integration were tested in polling for The 
Guardian by Opinion Research in 2015104.  This showed that: 
 
 47% felt that race relations in Britain now, compared with 5 years ago, were a 
little or a lot worse, while 21% felt they were a little or a lot better; 
 
 79% felt that British Muslims should 
definitely or probably make a special effort to 
state their allegiance to Britain, while 22% 
felt they should probably or definitely not;  
 
 65% agreed that Islamophobia is common in 
Britain today - above class prejudice (57%), 
racism (56%), sexism (43%) and 
homophobia (40%); and 
 
 In the same survey, terrorism (58%) and 
immigration (53%) were among the top three issues that people were 
personally worried about – behind the NHS (59%) and above the economy 
(46%), cuts to local services (44%), and crime/law and order (43%). 
 
British values 
 
5.8.  The idea of certain values that are seen as particularly ‘British’ has gained 
importance under recent governments, including the last Labour administration, the 
Coalition and the current Conservative administration.  While individually these 
values are recognised as not uniquely British, the current Government in its Counter 
Extremism Strategy considers the following combination integral to a successful and 
cohesive nation: 
 
 Democracy 
 
 The rule of law 
 
 Individual liberty 
 
 Equality 
 
 Freedom of speech 
 
 Mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 
 
…terrorism (58%) and 
immigration (53%) were 
among the top three 
issues that people were 
personally worried 
about… 
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5.9. During the review, we found mixed views on the notion of promoting British 
values.  It was supported and rejected by many.  Those who supported it argued that 
we should be proud of Britain and being British 
and that the promotion and adoption of British 
values was fundamental to integration.  Those 
who rejected it felt it was forcing a choice on 
individuals, not allowing for plurality or multiple 
identities and, ironically, rubbing against 
fundamental British values of freedom of speech 
and expression.  What both sides of this debate 
appeared to agree on was an acceptance that 
integration requires common values – but these 
need to strike the right balance between the 
benefits of diversity and those of unity or 
cohesion. 
 
5.10. Evidence from a set of opinion polls and surveys suggests a reasonable and 
consistent level of support among the public for a set of core ‘British’ values over 
recent time: 
 
 Respect for the law has featured as a popular attribute in a variety of surveys 
on values and Britishness, including a 2015 ComRes poll in which it was 
ranked second for ‘most important’ British values; the 2014 British Social 
Attitudes Survey in which 85% thought it was an important attribute for being 
‘truly British’; an ICM poll in 2014 with 69% identifying it as a British value; and 
the 2008 Citizenship Survey, in which it was the most commonly chosen value 
(by 57% of respondents). 
 
 Freedom of speech also features as an important value in 2014 polls run by 
ICM, in which 66% identified it as a British value, and by ComRes, in which 
46% record it as one of ‘the most important’ values.  Freedom of 
speech/expression was identified by 36% of respondents in the 2008 
Citizenship Survey as an important value for living in Britain, ranking among the 
top five listed values chosen by participants. 
 
 Equality was identified by only 23% of respondents as one of ‘the most 
important’ British values in the 2015 ComRes poll, ranking behind ‘a sense of 
humour’ (29%) and ‘politeness’ (27%).  However, it is interesting to note that 
‘equality between men and women’ was identified by 61% of respondents in the 
2014 ICM poll as a British value.  Equality of opportunity was identified by 38% 
of respondents as an important value for living in Britain in the 2008 Citizenship 
Survey. 
 
 Tolerance of others ranked 5th overall in the 2015 ComRes poll (behind 
politeness), with 26% choosing it as one of the most important British values, 
while respect for other people’s religion and beliefs’ was chosen as a British 
value by 52% of the 2014 ICM poll’s respondents, ranking 7th out of a supplied 
list of 10 values.  In 2008, it was the second most commonly identified value 
recognised by 56% of respondents in the Citizenship Survey.  
 
…integration requires 
common values – but 
these need to strike the 
right balance between 
the benefits of diversity 
and those of unity or 
cohesion. 
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 English language skills, while not strictly a ‘value’, were considered important to 
living in Britain by 95% of respondents in the 2014 British Social Attitudes 
Survey.  Speaking English was not offered as an option in the list of values 
offered to respondents in the ICM and ComRes polls but, in the 2008 
Citizenship Survey, English language capability was one of the most commonly 
chosen attributes (36%) considered important to British life.  
 
5.11. Across these surveys and polls, it is possible to see some variations in the 
consensus on these values by age, ethnicity and religion, although such distinctions 
should be treated with caution because the sample sizes tend to be small and results 
influenced by different wording for the questions asked: 
 
 By age, younger people are likely to place greater importance on equality and 
respect for people from different ethnic groups, while older age groups tend to 
value respect for the law and freedom of speech above equality. 
 
 By ethnicity, the 2008 Citizenship Survey noted that White people and people 
from ethnic minorities were equally likely to cite respect for the law as an 
important value, while White people were less likely and other ethnic groups 
more likely to mention equality of opportunity, respect for all faiths and respect 
for people from different ethnic groups. 
 
 By religion, Sikh (68%), Muslim (61%) and Hindu (47%) respondents in the 
2008 Citizenship Survey were more likely than Christians (32%) to mention 
respect for all faiths as an important value for living in Britain.   
 
Attitudes of Muslims in Britain 
 
5.12. With the increased visibility of Islamist extremists in the media, and in public 
discourse, there has been significant growth in interest in the attitudes and values of 
Muslims in Britain.  A number of polls and surveys have been conducted over the 
past few years, providing some insights into the views of some members of this 
religion; albeit with limited comparison to other minority groups.  
 
5.13. Analysis of the views of Muslim respondents on values in the 2008 Citizenship 
Survey, compared to all other respondents, is illustrated in the chart below.  This 
shows stronger support among Muslims for respect for all faiths, respect for people 
from different ethnic groups, freedom of religious choice and for the importance of 
voting; while showing weaker support among Muslims for the importance of pride in 
country/patriotism, freedom of speech/expression, speaking English, justice and fair 
play and responsibility towards others in the community. 
 
5.14. In 2008, Muslims were also noted to be less likely than the general population 
to agree that people should be free to say what they believe even if it offends others 
(48% of Muslims agreed with this statement compared with 65% of the general 
population) and were also more likely to strongly agree (53%) that different ethnic 
and religious groups should maintain their customs and differences.   
 
5.15. While somewhat dated, this 2008 data in relation to freedom of speech is 
complemented by more recent polling (ComRes, 2015) in which 78% of Muslim 
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respondents reported that they ‘find it deeply offensive to me when images of 
Prophet Mohammed are published’, while 68% agreed that ‘acts of violence against 
those who publish images of the Prophet Mohamed can never be justified’. 
 
Most important values for living in Britain, England, 2007-08 
Source: Citizenship Survey 2008 
 
5.16. A number of polls have supported concerns 
put to us by some in the review that British Muslims 
are feeling increasingly under siege and suspicion.  
ComRes polling of Muslims for the BBC in 
February 2015105 found that while 95% felt loyal to 
Britain and 93% believed Muslims in Britain should 
always obey British laws: 
 
 46% felt being a Muslim in Britain was difficult 
due to prejudice against Islam; and 
 
 Muslim women were more likely than men to feel unsafe in Britain. 
 
5.17. A YouGov poll on religion in March 2015106 found that 55% of British adults 
agreed that there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British 
society, while 22% felt Islam was generally compatible.  
 
5.18. A poll published in April 2016 (based on data gathered in June 2015) by 
Channel 4 and ICM Unlimited107 examined a range of attitudes among Muslims in 
Britain compared to attitudes of the general population.  The polling received some 
criticism.  We considered this carefully and found some design limitations – in that 
the survey oversampled in areas with populations of 20% or more Muslims (so could 
not be said to be representative of the attitudes of the whole Muslim population in 
Britain), and that the polling did not examine the attitudes of any other minority 
groups (who might also hold different views to the general population).  
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…British Muslims are 
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Nevertheless, we concluded that the results were valid and representative of the 
views of British Muslims living in areas of 20% or more Muslim population 
(accounting for nearly half – 45% – of all Muslims in Britain).   
 
5.19. The reported survey results included the findings that: 
 
 A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to their local 
area (91%) - higher than the national average (76%). 
 
 A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain 
(86%) - also higher than the national average (83%). 
 
 A large majority of British Muslims feel that they are able to practice their 
religion freely in Britain (94%). 
 
 88% of British Muslims think that Britain is a good place for Muslims to live. 
 
 78% of British Muslims would like to integrate into British life on most things 
apart from Islamic schooling and some laws. 
 
5.20. But the reported results also included the findings that: 
 
 39% of Muslim respondents agreed that wives should always obey their 
husbands (compared with 5% of the British population).  
 
 31% agreed that it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife 
(compared with 9% of the British population). 
 
 52% did not agree that homosexuality should be legal in Britain (compared with 
11% of the British population).  
 
 47% did not agree that it is acceptable for a homosexual person to be a teacher 
in a school (compared with 14% of the British population). 
 
 23% supported the introduction of Sharia law instead of British laws in some 
areas of Britain.  
 
 32% refused to condemn people who take part in violence against those who 
mock the Prophet. 
 
 34% would inform the police if they thought somebody they knew was getting 
involved with people who support terrorism in Syria (compared with 30% of the 
British population). 
 
 4% sympathised with people who take part in suicide bombings (compared with 
1% of the British population). 
 
 4% sympathised with people who commit terrorist actions as a form of political 
protest (compared with 1% of the British population).  
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5.21. Further analysis of the raw polling data illustrated that there was a relationship 
– though not necessarily a causal connection – between sympathy for extremist or 
radical actions, and other views that diverged from those of the general population: 
 
 British Muslims who said they wanted to live a largely Islamic life rather than 
integrate, were more likely to express sympathy towards extremist actions;  
 
 those who said they were sympathetic to extremism were more likely to say 
that religious harassment is a problem in their area; 
 
 those with the greatest sympathy for extremist and violent actions were more 
likely to think that girls and boys should be taught separately and to support the 
introduction of Sharia law; 
 
 analysis of the polling results also indicated that socio-demographic factors 
which had an association with sympathy towards extremist actions included 
where the person lived and their social class. 
 
5.22. On the face of it, the divergence of attitudes among some Muslims in Britain 
from the general population is concerning.  While, on the one hand, many Muslims 
feel more strongly attached to Britishness and British 
values than the general population, some are 
expressing more regressive attitudes towards 
women and freedom of speech and are, in a small 
minority, expressing greater sympathy for violent 
extremist action.   These differences in attitudes 
could be pushing communities further apart.  But our 
understanding of what lies behind this divergence is 
poor.  From what we have seen and heard during the 
review, it is likely that it arises from: 
 
 cultural and religious influences; 
 
 demographic and economic factors (for example, age and earnings); 
 
 growing identification with the plight of Muslims internationally and a sense of 
grievance or disagreement with ‘Western’ and/or British foreign policy in Muslim 
countries; 
 
 grievances stemming from disadvantage, discrimination and racial and religious 
hostility, including a growing sense of Islamophobia; 
 
 uncertainty about identity and the compatibility of Muslim life and British values; 
and 
 
 the influence of extremist organisations who promote a grievance narrative. 
 
…the divergence of 
attitudes among some 
Muslims in Britain from 
the general population is 
concerning…But our 
understanding… is poor. 
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5.23. More detailed research into wider public attitudes, including views on 
immigration, combined with stronger engagement with different communities in 
Britain to challenge negative influences and address real or perceived grievances 
will be essential in better understanding these factors and helping to shape future 
attitudes for a more united nation.  
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The media 
5.24. Access to the media and levels of media consumption can be important 
factors in influencing integration and public attitudes.  Different forms of media 
provide channels through which communities can access information and help to 
navigate society and understand and, increasingly, engage with public and private 
sector services – from keeping up with the news and buying the weekly shopping, to 
completing tax returns and applying for jobs.  It is also important for Government, 
public and private sector organisations to understand media consumption among 
different groups to help them reach and communicate with all sections of society. 
 
5.25. Media portrayal of events, issues and communities can also be key in keeping 
the population as a whole informed of issues they might otherwise be unaware of 
and influencing attitudes.  It was put to us by some organisations in submissions to 
the review that negative media portrayals of 
Muslims in Britain were contributing to 
Islamophobic sentiment and a demonisation and 
alienation of British Muslims, making some feel 
unwelcomed and blamed in particular for terrorist 
acts and a wider threat to British society.  Some 
Muslim organisations have said they find it hard to 
trust mainstream media organisations which they 
fear have an anti-Muslim bias.  
5.26. While the news media will to some degree 
inevitably be dominated by bad news more than 
good - and they do have an important role to play 
in shining a light on problems that might not 
otherwise be exposed – some representations to the review have argued that 
sections of the British media have on some occasions gone further than failing to 
highlight positive stories about Muslims and instead actively amplified the view that 
Muslims and their faith are incompatible with life in Britain.  We have been told that 
this has caused some British Muslims to fear for their own personal safety, or 
supported a self-fulfilling prophecy of increasing segregation.   
5.27. There is some research to support these views. A report by Cardiff University 
(2008) concluded that “decontextualisation, misinformation and a preferred discourse 
of threat, fear and danger, while not uniformly present, were strong forces in the 
reporting of British Muslims in the UK national press108.”  A study conducted by 
Insted Consultancy for the Greater London Authority (2007) found that “the tone of 
language is frequently emotive, immoderate, alarmist or abusive”, and suggested 
that coverage is “likely to provoke and increase feelings of insecurity, suspicion and 
anxiety amongst non-Muslims”, and “provoke feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and 
alienation amongst Muslims”109.   
5.28. A University of Birmingham (2012) report110 brings these findings together 
with others to conclude that “the evidence shows an overwhelmingly negative 
picture, where threat, otherness, fear and danger posed or caused by Muslims and 
Islam underpins a considerable majority of the media’s coverage” which, in light of 
the fact that 64% of the British public claimed that what they know about Muslims 
…negative media 
portrayals of Muslims in 
Britain were 
contributing to 
Islamophobic sentiment 
and a demonisation and 
alienation of British 
Muslims… 
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and Islam is acquired through the media, “has the potential to ensure stigmatisation, 
marginalisation and intolerance”.   
5.29. In a submission to the Home Affairs Select Committee, Dr Saffron Karlsen of 
the University of Bristol argued that effective counter-narratives to radicalisation 
need to recognise and respond to the effects of hostility expressed by wider British 
society, including via the media111.  The Anti Muslim Hatred Working Group is 
seeking to work with media regulators to address negative portrayal of Muslims in 
the media. 
5.30. That is not to say that journalists should be prohibited from investigating and 
reporting issues of genuine public concern in any community.  We were struck during 
the review by the wider lack of robust academic studies into some of the inequality 
and harmful practices that exist across communities, discussed further in later 
sections of this report.  In many cases, investigative journalists and documentary 
makers are shining a light on these issues – helping to open up otherwise largely 
closed communities and expose and challenge unacceptable practices.  Any efforts 
to curtail sensationalist, alarmist or abusive discourse should not impede the 
strength of genuine investigative journalism, which has a tradition of exposing wrong-
doing and influencing positive societal change. Lord Puttnam, in his TED Talk, Does 
the media have a “Duty of Care?”112, discussed the importance of reasonableness 
and the need for accurate, unprejudiced information on which people can make their 
own judgements. 
Digital media 
 
5.31. Concerns have been raised widely about use of the internet as a source of 
divisive messages and abuse, as well as of radicalisation.  A poor sense of 
awareness about the internet and concern about IT skills were also raised with the 
review: 
 
 We received submissions from two local authorities identifying a lack of IT skills 
among certain ethnic minority female cohorts, one of which was running a 
project to improve the IT skills of ethnic minority women, enabling them to have 
a better understanding of what their children may be accessing through the 
internet, as well as empowering them to use the internet for their own purposes.   
 
 We were told about examples from within the 
Somali community in Leicester where mothers 
of young boys had expressed their despair in 
not being able to communicate with their 
children on issues such as radicalisation, 
extremism and internet safety. They recognised 
the power a mother's voice can have in 
countering hate narratives but that this is 
diminished when unable to communicate with 
their children. 
 
 In meetings we held during the review with women’s community groups, 
mothers were concerned about their lack of understanding of digital media and 
the internet and their concerns about controlling their children’s usage.     
…mothers were 
concerned about their 
lack of understanding of 
digital media… 
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5.32. We also noted an Ofcom survey on use of and attitudes towards different 
types of media: 
 
 29% of adults thought that all or most of what is written on-line is regulated113. 
 
 40% of adults agreed that “I should be free to say and do what I want on-
line”114, while only 36% agreed that “everyone should be free to say and do 
what they want on-line”115. 
 
5.33. Evidence on digital media consumption indicates notable variation by socio-
economic status and age.  The Coalition Government’s Digital Inclusion Strategy116 
in 2014 noted that: 
 
 5% of the adult population do not have basic literacy skills, making internet use 
a bigger problem for this group. 
 
 Digital exclusion affects some of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups in society, with people living in social housing, on lower wages or 
unemployed more likely to be digitally excluded – 37% of digitally excluded 
households are in social housing, while 17% of people earning less than 
£20,000 per annum never use the internet, compared with 2% of those earning 
more than £40,000. 
 
 Older people are more likely to lack digital skills (53% of people who lack digital 
skills are over 65, while 6% are between 15 and 24 years of age). 
 
5.34. The Office for National Statistics bulletin on internet users in the UK in 2016117 
showed that 88% of adults (45.9 million) had used the internet in the last three 
months but 10% (5.3 million) had never used the internet: 
 
 Of those who had never used the internet, just over half were aged 75 years or 
older. 
 
 47% of men aged 75 years or older were recent internet users compared with 
33% of women aged 75 or older – there was little difference in rates of internet 
use between men and women in all age groups under 65 years. 
 
5.35. An Ofcom report in 2013 found that there were also notable ethnic variations 
in media consumption that are important to note for community engagement in 
Britain118: 
 
 Around 25% of adults rely on TV to keep informed – this was on average higher 
among ethnic minority groups (27%) than White British (24%). Those from 
Pakistani (37%) and Bangladeshi (36%) ethnic backgrounds were most reliant 
on TV to stay informed. 
 
 Around 71% of people have broadband at home - a higher proportion of those 
from Indian (82%), Mixed ethnic (80%), Black African (76%), Bangladeshi 
(75%), Pakistani (73%) and Black Caribbean (71%) ethnic groups have 
broadband at home, compared to White British (70%). 
…mothers were 
concerned about their 
lack of understanding of 
digital media and the 
internet and their 
concerns about 
controlling their 
children’s usage… 
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 Almost 1 in 5 young people (19%) aged 16-24 had recently used the internet to 
post opinions on civic or political issues119.  A higher proportion of people from 
Bangladeshi (37%), Indian (35%), Mixed (32%) and Pakistani (30%) ethnic 
groups were likely to be influenced by comments/reviews posted online, 
compared to Black African (25%), Black Caribbean (19%), and White British 
(18%) ethnic groups. 
 
5.36. Despite the generally higher broadband prevalence and internet usage among 
ethnic minority communities, the Office for National Statistics bulletin on internet 
users (quarter 1, 2016) showed that, across ethnic groups, households from 
Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds were most likely to have never used the internet 
(10.7%), followed by White (10.6%), Pakistani (10.3%) and Indian (9.4%) groups. 
 
5.37. The role of the media and the internet in integration is a vast topic and we 
have not had the time or capacity to do it justice in this review.  TV consumption is 
already diverse with access to digital and satellite channels, including international 
and foreign language channels, and is changing even more with reducing use of 
scheduled programming.  Social media and the internet are seen as potential 
negative factors in allowing access to radicalising material from Islamist and far right 
extremists, and in limiting views and entrenching bias through ‘echo chambers’.  
However, greater digital awareness may also be a protective factor in improving 
knowledge, understanding and access to public services. 
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6. Social and economic exclusion  
Chapter Summary 
 
 Social and economic progress is perhaps the most important indicator of 
successful integration.  Socio-economic exclusion, therefore, is a sign of 
integration failure. 
 
 Where socio-economic exclusion correlates with segregation, it indicates a 
negative cycle of very significant concern. 
 
 While significant progress has been made by Governments across the years in 
narrowing gaps and tackling poverty and deprivation, some groups remain left or 
falling behind. 
 
 Across the issues of deprivation, educational attainment, employment, and 
English language, gaps exist for several ethnic minority groups and for poorer 
households in the majority White British population.   
 
 For poorer White British households in some areas, problems of educational 
attainment appear to be growing.  Persistent unemployment stands out for young 
Black men, while people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity suffer significant 
disadvantage across a range of measures – on deprivation, income, employment 
and English language proficiency – relative to other ethnic minority groups. 
 
 There are also issues of social exclusion across other areas of social policy, 
including crime, housing need and public health which affect many of the same 
communities.  We have not focused as closely on these issues at this stage. 
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Deprivation  
6.1. Across the UK, after housing costs are taken into account, there are 13.2 
million people (21%) on relative low income120.  Individuals are said to be on ‘relative 
low income’ if they live in a household with an 
income (adjusted for household size and 
composition) below 60% of the average (median) 
income of the year in question.  For 2013-14, the 
relative low income figure, after housing costs, 
was £232 per week121.   
 
6.2. Households more likely to be on low 
income include those living in social rented 
housing (almost four times as likely to live on relative low income compared to home 
owners)122, in workless households (71% of people in households where one or 
more people were unemployed and 56% of people in inactive households were living 
on relative low income in 2013-14) and in lone parent households (41% in 2013-
14)123. 
 
6.3. People living in households headed by someone from an ethnic minority are 
also more likely to live on relative low income and this is particularly the case for 
households of Bangladeshi, Chinese, Pakistani and Black ethnicity – with 51%, 49%, 
46% and 41% respectively on relative low income compared with 19% of White 
households124.  
 
6.4. Additionally, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations and Muslim faith 
populations live disproportionately in the most deprived areas in England compared 
with other ethnic or faith groups. 
 
 By ethnicity, people with a Pakistani background are most likely to live in the 
most deprived areas in England – with 31% in the 10% most deprived areas, 
followed by 28% of people with a Bangladeshi background, 20% of Black 
groups, 15% of Mixed White/Black/Asian groups, 17% of other non-white ethnic 
groups, 10% of people of Chinese ethnicity, 9% of White groups and 8% of 
people with an Indian background125.   
 
 By faith, analysis of the Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation126 shows that 26% of the Muslim 
population live in the 10% most deprived areas in 
England (compared with 10% of all people 
holding a religion, 10% of people with no religion, 
9% of Christians and Sikhs, 8% of Buddhists, 5% 
of Hindus and 3% of Jews). 
 
6.5. There is a strong correlation for Muslim faith 
and Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups between 
concentration in our most deprived areas and high 
ward level concentrations, discussed in chapter 3, 
suggesting a vicious circle:  It is not clear whether the 
economic exclusion suffered by these groups results 
…there are 13.2 million 
people (21%) on relative 
low income. 
There is a strong 
correlation for Muslim 
faith and Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnic 
groups between 
concentration in our 
most deprived areas and 
high ward level 
concentrations… 
suggesting a vicious 
circle…   
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from a choice they make to live and stay in these areas; or whether they are unable 
to move as a consequence of the social exclusion that arises from living in these 
areas.  The most common view we came across in the review was that it was 
probably both.  
6.6. Across other parts of the UK:  
 In Scotland, White Polish and African ethnic groups are most likely to live in the 
most deprived areas, while Asian ethnic groups are less likely to live in these 
areas127.   
 
 In Wales, the ethnic minority population is more likely than average to live in 
deprived areas, with 15% living in the 10% most deprived areas.  Within Black 
and Minority Ethnic groups, ‘Other Black’ people are the most likely to live in 
deprived areas in Wales (31% live in the 10% most deprived areas), followed 
by people of African (28%) and Bangladeshi (22%) ethnicity128. 
 The pattern in London differs somewhat from England as a whole too. In 
London, 19% of people from a Bangladeshi background live in the 10% most 
deprived areas (compared to 37% of the Bangladeshi ethnic population across 
the rest of England), followed by Black African and Black Other ethnic groups 
(12% of each living in the 10% most deprived areas of London, compared to 
31% and 36% across the rest of England)129. 
 
6.7 Patterns of deprivation, family size and age appear to dictate levels of benefit 
receipt130.  The highest levels of Child Tax Credit are claimed by households headed 
by members of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups (27%), followed by Black 
(23%) and White (11%) groups, probably reflecting both rates of low-paid work and 
family/household size across these groups.  The receipt of Disability Living 
Allowance and Personal Independent Payment is highest among White households, 
likely to reflect their older age profile. 
 
6.8. People who fare poorly in educational 
attainment and employment and who live in deprived 
areas are more likely to suffer wider social exclusion.  
Although we have not considered in detail issues 
such as poor physical and mental health, being a 
victim and/or perpetrator of crime or living in poor 
housing, these are all issues of social exclusion that 
may hamper educational attainment and economic 
progress.  It is a double bind that holds people and 
communities back. 
 
White British ethnicity 
 
6.9. Analysis of different minority ethnic groups is important in understanding the 
range of factors at play in social and economic exclusion, just as it is also important 
to understand gender, age and other variations.  Policies that treat minority groups 
as a homogenous whole can mask wide differences and allow successful groups to 
continue to succeed, while less successful groups fall further behind. 
 
People who fare poorly in 
educational attainment 
and employment and who 
live in deprived areas are 
more likely to suffer wider 
social exclusion. 
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6.10. There is also a risk in considering the White British majority ethnic group as 
one in measuring and analysing its socio-economic progress.  In recent decades, it 
appears that in some respects, rather than becoming more of a classless society, 
sections of white working class Britain have become more isolated from the rest of 
the country and the rest of the White British population.  
 
6.11. Deindustrialisation accelerated in the 1980s and several studies have looked 
at how hard it has been for many communities previously reliant on heavy industry 
and manual labour to recover, with subsequent effects of economic, political, social 
and cultural isolation, self-reinforcing cycles of poor educational attainment, low-
skilled, insecure and low-status employment, worklessness, poverty and associated 
problems such as drug abuse, crime, poor housing, health and mental health.     
 
6.12. At the same time, research such as that by the Sutton Trust131 and the Social 
Mobility and Child Poverty Commission132 has shown how working class access to 
the professions and the sharp increases in social mobility in the post-war years have 
since slowed down or dried up, despite dramatic increases in further and higher 
education participation. 
 
6.13. This has been accompanied by the rises in immigration (discussed earlier in 
this report) both from Commonwealth countries across decades since the 1950s and 
Eastern Europe in more recent years.  Several studies have looked at the 
phenomenon of ‘white flight’ from the inner cities as a result of immigration and the 
fact that it has often been more prosperous middle class families who have benefited 
most from the positive impacts of immigration, for example in the service economy or 
in reciprocal benefits of globalisation such as cheap foreign travel.  Others have 
looked at how the far right has sought to exploit white working class opposition to 
mass immigration and conflate it with their resentment of deindustrialisation and 
sense of decline in their communities. 
 
6.14. All of this appears to have created a strong 
sense of disaffection and alienation among many 
white working class communities, particularly in 
areas such as coastal towns formerly reliant on 
domestic tourism, former mill towns in the north of 
England (also discussed extensively in relation to 
their South Asian ethnic communities) and other 
areas where heavy industry has declined without 
being adequately replaced, for example in the 
Potteries and Teesside and former coal mining 
towns such as those in South Wales, the East 
Midlands and Yorkshire.  
 
6.15. Governments of different political persuasions have made efforts to address 
this through initiatives such as City Challenge, Neighbourhood Renewal, the Social 
Exclusion Unit, Connecting Communities, the Coastal Communities Fund or the 
more recent Troubled Families programme, none of which were specifically targeted 
at white working class communities but reached them more than most, with varying 
degrees of success.  But it appears clear that further concerted and consistent effort 
is required. 
All of this appears to 
have created a strong 
sense of disaffection 
and alienation among 
many white working 
class communities… 
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Education and attainment 
 
6.16. In recent years there has been a general improvement in educational 
attainment in schools, with a narrowing in the gap between White pupils and pupils 
from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and African/Caribbean/Black ethnic backgrounds, 
although persistent and in some cases widening 
educational attainment gaps remain (for example for 
White children from poorer backgrounds).  Several 
ethnic minority groups now out-perform White British 
pupils. 
 
6.17. In 2015, during the early years foundation 
stage (aged 5 years), children of Indian ethnicity had 
the highest levels of achievement with 74% 
assessed as having a good level of development.  
Children of White Gypsy and Roma ethnicity had the 
lowest level of attainment at this age, with just 24% 
assessed as having a good level of attainment133. 
 
Achievement: Early years foundation stage by ethnicity and free school meals (FSM) 
eligibility 
 
Level of development % of pupils eligible 
for FSM achieving a 
good level 
% of all pupils 
achieving a good 
level 
All pupils 51 66 
White 49 67 
  White British 50 69 
  Irish 38 67 
  Traveller of Irish Heritage 30 38 
  Gypsy/Roma 24 24 
  Any other White background 49 57 
Mixed 56 68 
  White and Black Caribbean 54 64 
  White and Black African 62 68 
  White and Asian 55 71 
  Any other mixed background 56 69 
Asian 54 64 
  Indian 62 74 
  Pakistani 52 58 
  Bangladeshi 54 60 
  Any other Asian background 57 65 
Black 59 65 
  Black Caribbean 58 63 
  Black African 59 66 
  Any other Black background 57 64 
Chinese 57 67 
Any other ethnic group 53 58 
 
Source: Department for Education, 2015 
 
6.18. Children eligible for Free School Meals (and generally coming from poorer 
backgrounds) performed less well with 51% achieving a good level of development 
compared with 69% of children not eligible for Free School Meals – a gap of 18 
…persistent and in 
some cases widening 
educational attainment 
gaps remain (for 
example White children 
from poorer 
backgrounds). 
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percentage points.  And despite White British children being among the higher 
performing groups at this age, White British children on Free School Meals had the 
second biggest performance gap (after pupils of White Irish ethnicity) compared to 
those not on Free School Meals, indicating that disadvantage plays an important role 
in educational attainment even at very early stages134. 
 
6.19. In 2014-15, 57.1% of all pupils in state-funded schools in England attained 
five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C or equivalent, including English and 
Mathematics, as shown in the table below.   
 
  
Number of eligible 
pupils 
Percentage achieving 5+ 
A*-C grades inc. English 
& mathematics GCSEs 
All pupils 553,469 57.1 
White 438,576 56.8 
   white British 413,060 57.1 
   Irish 1,882 68.2 
   traveller of Irish heritage 142 17.6 
   Gypsy / Roma 1,055 8.6 
   any other white background 22,437 52.6 
Mixed 22,513 58.1 
   white and black Caribbean 7,300 48.7 
   white and black African 2,518 58.8 
   white and Asian 4,857 66.7 
   any other mixed background 7,838 61.2 
Asian 49,411 61.1 
   Indian 13,329 72.1 
   Pakistani 19,941 51.6 
   Bangladeshi 7,972 62.2 
   any other Asian background 8,169 65.1 
Black 27,244 52.0 
   black Caribbean 7,314 45.9 
   black African 16,677 55.7 
   any other black background 3,253 46.7 
Chinese 2,067 76.6 
any other ethnic group 7,760 57.0 
   
Source: Department for Education, 2016 
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6.20. A number of ethnic minority groups, including pupils of Chinese, Indian, Irish, 
and Bangladeshi ethnicity, outperformed White British pupils on this ‘good GCSEs’ 
attainment measure.  However, pupils of Pakistani and Black ethnicity had an 
attainment gap of more than 5 percentage points 
lower than White British pupils.  Pupils of White 
Gypsy and Roma ethnicity had the lowest 
attainment levels with only 8.6% achieving five or 
more good GCSEs135.  
 
6.21. The gap in attainment for pupils on Free 
School Meals was even greater at this stage – with 
33.1% achieving 5 or more good GCSEs, compared 
with 60.9% of pupils not on Free School Meals136 – 
a gap of nearly 28 percentage points.   
 
6.22. White British pupils had the second biggest gap in attainment (after a small 
number of pupils of White Irish ethnicity) between those eligible and not eligible for 
Free School Meals – 33.2 percentage points.  White British boys on Free School 
Meals were less than half as likely as all other pupils to get five good GCSEs137, 
highlighting a very significant issue for poorer White British households.  
 
Proportion of Free School Meals eligible pupils achieving 5+ A*-C grades (including 
English and Mathematics GCSEs) by ethnic group, 2014-15
 
Source: Department for Education 2016
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6.23. The House of Commons Education Select Committee concluded in 2014139 
that white working class educational underachievement is “real and persistent”, 
expressing particular concern at the widening gap from age five onwards and the 
fact that the consequences are getting worse, given the ever greater need for 
qualifications and skills in the modern labour market.  Further statistical analysis by 
Centre Forum140 (now the Education Policy Institute) in 2016 of the newer ‘Progress 
8’ measure of school attainment suggested that these trends were being 
exacerbated under the Government’s higher standards expectations, with 
disadvantaged white children falling further behind both more advantaged white 
children and minority ethnic children. 
 
6.24. Pupils from poorer neighbourhoods are significantly less likely to be in Ofsted-
rated outstanding schools and significantly more likely to be in satisfactory and 
inadequate schools.  However, the achievement gap does not appear to be down to 
schools alone, with some significant gaps continuing within good and outstanding 
schools.  The causes of this – and disentangling what is specific to poorer white 
children as opposed to all poorer children – are less clear, but some research141 has 
suggested that cultural factors may be involved, including both a lack of aspiration in 
white working class communities and families, which can devalue the importance of 
school, and a lesser degree of engagement by white working class children in 
school.  Long-term white-working class family backgrounds in manual labour for 
which few qualifications were required, for example, may contrast with most ethnic 
minority children being more closely connected to relatively recent waves of 
economically aspirant migration.  
 
6.25. In a visit to Barking and Dagenham, the review team heard that there was 
historically a culture of low white working class educational achievement locally, and 
little incentive for the schools to improve because there had always been relatively 
well-paid, secure jobs available for low-skilled workers at the local Ford car factory.  
But when the factory closed, the schools were still poor and the local culture of 
aspiration remained low. 
 
6.26. A lack of aspiration and engagement can also be self-reinforcing, contributing 
to further poor educational and employment outcomes and lack of aspiration in the 
next generation and so on.  And while white working class pupils may not lack 
ambition, they may connect this less with the need for formal qualifications.  A report 
for the then Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, for example, found that disadvantaged 
white pupils put less emphasis on the need to get 
a university degree in order to get the best jobs 
than all other ethnic groups (with the exception of 
Black Caribbean pupils)142. 
 
6.27. The Government’s Pupil Premium policy – 
which directs extra resources to schools 
educating disadvantaged children, as measured 
by being eligible for Free School Meals – is 
designed to address the achievement gap.  But 
as the Chief Inspector of Schools, Sir Michael 
Wilshaw143, and others have argued, further consideration should be given to the 
…further consideration 
should be given to the 
particular reasons why 
the gap is worse for 
some White British 
children than those from 
minority communities… 
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particular reasons why the gap is worse for some White British children than those 
from minority communities, with action taken to address them.  This could include 
further research into teaching methods and work to attract the best school trusts, 
headteachers and teachers into the areas most in need of support such as coastal 
towns and former industrial areas; the family and parenting factors at play; and a 
programme of action to raise aspiration among white working class children through 
mentoring, extra-curricular activities and connecting them with high quality careers 
advice, apprenticeships, universities and employers. 
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Further and higher education  
 
6.28. The number of young people aged 16 to 17 who go on to all forms of further 
education and training is generally high at around 91%144.  Those from White, Mixed 
and ‘Other’ ethnic backgrounds had the lowest participation in further education and 
training.  Young people from Chinese, Asian and Black backgrounds had the highest 
recorded participation145. 
 
6.29. Rates of progression to higher education institutions vary by socio-economic 
and ethnic background.  In 2013-14, just under half (48%) of all students from state-
funded mainstream schools and colleges went to a UK higher education 
institution146:  
 
 17% went to the top third of higher education institutions; 11% went to Russell 
Group institutions; and just 1% went to Oxford and Cambridge147. 
 
 Students who had been eligible for Free 
School Meals were half as likely as all other 
students to go to a top third higher education 
institution and less than half as likely to go to 
a Russell Group institution148. 
 
 Students from the highest socio-economic 
backgrounds are 37 percentage points more 
likely to go to university than those from the 
lowest socio-economic backgrounds – 
although the types of schools attended, prior 
levels of attainment and other factors 
contribute to this as well as socio-economic 
differences149. 
 
 Students from a Chinese ethnic background (32%) were most likely to progress 
to Russell Group institutions, followed by students from White Irish (22%), 
White and Asian (19%) and Indian (18%) ethnic backgrounds.  Ethnic groups 
least likely to progress to Russell Group institutions were White and Black 
Caribbean (7%), Black other (6%) and Black Caribbean (5%) – although 
students of White Gypsy and Roma ethnicity were so low in numbers as to not 
be recorded150. 
 
 Students from Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds do slightly better in accessing 
the top third higher education institutions but not Russell Group institutions 
when compared with all students from state-funded mainstream schools and 
colleges, and do better than students of Pakistani ethnicity across both151 
 
Ethnic group Top third institutions Russell Group 
All students 17% 11% 
Bangladeshi 19% 10% 
Pakistani 15% 8% 
 
Source: Department for Education  
Students who had been 
eligible for Free School 
Meals were half as likely 
as all other students to 
go to a top third higher 
education institution 
and less than half as 
likely to go to a Russell 
Group institution. 
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6.30. These differences in socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds also play out in 
variations in higher educational attainment.  Differences can be seen in the 
proportions of graduates from the most and least disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
who gained first or upper second class degrees in 2013-14 – although the attainment 
gap is reduced (from 11 to 3 percentage points) once prior qualifications and other 
factors such as age, sex, subject of study, school and higher education institution 
attended are taken into account152.   
 
6.31. White graduates achieve significantly higher 
degree classifications than graduates from other 
ethnicities, with a 15% difference between Black 
and other minority ethnic groups and their White 
counterparts in attainment of first or upper second 
class degrees – even allowing for prior 
qualifications and other influencing factors153.  
 
6.32. There are likely to be other factors at play 
too in under-representation of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic groups at the best 
universities and in their subsequent lack of representation in top professions: 
 
 Students of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnicity are less likely to achieve AAB 
grades or above (of which two are facilitating subjects) than White students, 
with 7.4% and 9% of Bangladeshi and Pakistani students respectively 
achieving this level against 12.2% of White students.  Moreover, they are far 
less likely to achieve three A* or A grades at A-
level, with 10% of White students achieving 
these grades against 6.4% and 5.5% of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi students 
respectively154. 
 
 One of the factors that was frequently brought 
up as a means of explaining poor performance 
in general at the higher end of A-level 
attainment was a lack of English capability, 
particularly ‘academic’ or formal English, 
among otherwise academically able pupils.  
However, this might not be a problem that is particular to students from 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds, or to others for whom English is 
a second language.  One head teacher we spoke to felt that the lack of 
‘academic English’ was something that applied more widely to young people in 
disadvantaged communities from any ethnic background. 
 
6.33. Faith might also be a factor affecting rates of attainment.  In several visits 
during the review we were told that a prominent factor reducing the number of young 
Muslims and particularly Muslim women accessing Russell Group universities and 
reaching top professions was a reluctance to travel to universities outside their local 
area.  Research conducted by Demos found that young Muslims’ decisions on 
whether to apply to study at universities outside their local area can be influenced by 
their parents’ desire to shelter and protect their children155.  This could contribute to 
under-representation in the top professions.  We were also told by community 
White graduates achieve 
significantly higher 
degree classifications 
than graduates from 
other ethnicities… 
Students of Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani ethnicity 
are less likely to achieve 
AAB grades or above (of 
which two are facilitating 
subjects) than White 
students… 
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groups that this reflected choices due to tuition fees, and was a growing 
phenomenon among poorer households from all backgrounds. 
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Employment  
6.34. Despite a narrowing in the attainment gap at GCSE level and relatively high 
participation in further and higher education among most minority ethnic groups, with 
some outperforming the White British majority, almost all ethnic minority groups still 
have unemployment rates around double the national average156.   
 
6.35. Some slight improvement has occurred 
over the last decade, with the ‘employment rate 
gap’ between employment levels for White 
British people compared to minority ethnic 
people narrowing from 15.6% in 2004 to 12.8% 
in 2015157.  Nevertheless, people from Black, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are still 
around three times more likely than those from 
White groups to be unemployed: 
 
 White 4.8%;  
 
 Black 14.0%;  
 
 Pakistani/Bangladeshi 11.5%. 
 
6.36. Ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in specific, often low status, sectors 
of the economy.  Even where they are represented in other or higher status sectors, 
they do not make as much progress to leadership roles as their White peers: 
 
 Analysis by the Department for Work and Pensions158 has shown that almost 
half of all ethnic minority workers are employed in four sectors: wholesale and 
retail trade, transportation and storage, 
accommodation and food services, and 
human health and social work. 
 
 One in four men of Pakistani ethnicity are 
employed as taxi-drivers159 and almost half 
of all men of Bangladeshi ethnicity work in 
restaurants160.   
 
 Fewer than 10% of professional, scientific 
and technical and education sector workers 
are from ethnic minority groups, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups are 
under-represented161. 
 
 The proportion of Black and Minority Ethnic civil servants has risen from 5.7% 
in 1998162 to 11.2% in March 2016163, which is closer in line with the 
economically active population (11.7%).  However, there are currently no Black 
and Minority Ethnic Permanent Secretaries (heads of Departments) and 
between 2007 and 2016 the proportion of Black and Minority Ethnic staff in the 
…people from Black, 
Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnic 
groups are still around 
three times more likely 
than those from White 
groups to be 
unemployed. 
Ethnic minorities tend to 
be concentrated in 
specific, often low 
status, sectors of the 
economy. 
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Senior Civil Service rose from just 3.2% to 4.4%164.  
 
 In 2014, the Green Park “Public Service Leadership 5,000” survey165 revealed 
that there was less ethnic diversity in public sector leadership across 
the UK than in the FTSE 100; even the most diverse area of Britain – London – 
had a lower proportion of visible minority executives than the FTSE 100. 
 
6.37. Demos analysis of Census data across the eight-tier occupational class 
system found little distinction between White British and ethnic minorities in class 1 
higher level occupations, with 9.8% of White British and 10.3% of ethnic minorities 
found in this class166.  But some ethnic minorities were better represented than 
others – for example, 15.4% of people of Indian ethnicity were in class 1 but only 
7.5% of Black African, 6.2% of Black Caribbean, 6.6% of Pakistani and 4.2% of 
Bangladeshi ethnic groups167. 
 
6.38. Controlling results of the analysis for 
differences that might be explained by age or 
education, the Dustmann et al analysis168 cited by 
Demos also found a much more significant wage 
gap between White British men and men of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity, who were 
earning 35.2% and 45.4% less respectively in 
2009.  Wage gaps were also apparent between 
White British men and men of Chinese and Indian 
ethnicity but these were less apparent and only 
showed up when controlling for the effect of 
higher educational attainment among Indian and 
Chinese groups. 
 
6.39. The same analysis shows that the wage gap between White British men and 
men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity narrowed for those who were born in the 
UK – by around a third to 20.3% for Pakistani men and by around two-thirds to 
14.7% for Bangladeshi men.  
 
6.40. Average (median) hourly earnings declined between 2008 and 2013 for all 
ethnic minority groups, with the exception of people from mixed ethnic 
backgrounds169.  Labour Force Survey data identified average hourly income for 
people in work of £10.60 for White people, compared with £10.20 for people from 
Black African and Caribbean backgrounds.  Pakistani and Bangladeshi earnings 
were the lowest for all ethnic minority groups, at £8.30170. 
 
6.41. In 2011, only 4.7% of White British people were in the bottom ‘never worked 
and long-term unemployed’ category, compared with 11.1% of ethnic minorities.  
Gypsy and Traveller people are the group most likely to have never worked or to 
have been long-term unemployed.  Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups also 
stand out in this category171.   
 
6.42. Inactivity rates for adults aged 16 to 64 are higher for Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
(37.9%), Black (25.7%) and Indian (24.3%) groups compared to White adults 
…a much more 
significant wage gap 
between White British 
men and men of 
Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnicity… 
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(20.5%)172.  There are though some very significant and worrying ethnic, age and 
gender differences across levels of unemployment and economic inactivity: 
 
 For young Black men, aged 16-24, the unemployment rate is 35% compared 
with 15% for young White men173; 
 
 Economic inactivity levels remain unusually high among women of Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi ethnicity – 57.2% are 
inactive in the labour market compared with 
25.2% of White women and 38.5% of all 
ethnic minority women174.  
 
 Women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
ethnicity have an unemployment rate of 
15%, more than three times the rate for 
White women (4.6%)175.  
 
 The differences between UK-born and non-
UK born women is significant in this group, 
with 44% of non-UK born Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women aged 16-24 classified as unemployed or inactive and not 
in Full Time Education – compared to 27% of their UK-born peers.  This 
percentage gap (17%) is considerably higher than that for Indian women (11% 
difference) and White women (2% difference)176.  
 
Proportion of people aged 16 - 64 who are economically inactive, Great Britain, 2015
 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions
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6.43. There are regional variations in employment rates, but the data178 suggests 
that additional barriers exist for Black and Ethnic Minority groups.  For example: 
 
 In Hackney, the White employment rate is 80.5%, while the ethnic minority rate 
is 51.5%; 
 
 In Bradford, the White employment rate is 70.6%, while the ethnic minority rate 
is 47.7%; 
 
 In Glasgow, the White employment rate is 68.9%, while the ethnic minority rate 
is 40.9%; 
  
 In Cardiff, the White employment rate is 68.8%, while the ethnic minority rate is 
46.3%. 
 
6.44. The gap in the employment rate between White and ethnic minority groups 
tends to be smaller in the East and South East of England and higher in Yorkshire 
and the Humber and the North West.  
 
Causes of variation in employment rates 
 
6.45. Discrimination, real and perceived, racial and religious, remains a significant 
barrier in minority groups’ employment: 
 
 In a study for the Department of Work and Pensions between 2008 and 
2009179, researchers sent 2,961 job applications to 987 advertised job 
vacancies.  The applications were identical 
apart from using different names of varying 
ethnic origin.  Of the applications with white-
sounding names, 10.7% received a positive 
response, compared with 6.2% for those with 
ethnic minority-sounding names. 
 
 According to the 2012 Labour Force Survey, 
British Muslims are more likely to report that 
they have felt discriminated against in job 
interviews, with 15% reporting discrimination 
– compared with a national average of 8%180. 
 
 A number of people on our visits have seen racial or religious discrimination as 
a key obstacle to obtaining employment or promotion.  Women in London felt 
that racism was the only explanation to persistent failure to obtain employment 
despite multiple degrees and substantial work experience in other countries.   
 
6.46. In a welcome move to address such discrimination, organisations from across 
the public and private sectors, together responsible for employing 1.8 million people 
in the UK, signed up to a pledge in October 2015 to operate recruitment on a ‘name 
blind’ basis. 
 
Discrimination, real and 
perceived… remains a 
significant barrier in 
ethnic minority 
employment. 
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6.47. Location of ethnic minority groups in some of the most deprived communities 
in the country suggests that economic deprivation may be a significant factor in 
access to employment.   
 
6.48. Cultural or religious factors and attitudes may also be contributing to poorer 
labour market outcomes for some communities.  Data from the Understanding 
Society survey found that 38% of Muslims think that “husbands should do work, 
wives should stay at home” compared to 18% of Christians and 11% of non-religious 
people.  In addition, 52% of Muslim respondents thought that “the family suffers if the 
mother works” compared with 34% of Christians and 23% of non-religious people181.   
 
6.49. In its 2015 report, “Is Britain Fairer?”182, the Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission found that Muslims had experienced the highest unemployment rates, 
lowest employment rates and lowest (and decreasing) hourly pay rates between 
2008 and 2013.  
 
6.50. The UK Parliament Women and Equalities Committee inquiry into 
employment opportunities for Muslims in the UK found that barriers to employment 
included discrimination and Islamophobia, stereotyping, pressure from traditional 
families, a lack of tailored advice around Higher Education choices and insufficient 
role models across education and employment. 
  
…cultural factors and 
choice are contributing to 
poorer labour market 
outcomes for some 
communities 
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English language 
 
6.51. In relation to integration and economic success, one factor that stands out 
strongly as a barrier to progress is proficiency in English.  English language is a 
common denominator and ensuring everyone is able to speak English enjoys strong 
public support183.  Lack of English skills presents a 
clear barrier to social and economic mobility – 
going for a job interview, writing a letter to a bank 
or understanding the country you live in.  
 
6.52. According to 2011 Census data184, 8.4% of 
the population in England and Wales (aged 16 and 
over) did not have English as their main language 
– around 3.6 million people.  More than 760,000 
people aged 16+ in England (1.8% of the 
population) could not speak English well or at all.  
Among children, data from the Department for 
Education showed that, in 2015, 19% of state primary school and 15% of state 
secondary school pupils were known or believed to have a first language other than 
English – around 694,000 secondary pupils and 477,000 primary school pupils185. 
 
6.53. Across faith and ethnic groups, analysis of 
Census data highlights the English language 
proficiency issues in Muslim, Polish, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities and reveals some 
worrying inequalities for women and girls in 
particular communities186: 
 
 By nationality, people in England and Wales 
who were born in Poland have the highest 
proportion (24.6%) aged 3 or over (141,395) 
who can’t speak English well or at all.   
 
 By ethnicity, Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic groups have the highest 
proportions of people aged 16 or over with poor English language proficiency – 
with 62,367 (21.9%) of the Bangladeshi ethnic population and 109,687 (18.9%) 
of the Pakistani ethnic population not 
speaking English well or at all, compared 
with 121,424 (12.6%) Chinese/other Asian, 
49,756 (11.9%) Arab or other ethnic, 95,145 
(8.4%) Indian, 29,728 (4.4%) Black African 
and 7,004 (4.1%) of other (non-
African/Caribbean) Black, 291,209 (0.8%) of 
White and Mixed/multiple and 1,435 (0.3%) 
of Black Caribbean ethnic groups.  
 
 By faith, the Muslim population has the 
highest number and proportion of people aged 16 and over who cannot speak 
English well or at all (282,136 people, 16% of all Muslims), compared with 
57,826 Hindus (8%) and 257,785 Christians (1%). 
English language is a 
common denominator 
and ensuring everyone is 
able to speak English 
enjoys strong public 
support. 
Muslim and Hindu women 
were more than twice as 
likely as Muslim and 
Hindu men not to speak 
English well or at all… 
More than 760,000 people 
aged 16+ in England 
(1.8% of the population) 
could not speak English 
well or at all. 
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 There is a notable pattern of poorer English language among women of 
Muslim, Hindu, and other non-Christian religions, with 189,931 (22.4%) Muslim 
women, 40,503 (12.7%) Hindu women, 138,598 (1.0%) Christian women and 
66,519 (3.4%) women of ‘other’ religions reporting not being able to speak 
English well or at all. 
 
 Muslim and Hindu women were more than twice as likely as Muslim and Hindu 
men not to speak English well or at all, with 189,931 (22.4%) Muslim women 
compared with 92,205 (9.9%) Muslim men, and 40,503 (12.7%) Hindu women 
compared with 17,323 (5.1%) Hindu men. 
 
Proportion of people who can’t speak English well or at all by Country of Birth and 
gender, England, 2011 
 
Source: 2011 Census
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A8 is the eight Accession countries which joined the European Union in 2004: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
 Muslim and Hindu girls (aged 3-15) were also more than twice as likely as 
those from other religions not to speak English well or at all.  However, it is 
interesting to note that a similar pattern also exists for Muslim and Hindu boys 
(aged 3-15) and that the significant gap between Muslim and Hindu men’s and 
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women’s ability to speak English well or at all appears to open up after the age 
of 16. 
 
 Birmingham has the largest number of women who are non-proficient in English 
(30,446) while Newham has the greatest proportion (11.1%). 
 
Geographic distribution of women who cannot speak English well or at all 
 
 Local Authority Number of women who cannot 
speak English well or at all 
% of women who cannot 
speak English well or at all 
1 Birmingham 30,446 5.8% 
2 Newham 15,578 11.1% 
3 Bradford 15,293 6.0% 
4 Leicester 14,844 9.3% 
5 Brent 13,914 9.4% 
6 Ealing 13,637 8.4% 
7 Tower Hamlets 12,101 10.3% 
8 Enfield 10,435 6.7% 
9 Haringey 9,949 8.1% 
10 Manchester 9,779 4.1% 
11 Waltham Forest 8,199 6.7% 
12 Barnet 8,151 4.6% 
13 Redbridge 7,998 5.9% 
14 Harrow 7,924 6.8% 
15 Hackney 7,857 6.6% 
16 Sandwell 7,544 5.0% 
17 Hounslow 7,113 5.9% 
18 Kirklees 6,792 3.3% 
19 Leeds 6,787 1.8% 
20 Luton 6,538 6.8% 
 
Source: 2011 Census 
 
 
6.54. Additionally, research by Demos188 has highlighted that: 
 
 By linguistic groups, people who speak Pakistani Pahari (with Mirpuri and 
Potwari) and Bengali (with Sylheti and Chatgaya) as their first language are 
among the least likely to speak English proficiently, at 55% and 70% 
respectively189.  
 
 Almost 14% of British Muslims for whom English was not a first language felt 
that language problems had resulted in difficulty finding or keeping a job, 
against an average of just under 12% of all those for whom English was not 
their first language190.  
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6.55. This is particularly worrying because poor English language skills have been 
shown to create a number of disadvantages, including: 
 
 a wage gap attributable to English as an 
additional language of 26% for men and 22% 
for women, and a lower employment rate 
(48.3%) for those who are non-proficient in 
English than those who are proficient 
(65.4%)191; 
 
 inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in public 
services due to lack of communication192; 
 
 a negative impact on children’s integration, education and life chances: while 
gaps are narrow and narrowing, speakers of languages other than English 
perform less well than the average across all school Key Stages193; 
 
 an impact on community cohesion and integration: 95% of people living in this 
country think that to be considered “truly British” you must be able to speak 
English (up from 86% in 2003)194 and 87% of people with English as their main 
language felt they belonged strongly to Britain compared to 79% of people 
without195; 
 
 a lower likelihood of participation in civic engagement or volunteering196; 
 
 a power imbalance which occurs in families where the man speaks English and 
the woman does not197. 
 
6.56. Conversely, we know that 27% of ESOL (English as a Second or Other 
Language) learners go on to further learning and that there is a clear link between 
the level of English spoken and the level of qualifications attained, and between 
levels of English and employment rates and labour market capabilities. 
 
6.57. During the review, a number of providers of English Language courses told us 
that funding for such provision from Government had reduced in recent years, was 
being devolved locally and focussed more on higher-level language and other skills 
for those seeking employment.  They felt that there was a significant gap in funding 
for pre-entry and entry level English language courses. 
 
6.58. Most non-European migrants coming to the UK have English language 
requirements placed on them as part of the immigration process.  These have been 
in place since 2008 for work visas and since 2009 for student visas.  With exceptions 
made – for example for people applying under exceptional talent categories, or 
students with disabilities – these requirements range from a ‘basic user’ level A1 (for 
example, for a sportsperson) to an ‘independent user’ level B2 (for example, for a 
Minister of Religion or a degree level student) to qualify for entry.  Since 2010, 
requirements to speak and understand a basic level of English have also been in 
place for non-European Economic Area (EEA) partners of a British citizen or person 
settled in the UK applying for a spouse/partner visa, and the Government plans to 
…poor English language 
skills have been shown to 
create a number of 
disadvantages… 
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introduce a higher (level A2) requirement for non-EEA partners for further leave to 
remain after 2.5 years in the UK where they are on a route to indefinite leave to 
remain.  Adult migrants, whether European or non-European, must have passed a 
‘Life in the UK’ test and met a B1 level of English language proficiency before they 
can achieve British Citizenship.  
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The integration gap 
 
6.59. In a study for the Department for Communities and Local Government, as yet 
unpublished, Professor Anthony Heath and a PhD student were asked to examine 
the ‘integration gap’ where members of Black and Minority Ethnic groups obtained 
poorer outcomes than White British people.  It focussed on settled communities 
rather than more recent EU migrants to understand why longer-established ethnic 
groups have yet to achieve parity.  It did not consider gaps within the White British 
community (for example among traditional ‘working class’ White British 
communities). 
 
6.60. The study supports much of the analysis in this section of the review in 
relation to longer-standing Black and Minority Ethnic groups, and concern for the 
socio-economic integration in particular of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean 
and Black African ethnic groups, with particular issues for women of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnicity and young Black men.   
 
6.61. The variations in socio-economic integration evidenced in this chapter, while 
often narrowing, have persisted for some groups and demand a more focussed 
effort, geographically, by ethnic and faith groups and by age and gender.  We should 
not be shy of targeting minority groups for assistance in a genuine endeavour to 
create a fairer and more equal society. 
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7. Inequality and harm 
Chapter Summary 
 
 Across the United Kingdom and throughout our history we have established 
some of the strongest equality rights in the world.  But there remains further to 
go. 
 
 Women still do not enjoy equality with men across a range of factors such as pay 
and representation.  Women from all backgrounds are vulnerable to different 
forms of domestic violence and abuse, and there are particularly acute 
inequalities and harms suffered by women in some communities, including 
female genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based crimes.  
Too often, these are perpetuated under the guise of cultural and religious values. 
 
 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people are also suffering abuse and 
harm and, where they come from less progressive religious communities, can 
face hate and stigmatisation from other communities because of their religious 
identity, and from their own community for their sexuality. 
 
 There are also concerns, raised by Ofsted and others, about the well-being of our 
children in some state schools and non-school settings, legal and illegal.  In these 
areas, educational segregation is being forced or created by parents and self-
appointed leaders; and some children are spending significant amounts of time in 
squalid conditions with un-vetted staff, and in circumstances where they are 
deprived of a rounded education and the opportunity to mix with children from 
other backgrounds.   
 
 What we saw and heard throughout our engagement suggests that these 
inequalities and divisions are persisting and appear to be worsening in more 
isolated communities where segregation, deprivation and social exclusion are 
combining in a downward spiral with a growth in regressive religious and cultural 
ideologies.  
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Inequality and harm  
 
7.1. Across the United Kingdom, we rightly take pride in having established a 
society, today, in which people from all different backgrounds are shown respect and 
are given equal rights and strong legal protection from discrimination.  We have a 
long tradition of providing rights and addressing inequality in law, from the Magna 
Carta in the 13th Century, through Acts of Parliament like the Catholic Relief Act of 
1829, the Representation of the People Acts in 1918 and 1928, to the establishment 
of the Welfare State in the 20th Century.  In more recent years, a raft of legislation 
(largely consolidated in the 2010 Equalities Act) has been put in place to tackle 
discrimination and prejudice on grounds of race, gender, disability, religion and 
belief, sexuality and age, reflecting Britain’s strong values of tolerance and fairness. 
 
7.2. There is further to go on these issues.  But our position today has grown out 
of a history that is marked by things which we should take pride in as a nation; as 
well as things of which we should not be proud but from which we should draw even 
greater strength in fighting for equality and social justice.     
 
7.3. Our analysis in earlier chapters of this report on social and economic 
integration has thrown up some worrying indications of inequality and harm which 
should be of significant concern in 21st Century Britain.  These concerns have been 
reinforced by people we have heard from during the review – in visits and meetings, 
and in written submissions – and in events that occurred as we conducted the 
review.  This chapter reflects what we have seen and heard. 
 
7.4. The causes of inequality vary and can be 
both internal and external to the communities in 
which they are suffered.  Common traits which we 
observed were that they: 
 
 often affect women – but have a knock-on, 
negative impact on children and the wider 
community; 
 
 taken to their extremes, are criminal acts; 
 
 in some cases are directly harming children; 
 
 in too many instances are the result of division, suspicion, fear, prejudice and 
hatred between communities, and retrenchment within communities; 
 
 can also feed division, suspicion, fear, prejudice and hatred between 
communities and be exploited by extremists, pushing people further away from 
mainstream society and creating a vicious cycle; and 
 
 may be described, excused and all too often ignored or ‘swept under the carpet’ 
as cultural or religious practices. 
 
The causes of inequality 
vary and can be both 
internal and external to 
the communities in which 
they are suffered. 
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7.5.  It is debatable whether some of this withdrawal into behaviours and practices 
that should have been left behind centuries ago as society progressed is a reaction 
to external pressures – such as discrimination and hostility, or disadvantage and 
deprivation – or a deliberate choice to sustain existing cultures, identity and power-
bases, and an active decision not to integrate.  What is not debatable is that the 
harms that result must be tackled. 
 
7.6.  There is a broad spectrum of behaviours at play between what might be 
described as cultural conservatism and acts that are clearly illegal.  It is more 
straightforward to condemn criminal acts but more difficult to challenge or act on 
behaviours that fall into ‘grey’ areas along this spectrum – where one person’s 
arranged marriage is another’s forced marriage; where one person’s loving 
relationship is another’s coercive control; or where one person’s religious 
conservatism is another’s homophobia.  We need an honest debate in society about 
this spectrum. 
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Women’s inequality 
 
7.7. It has been nearly 90 years since women achieved the same voting rights as 
men, over 40 years since the Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay Acts were passed, 
and 37 years since we had our first female Prime Minister.  However, while we have 
made significant progress in this space, persistent gender inequalities remain.  
Despite women being – numerically – the majority population, they do not enjoy 
equal outcomes and their inequality remains ‘labelled’ and subject to special targets 
and focus: 
 
 The female employment rate for January to March 2016 was 69.2%.  This is the 
highest since comparable records began in 1971, but still lags behind men at 
79.3%198. 
 
 Despite marked increases in recent years, 
women remain under-represented on both 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards.  In June 
2016, women accounted for 26% of FTSE 100 
Directors, up from 12.5% in February 2011.  
The majority of these women occupy Non-
Executive roles; 31.4% of Non-Executive 
Directors are women against 9.7% of 
Executive Directors.  These figures drop 
slightly for FTSE 250 boards - women account 
for 20.4% of FTSE 250 Directors; 25.7% of 
Non-Executive Directors and 5.6% of 
Executive Directors.  There are no remaining 
all-male boards in the FTSE 100, but there are still 15 all-male boards in the 
FTSE 250199 200. 
 
 As of November 2015, the overall UK gender pay gap for full and part time 
employees was 19.2 per cent201.  This gap is not just about unequal pay for 
comparable jobs.  Women tend to be concentrated in occupations and sectors 
with less scope for financial reward, and a proportion is due to differences in 
accumulated experience in full-time work, or the negative effect on earnings of 
taking time out of the labour market to look after children or relatives.   
 
 The 2011 Census revealed gender inequality in unpaid care across all English 
regions and Wales, with women taking on a greater share of the unpaid care 
burden.  Of the 5.41 million unpaid carers in England, 58% were female and 
42% male; of the 0.37 million in Wales, 57% were female and 43% male.  
Whether working full-time, part-time or unemployed, women provided more 
unpaid care than men202. 
 
7.8. While the latest pay gap figure is the lowest on record, no gender pay gap is 
acceptable and we fully support the Government’s ambition to eliminate the gender 
pay gap in a generation, as well as plans to introduce mandatory gender pay gap 
reporting for private and voluntary sector employers in England, Scotland and Wales 
with at least 250 employees, and to extend these plans to the public sector in 
England. 
Despite women being – 
numerically – the majority 
population, they do not 
enjoy equal outcomes 
and their inequality 
remains ‘labelled’ and 
subject to special targets 
and focus. 
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7.9. Women remain underrepresented in many spheres of political and public life: 
 
 Only just over one third of those attending Cabinet are women – even with our 
newly installed Prime Minister who has increased the number of women serving 
with her in the Cabinet. 
 
 30% of MPs are female203. 
 
 Female representation in the House of Lords is 26%204. 
 
 32% of local authority councillors in England were female as of 2013205. 
 
 54% of Civil Servants were female as of March 2016, though this fell to 40% of 
the Senior Civil Service206, and 19% of Permanent Secretaries (the Civil 
Service heads of Government Departments)207.   
   
7.10. This wider picture of discrimination and 
disadvantage remains despite numerous studies, 
strategies and targets over the years.  There are several 
particularly acute inequalities suffered by women in 
some minority communities, as set out earlier and later 
in this report, including lower levels of access to the 
labour market, poorer proficiency in English language 
and discrimination in politics.  But there are also a 
number of very serious harms suffered 
disproportionately by women across society, such as 
domestic violence and abuse; and by some women in 
particular communities as a result of cultural and religious catalysts, including female 
genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based crime.   The 
relationships between race, community and violence against women are complex, 
often unclear and need to be dealt with sensitively. 
 
Domestic violence and abuse 
 
7.11. Women from all backgrounds are at greater risk than men of different forms of 
domestic and sexual violence and abuse.     
 
7.12. Overall, 8% of women and 4% of men reported 
experiencing domestic abuse in the past year208.  This 
is equivalent to an estimated 1.3 million female victims 
and 600,000 male victims.   
 
 Office for National Statistics data for 2015 
(drawn from the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales) shows that the highest rates of domestic 
abuse are experienced by women from White 
and Black Caribbean (14%) and Irish (12%) 
ethnic backgrounds209.   
 
There are several 
particularly acute 
inequalities suffered by 
women in some minority 
communities…  
…those prosecuted for 
domestic abuse were 
overwhelmingly male 
(92%), White British 
(71%) and aged between 
25 and 59 years (74%). 
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 Data from the Crown Prosecution Service (for 2015-16) indicates that those 
prosecuted for domestic abuse were overwhelmingly male (92%), while 71% 
were White British and 74% aged between 25 and 59 years210. 
 
7.13. Studies such as Violence prevention the evidence: Promoting gender equality 
to prevent violence against women by the World Health Organisation, suggest that 
gender inequalities increase the risk of violence by men against women211.  Gender 
inequalities can also be worse in some ethnic groups than others – which is not to 
say that violence against women does not take place in all communities, when it 
clearly does, or that gender inequalities are exclusive to any ethnicity or faith. 
 
7.14. Data collected by Women’s Aid, providing a snapshot of 128 refuges and 96 
community-based services for the week 21 to 25 September 2015, show a different 
profile among victims of domestic violence who turn to services for help.  White 
British victims made up 41% of refuge users, followed by people of Asian/Asian 
British ethnicity (18%) and Black (14%) victims.  Community-based services showed 
a different profile: again, the largest group was White British, this time at 67%, 
followed by people of Asian/Asian British ethnicity at 9% and from Other White ethnic 
backgrounds at 6%212.  It is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from this data, 
having been captured from a single week snap-shot across a range of services 
(including 10% specialist services for Black and Minority ethnic communities) in 
locations that might not be representative of the population as a whole.  
Nevertheless, it merits further, more in-depth research into the experience of 
domestic violence among ethnic minority women. 
   
7.15. Research on domestic violence213 documents the particular vulnerability of 
some immigrant or ethnic minority women that might exacerbate their experience of 
domestic abuse, including: 
 
 lack of English language skills hampering 
understanding of rights and services 
available and the ability of service providers 
to respond; and 
 
 social isolation and notions of honour and 
shame in some communities, including fear 
of censure from wider family and 
community which leads victims to report 
later and can involve greater safety risks. 
 
7.16. We have heard concerns from service providers and experts that a lack of 
English language skills can create further complicating problems for victims of abuse 
in coming forward and getting help that might include:  
 
 the need for a translator (often a family member) when interacting with 
services, meaning a victim is less likely to reveal abuse;  
 
 having a reliance on a husband’s English skills economically and socially, 
making a victim more fearful of seeking help;  
 
…a lack of English 
language skills can 
create further 
complicating problems 
for victims of abuse… 
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 a reliance on a husband for their immigration status which victims fear would be 
at risk from coming forward; or  
 
 a lack of awareness - that abuse is unacceptable in the UK, of services that 
may be available to help or of how to access them, or sometimes even that 
they are being abused at all.   
 
Cultural and religious catalysts 
 
7.17. Throughout our review we have encountered countless examples of abuse 
and unequal treatment of women enacted in the name of cultural or religious values, 
or as a reaction to those values:  
 
 Islamophobic hate crime attacks, discussed later in this report, can be 
disproportionately targeted at women.  This appears to relate to more visible 
and identifiable forms of cultural dress, such as wearing a hijab, veil, niqab or 
burkha.   
 
 Pressure from families or wider communities to marry against one’s will, 
posters being put up instructing women to only walk on one side of the road, 
and preferred dress codes issued for parents. 
  
 Mosques and Islamic organisations offering regressive advice about the 
behaviours expected of Muslim women and girls – including not being allowed 
to travel more than 48 miles from home without their husband or male 
chaperone, or not being able to wear jeans – despite noted Islamic theologians 
dismissing such advice as inappropriate. 
 
 The segregation of women and men in mosques is common but has also been 
found by Ofsted in independent Muslim and Orthodox Jewish faith schools and 
reported in wider non-religious community meetings, including meetings of 
political parties and in universities.  
 
 Several ethnic and faith minority women’s 
groups told us of a misogynistic culture that 
prevails in their communities, with women 
disempowered and treated as second-class 
citizens, and with the abusive and controlling 
behaviour of men often reinforced by their 
mothers, by religious leaders and through 
religious councils or courts. 
 
 Community groups which sought to empower 
women, for example through teaching English 
language skills, told us that men in the 
household often discouraged and prevented 
their wives from attending classes, or were highly wary about allowing them to 
attend.  Several groups had devised specific tactics to overcome this.  But they 
feared reprisals if they spoke out publicly about these issues. 
Several ethnic and faith 
minority women’s groups 
told us of a misogynistic 
culture that prevails in 
their communities, with 
women disempowered 
and treated as second-
class citizens… 
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7.18. Practitioners have raised concerns with us about some of the same overlaying 
factors being behind gender inequalities more generally and violence against women 
in some communities.  These include greater levels of patriarchal control or uneven 
balances of power in a relationship; the acceptance of ‘home country’ norms in terms 
of both domestic abuse and a woman’s role in the home; or insular communities that 
deal with problems internally and, as such, are less likely to engage with services or 
mix with others.  The ‘first generation in every generation’214 trend in some 
communities, mentioned in chapter 3, can be a further exacerbating factor. 
 
7.19. Female genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based 
crimes are among the worst harms that some may try to justify in the name of 
religion when they are more clearly cultural choices connected very directly to 
countries or regions of origin.  They jar even more heavily outside their place of 
origin not just because they are criminal acts under our laws but also because they 
are so clearly at odds with the human rights we value and have fought for.  As such, 
they are sharp indicators of a lack of integration. 
 
Female genital mutilation 
 
7.20.  A 2015 study estimated that there were approximately 137,000 women and 
girls living permanently in England and Wales with 
female genital mutilation (FGM) and 60,000 girls who 
were born in England and Wales between 1996 and 
2010 to mothers with FGM215.   
 
7.21. There were 5,700 newly recorded cases of 
FGM reported in England in 2015-16, according to 
the first annual statistics published by the Health and 
Social Care Information Centre since the 
Government introduced compulsory reporting for 
NHS trusts and GP practices.  More than half of all 
cases related to women and girls from the London NHS Commissioning Region, 
comprising 52% of newly recorded cases and 58% of total attendances.  Of women 
and girls with a known country of birth, 90% were born in an Eastern, Northern or 
Western African country; Somalia accounted for 37% of all newly recorded women 
and girls with a known country of birth, while Eritrea, the Sudan, Nigeria and the 
Gambia also had a large volume of cases.  There were 43 newly recorded cases of 
FGM involving women and girls reported to have been born in the UK216.  Between 
July 2015 and March 2016, 46 FGM Protection Orders were issued following their 
introduction at the beginning of that period217. 
 
Forced marriage 
 
7.22. The Crown Prosecution Service’s most recent violence against women and 
girls crime report shows that the volume of forced marriage referrals to them from the 
police had risen from 67 in 2013-14, to 90 in 2015-16, with charges in 57 (63.3%) 
cases218219.  To date, more than 1,000 Forced Marriage Protection Orders have been 
made to prevent people from being forced into a marriage and to assist in 
repatriating victims220. 
…approximately 137,000 
women and girls… living 
permanently…with  
female genital 
mutilation… 
 109 
 
 
7.23. In 2015, the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) gave advice or support relating to a 
possible forced marriage in 1,220 cases.  Most of 
the cases (80%) involved female victims, and there 
were 67 ‘focus’ countries to which a victim was at 
risk of being, or had already been, taken in 
connection with a forced marriage.  The five 
highest volume countries were: Pakistan (44%), 
Bangladesh (7%), India (6%), Somalia (3%) and 
Afghanistan (2%).  In 14% of the cases, there was 
no overseas element, with the forced marriage 
activity taking place entirely within the UK221. 
 
7.24. The Government makes a clear distinction 
between forced and arranged marriages: 
 
 A forced marriage is where one or both people do not (or in cases of some 
people with learning or physical disabilities or mental incapacity, cannot) 
consent to the marriage and where violence, threats, or any other form of 
coercion are involved.  Coercion may include emotional force, physical force or 
the threat of physical force, and, financial pressure.  Examples include 
someone being made to feel like they are bringing shame on their family, or 
financial abuse (taking wages away or not providing any money)222.  
 
 An arranged marriage is not the same as a forced marriage.  In an arranged 
marriage, the families take a leading role in choosing the marriage partner, but 
both parties are free to choose whether to enter into the marriage or not223. 
 
7.25. Nevertheless, we have heard that many forced marriages begin as arranged 
marriages, where an originally consenting party changes their mind, but faces 
pressure to proceed with the marriage; when consent is withdrawn, it ceases to 
become an arranged marriage and becomes a forced marriage.  In some cases, the 
dividing line is not clear.  We have heard of cases where, having agreed to an 
arranged marriage, one party vocalises their non-consent to a third-party, but does 
not want to vocalise it to their family.  This appears to be a grey area where a 
seemingly arranged marriage in fact involves elements of non-consent and pressure 
which feel closer to the definition of a forced marriage. 
 
So-called ‘honour’ based crimes 
 
7.26. Data released by the police in July 2015 
showed that more than 11,000 so-called ‘honour’ 
based crimes were recorded between 2010 and 
2014224.  The Crown Prosecution Service’s most 
recent Violence Against Women and Girls crime 
report shows that the volume of referrals for such 
offences, having increased in 2013-14 and 2014-
15, fell in 2015-16 to just 216 cases225226. Several 
people have called for the removal of the word 
‘honour’ from descriptions of such crimes as an entirely inappropriate term, while 
…more than 1,000 
Forced Marriage 
Protection Orders have 
been made to prevent 
people from being 
forced into a marriage… 
…more than 11,000 so-
called ‘honour’ based 
crimes were recorded 
between 2010 and 2014. 
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others we have spoken to during the review told us that changing the description 
risked obscuring the cultural issues that lie behind such violence.   
 
Under-reporting 
 
7.27. In a 2015 report, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary said it was clear 
that “many, many instances of honour-based violence, forced marriage and female 
genital mutilation go unreported” and that police preparedness for dealing with those 
crimes was “pretty patchy”, with forces not understanding enough about the cultural 
issues behind such violence – with notable exceptions in London and the West 
Midlands where knowledge was found to be very good227 228.  It is vital that 
Government and other agencies continue to drive improvements in data collection in 
this area, as well as engaging with local communities to improve understanding and 
raise awareness among women of services that are available if they require help. 
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Intolerance of different sexuality 
 
7.28. There is evidence that some people in particular ethnic and faith communities 
have views around Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people that are 
at odds with mainstream modern British values and laws.  Such views are frequently 
ascribed to more hard-line and extreme individuals in those communities.   
 
7.29. During this review, however, we have come across a worrying prevalence of 
anti-LGBT sentiment.  Intimidation and hatred for those who leave their faith was 
brought to the attention of the team, particularly from people who left more traditional 
or conservative religious sects and who felt persecuted within their own community. 
 
7.30. This is not hidden.  In the 30th British Social Attitudes survey (2013), 40% of 
Anglicans and 35% of Catholics in Britain thought that being gay was “always” or 
“mostly” wrong.  Less progressive views towards sexuality may also be found among 
older people and those with low educational qualifications.  But the trend across 
society is towards more liberal and progressive views229. 
 
7.31. Polling of British Muslim attitudes by ICM in April 2016, discussed earlier in 
this report, found that 52% of Muslim respondents said that they thought 
homosexuality should be made illegal in Britain (compared to 11% among the rest of 
the population), while 47% said that teachers should not be gay (compared with 14% 
of the general population)230. 
 
7.32. Sadly, regressive views and attitudes are also being acted upon.  Recent 
research by the University of Sussex231 found that most LGBT people have been a 
direct victim of a hate incident in the past three years, and even more know someone 
who has been a victim. The report found that members of the community who know 
a victim of a hate crime:  
 
 feel more anger, anxiety, and shame;  
 
 are more likely to avoid certain locations, more likely to join community based 
organisations; and  
 
 some are more likely to want retaliation. 
 
7.33. During the review, we heard from a number of LGBT members of faith 
communities, in particular from within the Muslim community, about their 
experiences.  These people face hate and stigmatisation both for being a Muslim 
and from within their own community for being gay and are therefore particularly 
isolated and held back.  Some Muslim groups we spoke to advocate an 
interpretation of British Islam which maintains the values of the Qur’an and embraces 
all sexualities.  However, more conservative Muslim groups fundamentally disagree 
with this view. 
 
7.34. The Government’s Forced Marriage Unit has dealt with issues around minority 
communities and LGBT rights.  Although the overall numbers are small, in 2010 the 
unit reported a 65% increase in the number of men being made to marry – including 
a number of gay men being forced by their families to marry women232.  While we did 
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not hear about the issue of men and women being forced into heterosexual 
marriages as a result of their homosexuality during the review, we concur with the 
view that these findings may under-report the prevalence of this issue in some of our 
most isolated communities.   
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Risks to our children’s well-being 
 
7.35. Schooling and education are fundamental to the well-being of our children and 
play a major part in fostering resilience, tolerance and critical thinking.  Schools can 
also provide an environment in which children from different backgrounds mix and 
gain a broader view of the diverse communities and cultures that make up our 
society today.  But the high levels of ethnic and faith segregation in some of our 
schools, discussed earlier in this report, are a 
cause for great concern.  They risk children’s well-
being when pupils in segregated schools do not 
have the opportunity to mix with children from other 
backgrounds or gain from a properly rounded 
education. 
 
7.36. The Department for Education has 
strengthened requirements on all schools to 
promote fundamental British values, including 
respect and tolerance of those with different 
religions and beliefs, and Ofsted inspectors have increased their focus on how 
schools deliver this and the breadth of the curriculum offered to pupils.  It has also 
increased transparency about governors and taken stronger powers to remove those 
that are unsuitable.   
 
7.37. We are concerned, however, that schools in some areas face a constant 
battle in reaching out to parents to engage them and convince them not to withdraw 
their children from key parts of the school’s activities (whether that is swimming or 
visiting the theatre) that would help them gain a broader understanding of the world 
in which they are growing up and the people from different backgrounds that they will 
meet in life.  In some schools, teachers face a constant challenge from parents 
and/or ‘community leaders’ who want to narrow the education and activities available 
to their children.  This felt like hard work, and teachers were crying out for more 
backing from Government in their efforts to persuade parents to give their children a 
fully rounded education. 
 
7.38. In addition to visits to schools across the 
country, we held review discussion groups with 
teachers in Birmingham, Manchester and Bristol 
which highlighted the value that they place on 
discussion of personal, emotional and health 
issues outside of a purely academic context.  All 
groups were clear about the importance of 
promoting shared values (though the methods of 
doing so varied) in order to develop children’s 
tolerance of difference, ability to reason and 
critique, and to build their resilience to harmful 
influences later in life.  They noted the importance 
of tackling parental objection to this kind of 
education, and of preventing divisive 
environments which can act as a barrier to messages of equality and tolerance.  
Teachers wanted the freedom to teach values in a way that suited their particular 
…high levels of ethnic 
and faith segregation in 
some of our schools are 
a cause for great 
concern.   
All groups were clear 
about the importance of 
promoting shared 
values… to develop 
children’s tolerance of 
difference, ability to 
reason and critique, and 
to build their resilience 
to harmful influences 
later in life. 
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schools but felt that insufficient weight or recognition was given to their role in this 
respect in the Department for Education’s frameworks, including Ofsted inspection. 
Trojan Horse 
 
7.39. The role of faith and education were thrown into the spotlight in 2014 with the 
‘Trojan Horse’ episode, following attention being drawn to a letter which set out how 
a number of schools in Birmingham had been taken over to ensure they were run on 
strict Islamic principles.  There have been numerous inspections of the schools 
involved, a number of independent inquiries and extensive media coverage of the 
affair.  It is important to note that these were not ‘Muslim’ or ‘faith’ schools.  Peter 
Clarke, in his July 2014 report233 said: 
 
“I took particular note of the fact that the schools where it is alleged that this has 
happened are state non-faith schools.” 
 
7.40. He highlighted a range of inappropriate behaviours across the schools 
including irregularities in employment practices, bullying and intimidation, changes to 
the curriculum and educational plans, inappropriate proselytising in non-faith 
schools, and unequal treatment and 
segregation, with specific examples including: 
 
 a teachers’ social media discussion called 
the “Park View Brotherhood”, in which 
homophobic, extremist and sectarian 
views were aired; 
 
 teachers using anti-Western messages in 
assemblies, saying that White people 
would never have Muslim children’s 
interests at heart; 
 
 the introduction of Friday Prayers in non-
faith state schools and pressure on staff 
and students to attend – in one school a 
Public Address system was installed to call 
pupils to prayer, with a member of staff 
shouting at students who were in the playground, not attending prayer, and 
embarrassing some girls when attention was drawn to them because girls who are 
menstruating are not allowed to attend prayer; and 
 
 senior staff calling students and staff who do not attend prayers ‘k****r’. 
 
7.41. Peter Clarke concluded:  
 
“There has been co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained action, carried out by a 
number of associated individuals, to introduce an intolerant and aggressive 
Islamic ethos into a few schools in Birmingham.  This has been achieved in a 
number of schools by gaining influence on the governing bodies, installing 
sympathetic headteachers or senior members of staff, appointing like-minded 
…inappropriate 
behaviours across the 
schools including 
irregularities in 
employment practices, 
bullying and intimidation, 
changes to the curriculum 
and educational plans, 
inappropriate proselytising 
in non-faith schools, and 
unequal treatment and 
segregation… 
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people to key positions, and seeking to remove headteachers they do not feel 
sufficiently compliant234.”   
 
7.42. Many of the individuals involved deny the allegations against them and 
continue to this day to maintain they were acting in the best interests of pupils.  We 
heard wider views in Birmingham that sought to underplay the seriousness of the 
issues or to deny the extent of the problem, portraying the whole episode as a 
conspiracy and the letter a fake.   
 
7.43. Professional misconduct and legal proceedings are underway against the 
individuals involved so we will only have a complete picture when these 
conclude.  However, at the point of finalising this review, four teachers had been 
found guilty of unacceptable professional conduct and three of these have been 
prohibited from teaching. The independent panels hearing the cases235 have found 
that teachers:  
 
“agreed to the inclusion of an undue amount of religious influence in pupils’ 
education; did not show tolerance and respect for the rights of others; expressed 
personal beliefs in ways which could exploit pupils’ vulnerability; and breached 
proper recruitment processes.”   
 
7.44. We noted with concern that, as recently as 8 July 2016, Her Majesty’s Chief 
Inspector, Sir Michael Wilshaw, wrote to the Secretary of State for Education about 
Birmingham City Council’s support for vulnerable schools236 and noted that while 
many of the schools at the centre of the episode have improved, the situation 
remains fragile, with: 
 
 a minority of people in the community who are still intent on destabilising these 
schools; 
 
 a lack of co-ordinated support for the schools in developing good practice; 
 
 a culture of fear in which teachers operate having gone underground but still 
there;  
 
 overt intimidation from some elements within the local community; and  
 
 organised resistance to the personal, 
social and health education (PSHE) 
curriculum and the promotion of equality. 
 
7.45. The ‘Trojan Horse’ episode highlighted 
weaknesses in how leaders in education – 
whether in the Council or as head teachers – 
deal with robust requests from a minority of 
parents claiming to represent the community.  
While such ‘requests’ are made on the basis of 
accommodating religious and cultural needs of 
Muslim children, they are often about 
sustaining the power of self-appointed 
…weaknesses in how 
leaders in education – 
whether in the Council 
or as head teachers – 
deal with robust 
requests from a minority 
of parents claiming to 
represent the 
community. 
 116 
 
community leaders intent on perpetuating inequality and regressive attitudes.   
 
7.46. Ian Kershaw’s report237 commissioned by the Council found that individuals 
had placed pressure on head teachers to deny pupils their right to access a broad 
and balanced curriculum, including understanding world religions and sex and 
relationship education.   He concluded that the Council’s inability to act where head 
teachers were being pressurised and undermined was exacerbated by a culture 
within the Council of not wanting to address difficult issues and problems with school 
governance where there was a risk that the Council may be accused of racism and 
Islamophobia.  We found several examples of this across the country, with people 
not wanting to believe such practices were taking place, calling the episode the 
‘Trojan hoax’ and accusing Government and Ofsted of being anti-Muslim. 
 
7.47. These dual issues of public officials accepting claims by a small number of 
individuals to represent the views of a wider community and failing to challenge their 
views due to concerns around racism or community relations, or simply a lack of 
knowledge and confidence, are not unique to this episode; indeed we have been told 
by head teachers and others of similar experiences, poor practice and unhealthy 
power dynamics elsewhere – and we saw this for ourselves in other areas of the 
country.  Ofsted are also investigating in a number of other areas, including 
Bradford, East London and Luton.  We return to wider issues of leadership later in 
this report. 
 
Children in unregulated environments   
 
7.48. As the requirements on all schools, including independent schools, have been 
strengthened, the focus on the safety and well-being 
of children receiving education in settings which are 
not registered has sharpened.  Settings where 
children are receiving a full-time education are 
required to register as independent schools; failure 
to do so is a criminal offence.   
 
7.49. Ofsted are checking more than a hundred 
cases of such institutions which may potentially 
have to be registered but are not, and found 
instances of squalid conditions, concerns with the 
safety of the premises and no evidence that staff 
had been vetted to work with children.  In his letter 
to the Secretary of State for Education of 16 May 2016238, Sir Michael Wilshaw said 
the Ofsted inspection process: 
 
“Firmly reinforces my belief that there are many more children hidden away from 
the view of the authorities in unregistered schools across the country than 
previously thought.  Last month, inspectors issued seven warning notices to 
suspected illegal schools…  In total, around 350 children or young people were 
found to be on the premises during these visits.” 
 
7.50. The narrow curriculum offered would be unlikely to meet the standards 
expected of an independent school.  It is important that, despite parents accepting 
Ofsted are checking 
more than a hundred 
cases of such 
institutions which may 
potentially have to be 
registered but are not... 
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the conditions and type of education, the rights of children to be safe from harm and 
to a suitable education come first and Ofsted is 
preparing cases for the Crown Prosecution 
Service to pursue prosecutions where the law 
has been broken.    
 
7.51. There are also a significant number of 
settings which are not full-time where children 
receive some form of education outside school, 
such as sport clubs, dance studios and religious 
settings.  During this review, the Department for 
Education conducted a call for evidence239 on whether to regulate settings providing 
intensive education (6-8 hours per week) and to prohibit:  
 
 corporal punishment;  
 
 unsuitable premises;  
 
 the appointment of unsuitable staff; and  
 
 undesirable teaching, such as promoting extremist views.  
 
7.52. It proposed that Ofsted would be able to inspect such settings where there 
were concerns that prohibited activities were taking place and that appropriate 
sanctions would be introduced.      
 
7.53. Concerns about the welfare of children in out-of-school settings, including 
being exposed to extremist views, are long-standing (they were mentioned in the 
2011 Prevent Strategy240) and we noted widespread public support for the 
Department for Education’s proposals.   According to a Survation poll of 1,031 
members of the British public for the Huffington Post UK conducted online on 7 
October 2015, 62% of respondents endorsed the plans, while 13% were opposed 
and 24% were undecided241. 
 
7.54. The proposals drew public concern from a range of religious organisations, 
principally around the requirement to register, which they regarded as unnecessary 
state interference in religion and, for some, that the prohibition on extremist teaching 
could be interpreted as preventing the teaching of traditional religious beliefs.  There 
have also been calls for inspection to be undertaken by faith organisations 
themselves rather than by Ofsted.  When the proposals were debated in 
Westminster Hall on 20 January, MPs raised concerns about whether they were 
proportionate242.   
 
7.55. In trailing the proposals in October 2015, the then Prime Minister said:  
 
“But in some madrassas we’ve got children being taught that they shouldn’t mix 
with people of other religions; being beaten; swallowing conspiracy theories about 
Jewish people. These children should be having their minds opened, their 
horizons broadened…not having their heads filled with poison and their hearts 
filled with hate243.” 
…the rights of children 
to be safe from harm 
and to a suitable 
education come first… 
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7.56. During the review this was mentioned by several people we met as signalling 
that the proposals were actually targeted at madrassas and Muslims.  Few who said 
this seemed to have read the Department for Education’s proposals.  A ‘Keep 
Mosques Independent’ campaign was launched in opposition to the Department for 
Education’s call for evidence, providing a website with campaign resources such as 
posters and sermons and selective quotes from the Prime Minister.  The campaign 
website provided no copy of or link to the Department for Education’s document – 
which made it clear that the call for evidence was not only about madrassas but all 
out-of-school settings. 
 
7.57. Despite the negative reaction among some Muslim groups, we did also hear 
concerns, particularly from mothers, about the availability and quality of Islamic 
religious teaching; whether all parents felt able to question what their children were 
being taught; and about the use of physical punishment in madrassas.   
 
7.58. While no reliable records exist to identify the number of madrassas or other 
supplementary schools that exist across Britain, or the number of children attending 
them, the scale is believed to be significant, particularly within Muslim communities.  
Estimates have been produced to suggest there are around 2,000 madrassas in the 
UK (Hayer, 2009244), attended by more than 250,000 British Muslim children 
(Abrams, 2011245).   
 
7.59. Ensuring the welfare of children must be 
paramount and it does no good to deny that 
there are concerns and particular risks with 
settings about which not much is known and 
where a significant number of children spend a 
considerable amount of time; or to reject out of 
hand proposals to ensure the well-being of our 
children.  And while the recent campaign of 
resistance has stemmed mainly from Muslim 
communities, these are not concerns limited only 
to madrassas or Muslim children.  The main 
churches in England, the Church of England and 
the Catholic Church, and the Jewish community, 
are not free of historic problems in ensuring the 
well-being of children in their institutions.    
 
Home education 
 
7.60. Education is the fundamental right of every child.  According to the Education 
Act 1996 it is parents (not the state) who are responsible for providing their children’s 
education ‘at school or otherwise’246.  There are a number of reasons why some 
parents may choose to home educate their child, including philosophical or religious 
motivations or high rates of travel – for example for work.  In other cases, a child 
might start off in school but later be taken out and educated at home – perhaps 
because a child has special needs or the parent does not think the schools available 
are suitable for their child.  These are all valid reasons and there are many 
responsible parents and parents’ groups who argue strongly for their right to exercise 
Ensuring the welfare of 
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good to deny that there 
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time… 
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their statutory responsibility to educate their children in the manner they regard most 
appropriate. 
 
7.61. The 1996 Education Act stipulates that 
parents are responsible for providing an 
‘efficient’ and ‘suitable’ education for their 
children247.  But there is no definition in law of 
what constitutes a ‘suitable’ education.  In 
2007, the Department for Education issued 
guidance248, still in place, using a definition 
which was taken from commentary in a 
judicial review case in 1985.  ‘Suitable’ was 
referred to in R v Secretary of State for 
Education and Science (1985249) as 
education that: 
 
“primarily equips a child for life within the community of which he is a member, 
rather than the way of life in the country as a whole, as long as it does not 
foreclose the child’s option in later years to adopt some other form of life if he 
wishes to do so.” 
 
7.62. This definition from a 30-year old case runs counter to efforts to foster British 
values in schools across the country and contrary to efforts on integration and 
building cohesive communities which are 
based on shared values.  Even independent 
schools, which do not have to follow the 
national curriculum and have a lot of 
autonomy on what and how they teach, are 
required to teach fundamental British values 
on the principle that all children should be 
equipped to participate fully in British life. It 
seems wrong, therefore, that this should not 
also be the case for home-educated children.  
All children should have equal opportunity in 
attainment and life chances regardless of the 
method of education chosen for them. 
 
7.63. While there are many proponents of the benefits and strengths of home 
education, there are a number of difficulties and risks associated with it and little 
evidence we could find to assess the educational attainment and socio-economic 
progress made by home educated children.   
 
7.64. There is no requirement for parents to register or notify their local authority 
that they are home educating their child.  Local authorities do not therefore have any 
sure way of knowing the extent of home education in their locality, nor the quality or 
‘suitability’ of education being provided outside school settings.  A study in 2014 put 
the figure of registered home education children in England at 27,292250.  The 
unregistered number is unknown and thought to be several multiples of this.   
 
All children should have 
equal opportunity in 
attainment and life 
chances regardless of 
the method of education 
chosen for them. 
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7.65. A further concern – expressed by Ofsted and others – is that some people 
may be misusing the right to home educate and its light regulation to place their 
children in unregistered and illegal schools.  In 
cases where Ofsted found unregistered schools 
there is evidence to suggest some of these 
schools are using the freedoms afforded to 
genuine home educators as a cover for their 
activities251.  
 
7.66. Some local authorities have also raised 
concerns with us that the current legal framework 
has serious limitations on the extent to which 
local authorities can lawfully and effectively 
investigate to establish the suitability of education 
being provided to home-educated children, and 
so also be aware of any child protection issues that may arise from the nature of 
education being provided and the home in which it is being provided.  
 
7.67. At the beginning of 2016, the Department for Education consulted on 
tightening up regulation on pupil registration in schools to improve local authorities’ 
awareness of pupil destinations and track children going missing from education252, 
following concerns raised by Ofsted who identified risks that such children may face, 
including forced marriage, child sexual exploitation, female genital mutilation and 
falling prey to radicalisation.   
 
7.68. We welcome action to address this but it only has the potential to improve 
tracking of children who have been attending but then been withdrawn from school.  
We believe further action is necessary to cover children who are home educated 
without ever having attended school – otherwise there will always be a cohort of 
pupils who are not known to local authorities and the opportunity to abuse the 
system will remain. 
 
7.69. Parents should continue to have the right to home educate their children but 
stronger safeguards are required to ensure the child’s right to a decent and suitable 
education for life in Britain, and to protect them from harm.  The evidence we have 
seen in this review shows it is too easy for children to be raised in a totally secluded 
environment that does not provide a suitable education or sufficient protection from 
harm.  One case of this happening is one too many. 
 
7.70. The harms and inequalities highlighted in this chapter often result from 
cultural practices and behaviours that are out of step with modern British values and 
in many cases, the law.  More effort is required to ensure illegal acts are met with the 
full force of the law.  But attitudinal change is required too and we hope communities 
will not deny, reject or shy away from the difficult issues brought out in this review, 
but engage constructively in a debate about improving equality and reducing harm – 
for the benefit of all. 
 
  
…some people may be 
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8. Religion 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
 There is a rich tradition of religion as a force for good in this country and we 
remain largely religious, with 7 out of 10 of us saying we belong to a religion. 
 
 But there has been a significant shift in the religious landscape of the nation, with 
a reducing number identifying themselves as Christian, more people saying they 
hold no religion and more diverse and growing minority faith populations, of which 
Muslims are the most prominent. 
 
 This increase in the diversity of faiths and beliefs in the UK has increased the 
visibility of tensions between religious groups and the presence of more visible 
signs of religion, for example in the growth of mosques, and led to increased 
anxiety – which has not been sufficiently acknowledged or discussed. 
 
 The connection between violent Islamist terrorist groups and Islam, while rejected 
by many Muslims, has also increased public attention and awareness of more 
regressive attitudes in some minority religious groups, and the abuse of religious 
codes like Sharia law.  These attitudes, and the behaviours that stem from them, 
suggest support in some groups for the inequalities and harms addressed in this 
review and increase the sense of separatism and divergence from modern 
values. 
 
 Faith leadership has not to date been strong enough to counter the vocal minority 
who are bringing religion into disrepute and influencing the attitudes of people 
who increasingly regard religion as a force for bad. 
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Religion 
 
8.1. There is a rich tradition of religion as a force for good in this country and much 
that is currently being done by people of faith that we can build upon.  Many people 
still look to religion and to religious leaders for guidance in times of turmoil and crisis, 
whether personal or societal and it is notable that, during episodes of heightened 
community tension, our political leaders often turn to religious leaders for messages 
of peace and calm.  During the course of the review we have heard a great deal 
about the work of churches, mosques, synagogues and temples to: 
 
 care for the sick or the elderly or the 
socially excluded; 
 
 help educate, protect and empower our 
children; 
 
 feed, clothe and house the poorest in 
society, fight the trafficking of women and 
children, and address a range of social 
justice issues. 
 
8.2. We heard, for example, about:  
 
 young Muslims taking it in turns to drive to Cumbria to help flood victims; 
 
 religious representatives bringing people of different faith and ethnicities 
together to support local projects;  
 
 many thousands of people of faith coming together across the country through 
events (such as Sadaqa Day and Mitzvah Day) and organisations from the 
Caritas Social Action Network (the Catholic Church in England and Wales’ 
social action arm) to Kumon Y’All (a small Yorkshire-based youth group) to 
undertake social action and help make local communities in Britain a better 
place to live. 
 
8.3. Such work is selfless, often unremarked upon in society, but can have a 
dramatic impact in relieving individual human anguish and suffering.  For all those 
involved, faith is not something incidental to their actions.  It is fundamental: the font, 
the origin, the thing that makes these people who they are and do what they do.  To 
them, their faith is realised in action: in commitment to others; in caring; in 
compassion; in an all-embracing feeling of solidarity.   
 
8.4. But there are also a significant number of people who regard religion as a 
negative and divisive force in society.  There is a global history of wars, persecution 
and other harms that have been perpetrated in the name of religion, against or 
between religious groups, and many of these have left on-going tensions between 
different religious communities and sects that impact on community cohesion.   
 
 
There is a rich tradition 
of religion as a force for 
good in this country… 
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Trends in religion in Great Britain 
 
8.5. Over the past half century, Britain’s religious and belief landscape has been 
transformed.  As discussed in chapter 3, there has been an increase in the number 
of people with non-religious beliefs and identities.  While nearly 70% of the 
population described themselves as belonging to a religion in the 2011 Census, with 
25% saying they held no religion253, the National Centre for Social Research’s 
annual British Attitudes Survey suggests that almost half the population sees itself as 
non-religious254. 
 
8.6. We remain an officially Christian country with our Head of State, Her Majesty 
the Queen, also Supreme Governor of the established Church in England, while at 
the 2011 Census, 59% of us described ourselves as Christian.  But that figure had 
fallen significantly from 72% a decade earlier255.  And the Church of England has 
seen a steady decline in church attendance over the last half century, with the 
proportion of the population attending Sunday services now only one third of that in 
the 1960s256. 
 
8.7. At the same time there has been a shift away from mainstream Christian 
denominations and a growth in evangelical and Pentecostal churches, largely 
reflecting changes in ethnic diversity257.  
 
8.8. There has also been an increase in the variety of faiths being practiced.  Fifty 
years ago, Judaism – at less than 1% of the population – was the largest non-
Christian faith in the UK.  Now it is the fourth largest non-Christian faith with 269,000 
people identifying as Jewish in the 2011 Census 
behind Islam (2.8 million people), Hinduism 
(833,000), and Sikhism (432,000).  Although still 
comprising less than 10% of the population, 
minority faith groups have younger age profiles 
than the largest Christian groups, and can be 
expected to grow as the latter decline258.  The 
increase in people identifying as Muslim has been 
particularly noticeable, with 1.2 million more – a 
72% rise - in the 2011 Census than the 2001 Census259, attributable mainly to 
immigration and higher birth rates.    
 
8.9. The nature of religion in Britain has therefore changed dramatically in recent 
years.   
 
Religious tensions 
 
8.10. This increased variety of faiths – and the cultures, histories and global links 
that they bring with them – has led to increased awareness and visibility of the 
tensions between some religious groups, many long-standing.  Our engagement has 
particularly highlighted the many intra- and inter-faith disputes inextricably linked to 
today’s geopolitical crises across the Middle East, and in many parts of Africa and 
Asia.  Many of these disputes are reflected back into British society and are now part 
of the everyday experience of people living in Britain, creating or exacerbating 
tensions between different communities. 
The nature of religion in 
Britain has therefore 
changed dramatically in 
recent years. 
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8.11. Religious leaders on the national and international stage, as well as those 
working locally in our communities, have recognised and responded to this.  There 
has been a great deal of ‘inter-faith’ work to bring 
faith communities together around the values that 
they share.  Government strategies for community 
cohesion and integration have supported such 
work, including financially, and we comment on this 
later on in this report.  We do not undervalue the 
importance of inter-faith work; neither do we under-
estimate how hard it is to draw together the 
communities with the most polarised and 
entrenched views. 
 
8.12. We have heard a lot about the anxiety that 
rapid change has caused.  Some faith groups are 
concerned about what they describe as an aggressive secularisation taking hold of 
Britain, exemplified by curbs on signs of religion being displayed or worn in some 
public services; and religion seen as being side-lined, marginalised and downgraded 
in the public sphere.  
 
8.13. Others express concern about an increase in signs and symbols of religious 
fundamentalism or, as some described it, the ‘Islamification’ of Britain (including, for 
example, concerns about the growth in the numbers of mosques and traditional 
Islamic forms of dress).   
 
8.14. There has been a reluctance to discuss or acknowledge the impact that this is 
having on long-standing communities, akin to the 
sensitivity we have seen over immigration.  In turn, 
this can cause disaffection and it has been seized 
upon by far right extremists to pull people towards 
their agenda.  
 
Growth of mosques 
 
8.15. The growth in the number and visibility of 
mosques, madrassas and other Islamic buildings 
has proven an issue of particular contention in 
some communities.  The growth in recent years has 
been exponential, but the particular impact felt in 
communities may be explained by a) the more rapid 
growth in recent years of the Muslim population in Britain compared to other faiths, 
b) the stronger tendency towards geographical concentration among Muslims 
compared to other minority faith groups, c) the decline in longer established 
churches, d) the distinctive architectural style and features of mosques and e) the 
attention that has been drawn over the last decade or more to some mosques as 
‘breeding grounds’ for radicalisation and terrorism. 
 
8.16. The online religious data resource, British Religion in Numbers260, records the 
number of officially registered mosques in Britain over time, drawn from data held at 
We do not undervalue 
the importance of inter-
faith work; neither do we 
under-estimate how hard 
it is to draw together the 
communities with the 
most polarised and 
entrenched views. 
There has been a 
reluctance to discuss or 
acknowledge the impact 
that this is having on 
long-standing 
communities, akin to the 
sensitivity we have seen 
over immigration.   
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the General Register Office.  While noting that this tracks only the number of 
mosques that are officially registered as places of worship (not the total number of 
mosques), it shows the long-term growth trend in the chart below:  
 
Number of mosques certified as registered Place of Worship in England & Wales, 
1910 - 2012 
 
Source: British Religion in Numbers (1910-1998); Office for National Statistics - Marriage, Divorce and 
Adoption Statistics, England and Wales (Series FM2) (1999 – 2007); General Register Office (2007 – 
2012)
261
 
8.17. A significant number of mosques are not registered as places of worship and 
best estimates we have seen during the review suggest that there are now more 
than 2,000 mosques in the UK, distributed broadly in line with the high 
concentrations within the Muslim population identified earlier in the report.  The 
Muslims in Britain website identified the following geography of mosques in this 
country: Birmingham 161, Bradford 91, Leicester 71, Tower Hamlets 60, Kirklees 52, 
Manchester 62, Newham 47, Blackburn with Darwen 45, Sheffield 36 and Oldham 
30.  Glasgow has 28 and Cardiff 15262.   
 
8.18. Data analysis of registered places of worship by 
British Religion in Numbers (excluding the Church of 
England or Church in Wales which, as the established 
churches, are not required to register) indicates a net 
reduction in longer-established Christian churches, and 
a growth in places of worship for Christian 
communities outside the traditional categories and 
other non-Christian religions, notably Muslim, Sikh and 
‘other’263.  However, the scale and rate of growth of 
places of worship for non-Christian religions appears 
significantly smaller than for mosques. 
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Number of Places of Worship in England and Wales by religion, 1999 - 2012  
 
Source: ONS - Marriage, Divorce and Adoption Statistics Series FM2 & General Register Office 
8.19. The rapid growth in mosques has played a part in an increase in community 
concerns and tensions.  In a major city in the North West of England, we visited a 
street on which there were four mosques along a stretch of road less than a quarter 
of a mile long, each serving a slightly different Muslim community or offering prayers 
in different languages.  They had all been built in a short time period.  The mosques 
along this road faced a largely white working class community and the police told us 
tensions were high, particularly on Friday afternoons in 
the summer as Muslim men from the area assembled 
for prayers.  When we spoke to members of the white 
community in the area, they felt they were unable to 
express any concerns about the growth in the number 
of mosques because they would be accused of being 
racist and ignored by the authorities. 
 
8.20. We also heard about growing community 
opposition to new mosque proposals.  Often, the most 
strongly expressed concerns – for example in objecting 
to planning applications – were about the impact on 
local parking.  But there was also a sense of community 
concern about the architectural appearance of 
mosques.  The public mood was described to us as having changed from 
acceptance and curiosity about a small number of buildings that seemed rare, to a 
concern about an unknown culture increasingly dotting the British skyline and 
highlighting difference.  During the review, Baroness Warsi called publicly264 for the 
development of mosque architectural designs that better contextualised Islam in 21st 
During the review, 
Baroness Warsi called 
publicly for the 
development of mosque 
architectural designs 
that better 
contextualised Islam in 
21st Century Britain. 
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Century Britain.  Such a step could be symbolic of a wider desire in the Muslim 
population to cultivate a British flavour of Islam, comfortable in its identity, discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
8.21. We visited several mosques during the 
review and met Imams and members of mosque 
governing bodies who were keen to emphasise 
the links they were making to the community 
through charitable acts and open events.  But we 
were also struck by the defensiveness of some 
Muslims about any Government or authority 
interest in mosques, plainly driven by them 
feeling under suspicion and that such 
engagement seemed to them to be driven 
primarily if not solely by a desire to spot and act 
on signs of radicalisation.  This is a shame.  Now 
more than ever, mosques and their leadership 
need to be open and transparent to the 
communities around them to help break down suspicion and build trust.  A new 
approach to engagement between mosques, Government, local authorities and 
communities is needed urgently. 
 
 
  
Now more than ever, 
mosques and their 
leadership need to be 
open and transparent to 
the communities around 
them to help break down 
suspicion and build 
trust.   
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Regressive attitudes 
 
8.22. Unfortunately, when some people in Britain think of faith they also think 
about terrorism, extremism, sectarian violence, child abuse, discrimination and a 
rejection of many of the values that we hold dear in this country (including 
democracy, the rule of law and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths, 
beliefs and life styles). 
 
8.23. While many people in the UK appear to be seeing religion as increasingly less 
important and, in some cases, less of a force for good, for others, religion is very 
important in their daily lives.  Within this latter group 
there appear to be some who are keen to take 
religion backwards and away from 21st Century 
British values and laws on issues such as gender 
equality and sexual orientation; creating 
segregation and pulling communities apart.  
 
8.24. Public concerns about the increasing 
visibility of Islam in Britain may be driven by 
practical concerns but also by anxiety and fear of 
the unknown, including the twisted version of Islam 
that, while unsupported and denied by many 
Muslims, is promoted vociferously by Islamist 
terrorist and extremist organisations.  They may 
also be driven by the widely reported shift to more traditional, literalist and some 
would say regressive or extremist interpretations of Islam in some communities. 
 
8.25. In this review, we have heard a number of theories about the drivers for the 
emergence of more regressive Islamic religiosity.  Before the early 2000s, both the 
Saudi state and private Saudi citizens are reported to have actively promoted a 
Saudi interpretation of Islam overseas, including in Britain.  This included the 
production of Islamic literature and promotion of teachings that claimed the 
supremacy of ultra-conservative Salafi Sunni Islam which encouraged intolerant 
views, including anti-Semitism, hatred of other sects (Sufi and Shi’a Muslims), anti-
Western sentiment and violent punishment for homosexuality.  Saudi officials are, 
naturally, quick to emphasise that these judgements were not intended to be applied 
in the UK and that Islam mandates observance of local norms for Muslim citizens of 
non-Muslim states – but this message does not appear to have got through to 
practice on the ground in many places.  
 
8.26. Since 9/11 some have claimed that there has been a reduction in the scale 
and impact of Saudi influence in the UK and a fragmentation of Salafi networks that 
has diluted their influence.  Despite this, Salafi interpretations of Islam and other 
literalist and intolerant interpretations of Islam remain easily accessible and still 
appear popular in some parts of the UK, especially among the young and those new 
to Islam.  We visited several mosques where we were told it was nigh on impossible 
to get well qualified English speaking Imams and in one we were told they felt 
pressured and even persecuted by other Saudi-influenced mosques in the 
surrounding area.  
 
…there appear to be 
some who are keen to 
take religion backwards 
and away from 21st 
Century British values 
and laws on issues such 
as gender equality and 
sexual orientation… 
 129 
 
8.27. Speakers from the Deobandi revivalist movement in Sunni Islam have also 
become increasingly prominent in Britain in recent years, and although not 
necessarily supporting terrorism, they have promoted anti-Western and isolationist 
messages that are not conducive to integration.   
 
8.28. Scholars who argue that religious guidance should be contextualised in the 
21st Century are a small minority.  Deobandi networks exert a significant influence in 
Britain, particularly in Birmingham, parts of London, Leicester and towns in the North 
West.  Their scholars have a significant authority and influence on their communities.  
Some 45% of UK mosques follow Deobandi teachings and Dar ul-Uloom seminaries 
are responsible for the majority of UK Islamic training265.  
 
8.29. Many people talked to us during the review about the teachings and 
interpretations of their religions.  Some Muslims 
recognised the challenges that arose from the 
diversity and complexity of their faith – for 
example the different strands of Islam, lack of 
formal hierarchy or authority, scarcity of Imams 
who speak good English, and the role and power 
politics of self-appointed leaders – and the need 
for clearer interpretation of Islam for life in the UK.  
The idea of a modern British understanding of 
Islam is also advanced by Dilwar Hussein, founder 
of New Horizons in British Islam, who argues that 
the Qur’an should be interpreted for modern times 
and modern values.   Past attempts to 
contextualise Islam in Britain have been fraught 
with difficulty and have not made sufficient progress but we think there is strong 
merit in these being pursued with more vigour by Muslim leaders and communities. 
 
8.30. Academic research266 267 suggests that there has been a rise in the more 
traditional markers of faith particularly among young Muslims.  Many young Muslims 
in Britain attribute a greater salience to Islam for their personal identity and there is a 
greater adherence to Muslim dress than among previous generations.  Some have 
attributed this to young Muslims being far more politically active, albeit largely 
outside of the traditional British party political system with which many are 
disillusioned, and conscious of international issues - especially suffering experienced 
by the ‘Ummah’ (the wider global Muslim community) and their responsibilities 
towards it.  Young people feel ‘problematized’ and alienated because of their religion 
and pull further away from mainstream society as a result. 
 
8.31. It has been said that the outward physical manifestation of religiosity is a 
reflection of an inner contestation over the nature of fractured identities: Wearing of 
religious dress is “a sign of defiance and resistance in the face of persistent negative 
media and political vilification268”.  Others, including Muslim women we met during 
the review, have described the pressure on Muslim women to wear traditional and 
cultural forms of Islamic dress (such as the veil and niqab) as another reflection of 
misogynistic attitudes towards women.  We were struck also by points on these 
issues attributed to Sadiq Khan during his London Mayoralty campaign269: 
 
Some Muslims 
recognised the 
challenges that arose 
from the diversity and 
complexity of their 
faith… and the need for 
clearer interpretation of 
Islam for life in the UK.   
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“When I was younger you didn’t see people wearing hijabs and niqabs, not even 
in Pakistan when I visited my family.  In London we got on.  People dressed the 
same.  What you see now are people born and raised here who are choosing to 
wear the jilbab or niqab.  There is a question to be asked about what is going on 
in those homes. What’s insidious is if people are starting to think it is appropriate 
to treat women differently or that it has been forced on them.  What worries me is 
children being forced to adopt a lifestyle. It’s not for me to tell women what to 
wear.  But I do think that in public service we should be able to see each other’s 
faces.  Eye contact matters.  You should be able to see the face.  There is no 
other city in the world where I would want to raise my daughters than London.  
They have rights, they have protection, the right to wear what they like, think what 
they like, to meet who they like, to study what they like, more than they would in 
any other country.” 
 
8.32. As common-sense as Sadiq Khan’s viewpoint is, it has been clear during the 
review that not everyone shares it.  We have heard about various religious 
institutions across Britain and preachers accessible on widely available British media 
stations and the internet which have argued a very different view, that men have 
numerous rights over women.  We do not believe this is happening everywhere but it 
does exist and, wherever it does, it is wrong.  Examples we have come across 
during the review included advice that: 
  
 “A woman should seek her husband’s 
permission when leaving the house and 
should not do so without his knowledge”270; 
and 
 
 It is for men to grant permission for women to 
travel, even if the decision of the husband 
goes against the wishes of the female, and 
banning women from driving a car for long 
distances (three days/48 miles) without a 
male chaperone271.  
 
8.33. We also came across examples of literalist interpretations and advice that 
increased divisions between communities.  In the West Midlands, we were given a 
leaflet that was branded as coming from a ‘Public Council’ in the city, calling on 
Muslims to boycott a community music festival in a local park.  It advised that: 
 
“This kind of events [sic] not only increases the proliferation of sinful activities; it 
also threatens the very structure of our community” and  
 
“it is the duty of every Muslim to boycott and abstain from this kind of events [sic] 
and discourage their families, children and relatives from attending these events”. 
 
8.34. There are examples of inequality and intolerance in other ethnic and faith 
groups, with concerns expressed to us during the review about increased Sikh 
extremism (for example in disruptions to mixed faith couples’ weddings), the 
treatment of women in some strictly Jewish Orthodox communities (with children 
reportedly being taught that a woman’s role is to look after children, clean the house 
We do not believe this is 
happening everywhere 
but it does exist and, 
wherever it does, it is 
wrong. 
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and cook) and newer Christian churches (with activists seeking to ‘cure’ people of 
homosexuality).  All such instances undermine integration and should be challenged. 
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Religious codes 
 
8.35. The laws in this country provide for equal rights and security for every citizen 
regardless of ethnicity, faith, gender, sexual orientation or financial standing.  As our 
earlier discussion of values showed, there is widespread acceptance of the rule of 
law as a core value in the UK to which majority and minority ethnic and faith groups 
subscribe strongly. 
   
8.36. Many people in this country of all 
different majority and minority faiths follow 
religious codes and practices, seek guidance 
from faith leaders in dealing with a wide range 
of life issues and matters of conscience, and 
benefit from the guidance they receive.  
Religious communities also operate counselling 
and mediation services, arbitration councils and 
boards to resolve disputes.  Under British civil 
laws, a third party can be used to resolve a 
dispute as long as both sides agree to the arbitration.  They cannot, however, 
replace civil law.  The overriding principle is that these rules, practices and bodies 
must operate within the laws of the UK.  
 
8.37. However, we received a number of representations during the review that 
suggested some religious bodies might not be following this principle - operating in 
ways that are discriminatory, causing harm and subverting individuals’ legal rights.  
 
8.38. Sharia Councils have been operating in the UK since the 1980s.  While there 
have been a number of controversial media headlines about them, not much is 
known about how they actually operate across the country.  There are reported to be 
between 30 to 85 such councils in the UK but there could be more272 273.  We have 
been told that much of their work focuses on providing advice to Muslims who 
choose to use them to resolve civil and family disputes.   
 
8.39. Functions generally include mediation, issuing religious divorce certificates 
and occasionally guidance on how to conduct day-to-day activities such as which 
mortgages or insurance products are consistent with sharia law.  How they operate 
varies considerably depending on factors such as ethnicity, culture, sect and school 
of thought.  
 
8.40. However, we heard about discriminatory 
practices against women which, in some cases, 
are causing serious harm.  Some women’s 
rights groups have accused Sharia Councils 
and other parallel legal systems of denying 
vulnerable women and children access to 
equality and human rights.  There have been 
claims that some Sharia Councils have been 
supporting the values of extremists, condoning 
wife-beating, ignoring marital rape and allowing 
The overriding principle 
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forced marriage.  It has also been claimed that their influence is growing.   
  
8.41. We heard about women being charged higher fees than men for using the 
same service (sometimes up to four times as much) and women facing lengthier 
processes for divorce than men.  Most concerning of all, we were told that some 
women were unaware of their legal rights to leave violent husbands and were being 
pressurised to return to abusive partners or attend reconciliation sessions with their 
husbands despite legal injunctions in place to protect them from violence.  
 
8.42. We also heard evidence that some Muslim Arbitration Tribunals in the UK 
exceeded their mandate in arbitrating on issues outside of their jurisdiction, such as 
child custody and domestic violence.  It was claimed that lack of oversight and an 
absence of consistent standards meant individuals with little or no training were 
found dispensing life-changing advice.  These experiences often left the women and 
children feeling traumatised.  We have heard reports that there are now up to 
100,000 sharia marriages in the UK, many of which are not recognised under UK 
laws and leave women without full legal rights upon divorce.  It has been claimed 
that 70 to 75% of Muslim marriages in the UK have not been registered under the 
Marriage Act274.  The Muslim Women’s Network publication, ‘Information and 
Guidance on Muslim Marriage and Divorce in Britain’, cites research that found that 
over half of the cases dealt with by Birmingham Central Mosque Sharia Council 
involved couples who were not married under English civil law; and references data 
from their own helpline in which 30% of enquiries about divorce were from women in 
marriages not recognised legally.275 
 
8.43. The prevalence of unregistered 
marriage would be concerning in any group, 
as an indicator that people were not accessing 
their rights.  It is particularly concerning in a 
group that includes those known to have lower 
levels of female employment, lower levels of 
English language and, anecdotally at least, a 
lack of awareness of other civil rights.  The 
potential for women (in particular) to find 
themselves in what they believe to be a 
binding commitment, be economically and 
socially dependent on their spouse, and yet 
have no legal marriage status, is worryingly 
high.  
 
8.44. The imbalance of power in such relationships has been raised a number of 
times throughout this review.  We heard that some men had refused to give or agree 
to a divorce even though they had moved forward with their lives and remarried; 
refused or contested an Islamic divorce to extract a more favourable financial 
settlement from their wife; threatened women with an instant verbal divorce (without 
having to go through a formal procedure); or threatened to marry again and commit 
polygamy.   
 
8.45. The practice of ‘unregistered polygamy’ appears to be more commonplace 
than might be expected.  The existence of matchmaking sites like “secondwife.com” 
The prevalence of 
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and a number of accusations, anecdotes and assertions encountered throughout our 
engagement imply a common acceptance of polygamy – which impact negatively on 
women (and their children) who have not had a legal marriage, through denial of 
inheritance and maintenance rights – even if most people would not wish the 
situation upon themselves.  In situations of polygamy, the power imbalance of an 
unregistered marriage is compounded by the power imbalance of being one of many 
spouses – something the United Nations has condemned as particularly 
“contraven[ing] a woman’s right to equality with men, and [having]… serious 
emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependents”276.  
 
8.46. The practice highlights the complexity that we as a state, and as a society, 
face in challenging issues of cultural difference.  In the eyes of the law – provided no 
bigamy, or encouragement or assistance of bigamy or any other crime is committed 
– there is nothing illegal with living with a wife and a girlfriend.  Condemnation of the 
practice on the grounds of a spouse’s rights becomes more difficult without a clear 
legal framework; and falls into a realm of cultural sensitivity which many people are 
uncomfortable dealing with.  
 
8.47. For example, a BBC Asian Network interview with the founder of 
secondwife.com277, while questioning whether the justification for polygamy is strictly 
applicable in the modern context, shied away from presenting any direct criticism.  
Instead, the interview focussed on gently ridiculing the founder’s verbal blunders and 
contradictions, allowing the statements that thousands of women are willing to be 
second wives and that the website is most popular in the UK to pass as 
unexceptional. 
 
8.48. We have also heard about cases where devout Orthodox Jewish women in 
some communities, despite being able to get a divorce in British law courts, have felt 
trapped in a marriage they cannot get out of, as only the husband has the power to 
grant a ‘get’ (a Jewish divorce document authenticated by a Rabbi and given by a 
husband to his wife releasing her from their marriage). 
 
8.49. While Government and law enforcement agencies must take swift and 
decisive action against any practices that are incompatible with UK laws, reform, 
especially on matters of equality, must also be driven from within faith communities.  
We welcome the tireless work being done at grassroots level by some groups and 
individuals to support vulnerable women and children who have been victimised by 
such systems and to raise awareness of the 
rights afforded to all British citizens.  We also 
recognise that some faith groups and leaders 
have called on such religious bodies to ‘do the 
right thing’ and have named and shamed those 
who have not.  Some faith leaders are working to 
formalise and standardise procedures in order to 
address some of these concerns.  But this alone 
is not enough and there is more that needs to be 
done to ensure that all religious and cultural 
tribunals operating in the UK comply with our standards of equality and our 
legislation.  
 
…reform, especially on 
matters of equality, must 
also be driven from within 
faith communities. 
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8.50. All marriages, regardless of faith, should be registered so that the union is 
legally valid under British laws.  We have heard strong arguments that the Marriage 
Act should be reformed to apply to all faiths and 
that faith institutions must ensure they are 
properly registered and operate within existing 
legislation.  Faith groups and leaders, with the 
support of Government, must ensure anybody 
advising couples is appropriately vetted and 
adequately trained, not simply theologically but 
also in matters pertaining to domestic abuse.  
 
8.51. We need to ensure that women in 21st 
century Britain are better informed about their 
rights and, in particular, practices relating to 
marriage and divorce.  We must put a stop to 
cases where, in the name of religion, women and 
children are given short shrift, discriminated 
against and denied the rights that this country provides for everyone.  
  
8.52. During this review, the then Home Secretary announced an independent 
inquiry into the role of Sharia law278.  We think this is timely in the light of points put 
to us and believe it should have a particular focus on equalities issues and the 
treatment of women. 
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Faith leadership 
 
8.53. We discuss broader aspects of community and public leadership in a later 
chapter but, across the wider range of concerns about religious practices and 
influences that were put to us during the review and which we have reflected in this 
report, it is clear that there are too many religious leaders condoning or promoting 
intolerant and hateful teachings.  Too often, these views appear to be based on 
warped theology, designed to sustain the power of particular individuals or groups 
and to excuse or even legitimise their transgressions. 
 
8.54. These have an impact on vulnerable individuals who might feel they should 
follow them, but they also increase the fear and suspicion of others.  They are a 
vocal minority.  But the majority of peaceful, tolerant and liberal religious leaders, 
who have the potential to heal the divisions between communities of different faiths 
and none, are not being loud enough or bold enough to protect vulnerable individuals 
or to reduce the fear and suspicion of others. 
 
8.55. We were pleased to note during discussions with the leadership of the Church 
of England, the Catholic Church in Britain and the Jewish faith, as well as with some 
influential Muslim and other minority faith leaders, an enthusiasm for continuing inter-
faith dialogue, a willingness to share learning from their respective histories and 
experiences, and a recognition of the importance of 
promoting tolerance and greater respect for all, 
regardless of colour, creed or sexuality.   
 
8.56. We hope those leaders will respond 
positively to this review and push this important 
work harder and faster, including through their 
education and school arms, to promote shared 
human values, confront the harms we have 
identified and enable anyone of any belief, or none, 
to feel respected, not condemned; protected by the 
laws and traditions of the United Kingdom.  And we hope that Muslim leaders will 
respond to the demand in their communities for a clearer interpretation of Islam for 
modern life in Britain. 
 
  
We hope those leaders 
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this review and push this 
important work harder 
and faster… 
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9. Hate and extremism 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
 Recorded hate crimes are on the increase and, while there is some debate about 
whether this is simply a result of better reporting, the Crime Survey suggests that 
only around one in four incidents is reported. 
 
 There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that hate crimes increase following 
‘trigger events’ such as terrorist incidents that raise tensions between particular 
communities, and the increase in reported hate crimes following the EU 
referendum may be another example of such a spike.  
 
 Groups that record crimes against particular religious groups also report an 
increase in anti-Muslim (Islamophobic) hate crime, in violent anti-Semitic assaults 
and in sectarian violence. 
 
 Prominent Islamist and far right extremist groups are peddling fear and hatred 
and pushing communities further apart.  While diametrically opposed to each 
other, they are both pushing an ideology that Islam and British values are 
incompatible, creating a vicious circle that increases fear and prejudice and 
further alienates Muslim and non-Muslim communities. 
  
We hope those leaders 
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this review and push this 
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Hate crimes 
 
9.1. Hate crimes are “crimes committed against someone because of their 
disability, gender-identity, race, religion or belief, or sexual orientation”279. They are a 
particularly powerful manifestation of prejudice and discrimination as they are often 
directed at characteristics over which we have no control; striking against the respect 
and individual liberty that most of us hold dear as a British and human value.   
 
9.2. The vast majority of hate crimes remain race related as opposed to other 
forms of hatred – although we were told during the review that the threshold for 
proving a hate crime was religiously motivated was harder to pass when compared 
to racially motivated crime, and that many religiously motivated hate crimes were 
therefore being prosecuted on grounds of race (and thereby under-reflected in the 
data).  
 
9.3.  In 2015-16, there were 62,518 hate crimes recorded by the police280, an 
increase of 19% compared with 2014-15:  
 
 49,419 (79%) were race hate crimes;  
 
 7,194 (12%) were sexual orientation hate 
crimes;  
 
 4,400 (7%) were religious hate crimes;  
 
 3,629 (6%) were disability hate crimes; 
and  
 
 858 (1%) were transgender hate crimes.  
 
9.4. There were increases in offences recorded for all five of the monitored hate 
crime strands (race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity) 
between 2014/15 and 2015/16281. 
 
9.5.  The Office of National Statistics has attributed much of the recent increase in 
police-recorded hate crime to improvements in recording rather than an increase in 
offences.  Indeed, the Crime Survey for England and Wales282 estimated that there 
were 222,000 hate crimes on average per year from 2012/13 to 2014/15, 
representing a decrease of 56,000 compared 
with the previous period covered by the 
survey283. This includes a decrease in religious 
and race hate crimes.  Nevertheless, it also 
indicates that the number of hate crimes people 
experience is around four times higher than 
those recorded, suggesting a very significant 
level of under-reporting. 
 
9.6.  There is some evidence and anecdotal 
reports which suggest that increases in race 
In 2015-16, there were 
62,518 hate crimes 
recorded by the police, 
an increase of 19% 
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and religious hate crimes may be due to higher levels that follow specific highly 
publicised incidents or ‘trigger’ events, such as the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 
2013284.  Monthly monitoring of race and religious hate crimes by the Home Office 
shows spikes following a number of events over the last couple of years: 
 
 
   
9.7. The increased level of reported hate incidents in the wake of the EU 
referendum result – including violent attacks on Polish and other Eastern Europeans 
– might be another such spike, with perpetrators 
feeling emboldened by the outcome.  In the week 
following the referendum, online reporting site True 
Vision received reports of 331 hate crime incidents, in 
comparison with a weekly average of 63 reports285, 
although it is important to note that this is just one 
reporting mechanism.  National Police Chiefs’ Council 
(NPCC) data286 showed that, in the last two weeks of 
June 2016, 3,192 hate crimes and incidents were 
reported to police forces across England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, an increase of 1,031 compared with 
the same period in 2015.  This fell to 3,001 hate 
crimes and incidents in the first two weeks of July 
2016 but was 20% higher than the equivalent period 
last year.  The main type of offence across both periods was violence against the 
person - chiefly harassment, common assault and other violence.  It is difficult to 
ascertain how far the increase in reported incidents is due to an increase in incidents 
as opposed to an increase in reporting:  the NPCC emphasise that forces have been 
monitoring and managing hate crime more robustly since the Paris attacks of 2015; 
and it is likely that media coverage of hate crime would 
similarly lead to greater awareness and increased 
reporting. 
 
Anti-Muslim hate crime 
 
9.8.  Tell MAMA, a confidential third-party reporting 
service for individuals who experience anti-Muslim 
hate incidents and crimes, reported a 200% increase 
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in offline Islamophobic incidents in 2015.  They found that 61% of all recordable 
victims were female, and 75% of female victims were visibly Muslim, concluding that 
visibility through the hijab and niqab play a role in the targeting of the 
individual.  Where the gender and ethnicity of the perpetrator were known, 76% were 
male and 89% were white.  The three most common places where attacks occurred 
were public areas (26%), the transport network (20%), and places of business 
(12%)287. 
  
9.9.  Research evidence (Pew, 2008288; Change Institute, 2009289; DCLG, 2011290) 
points to increasing negativity towards Muslims and Islam after 2001.  Though the 
reasons behind this increase are complex and difficult to unpick, academic 
commentators suggest the growing anti-Muslim sentiment has been associated with 
wider public feelings of fear and anxiety (Bleich, 2011291) and linked to a perceived 
or symbolic threat of conflict between Muslim and British/Western culture (Alam and 
Husband, 2013292). 
 
Anti-Semitic hate crime 
 
9.10. The Community Security Trust (CST), a 
charity that monitors anti-Semitism and provides 
security for the Jewish community in Britain, 
recorded 557 anti-Semitic incidents across the UK 
from January to June 2016293, which represented an 
11% increase on the same period in 2015, and the 
second highest incident total CST has ever recorded 
for this  period.  According to CST, the number of 
anti-Semitic incidents has remained at a relatively 
high level since summer 2014, when the UK saw a 
large spike in incidents in relation to the conflict in 
Israel and Gaza.  Of the total 557 incidents, 79% 
were recorded in Greater London and Greater Manchester, areas with the two 
biggest Jewish communities in the UK.  While the 379 anti-Semitic incidents 
recorded in Greater London represented a 62% increase on the same period in 
2015, the 62 anti-Semitic incidents recorded in Greater Manchester represents a fall 
of 54%.  The data also shows that: 
 
 In contrast to anti-Muslim incidents, where CST received a description of the 
gender of the victim, the majority were male (64% of such cases), while 27% 
were female and 9% mixed-gender groups.   
 
 In cases where the age of the victim was described to the CST, 21% were 
believed to be minors.  
 
 Where CST received a description of the offender, 84% were reported to be 
male, 54% were described as White – north European, 5% as White – south 
European, 20% south Asian, 13% Black, 7% Arab or north African, and 1% as 
east or south east Asian. 
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Sectarian violence 
 
9.11. In addition to abhorrent teachings about homosexuality, the place of women in 
society, anti-Semitic views and intolerance towards apostates, tensions between 
different ethnicities and religious sects are also 
evident in some communities.  Tell MAMA 
reports294 that the number of cases of abuse 
against minority sects, particularly the Ahmadis, 
has increased over the past five years.  
 
9.12. In March 2016, Glasgow shopkeeper Asad 
Shah was attacked and killed at his premises.  Mr 
Shah was an Ahmadi; an Islamic movement that 
arose in Northern India and recognises its 
founder Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet.  Ahmadis 
face persecution in many Muslim countries for 
this belief, particularly in Pakistan, where the group cannot legally identify as Muslim 
and are subject to protests, arrest and violent attack.  A Glasgow-based Human 
Rights lawyer called for unity in Scotland’s Muslim community295 following the 
events, but reported receiving death threats as a result, with abuse and hatred 
across social media. 
 
 
In the case of shopkeeper Asad Shah’s murder, the perpetrator, Tanveer 
Ahmed, claimed that: 
 
“this all happened for one reason and no other issues and no other 
intentions.  Asad Shah disrespected the messenger of Islam the Prophet 
Muhammad peace be upon him. Mr Shah claimed to be a prophet…. If I 
had not done this, others would and there would have been more killing 
and violence in the world”296.  
 
In Ahmed’s trial, at which he pleaded guilty, the prosecuting Advocate 
deputy said: 
 
"the accused's consistent and repeated account as to his motivation for 
murdering Asad Shah was that Shah claimed to be a prophet, which so 
offended his feelings and his faith that he had to kill him.297" 
 
The judge, concluding that he would face a very lengthy period of 
imprisonment, said: 
 
"This was a truly despicable crime, motivated, it seems, by your sense of 
offence at a man's expression of his religious beliefs, which differ from 
yours.  Let me be clear - there's no justification whatsoever for what you 
did.298" 
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9.13. Such intolerance is in no way restricted to Islam.  Many British residents are 
acutely aware of the ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland, which is 
entangled in sectarian divisions between Catholicism and Protestantism.  While we 
do not deal with the conflict in Northern Ireland in this report, it is hardly possible to 
discuss Islamic sectarian violence without noting the long running impact of Catholic-
Protestant tension throughout the last decades of the 20th Century and the potential 
to learn lessons from it.  
 
9.14. This tension remains present in many communities across Great Britain. 
Scotland in particular remains affected by the mark of sectarianism, with 299 
charges in 2015-16 brought against people for Religiously Aggravated Offences 
against Roman Catholics, and 141 against Protestants299.  The majority of these 
charges related to ‘threatening or abusive behaviour’ against both groups, although 
26 assaults were also recorded – 20 against Catholics and 6 against Protestants.  
 
9.15. The Scottish Social Attitudes survey 2014 highlighted that 88% of 1,500 
respondents believed sectarianism to be a problem in Scotland, 54% and 41% said 
that Catholics and Protestants (respectively) are the subject of at least ‘some’ 
prejudice300.  
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Extremism 
 
9.16. Extremism is a subjective concept, defined in a number of ways. It is generally 
taken to mean the holding of an extreme view or 
taking an extreme action, usually associated with a 
political or religious ideology, which is at odds with 
the views of mainstream society.  Extremist views 
will often be seen as uncompromising or intolerant, 
while extremist actions (or tactics) can be violent 
and non-violent.   
 
9.17. In her book, The Battle for British Islam, 
Sara Khan defines extremists as including any who 
incite violence, hatred or discrimination for political, 
religious or ideological causes.  She goes on to 
say that this can often include undermining the rule of law and democracy, that 
extremism is not just about violence, and that in the twenty-first century, universal 
human rights and norms should be the means by which we judge extremism. 
 
9.18. The Government has defined it in the 2015 Counter-Extremism Strategy301. 
This states that extremism is: 
 
“the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed 
forces as extremist.” 
 
9.19. This definition attempts to make the concept 
of extremism less subjective; framing fundamental 
values, and exemplifying these, as the mainstream 
social norms against which extremist views or 
actions can be assessed.  It is also an attempt to 
distinguish the wider concept of extremism from 
terrorism.  While it is true that not all extremists are 
or will become violent or terrorist, it is the case that 
all terrorists are extremists.  The public and news 
media do not necessarily understand or make any 
distinctions between these terms. 
 
9.20. During the course of this review, there have been a number of terrorist attacks 
across the world, including those in Paris, Brussels and Baghdad.  Additionally, more 
than 800 British citizens, including a growing number of women and girls, have 
chosen to travel to territory in Syria and Iraq controlled by the so-called Islamic State 
(or Da’esh).  Attacks in non-European countries have tended to result in higher 
numbers of casualties and many victims have been Muslims.  While all loss of life is 
a tragedy to be mourned, the proximity of attacks on mainland Europe have brought 
home to British citizens the stark reality and likelihood of such attacks happening 
again on our own soil and are likely to have contributed to increased public concern 
about terrorism, and anxiety and mistrust between communities.   
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9.21. Extremist organisations exist in many forms in Britain and maintain significant 
support across the country, promoting divisive, supremacist and inflammatory 
narratives.  In Britain today, the most significant and popular extremist ideologies are 
those of Islamist extremists and the far right wing.   
 
9.22. The most well documented harm associated with extremism (both Islamist 
and extreme right wing), is the widespread promulgation of racist, discriminatory and 
intolerant material, which is judged to foment social tensions and encourage 
isolationism, including the view that Muslims cannot reconcile their British and 
Muslim identities. The academic evidence suggests a large proportion of hate crimes 
are related to extremism, but the relationship is not well understood.  
 
9.23. There is a substantial network of political Islamist groups – often describing 
themselves as advocacy and human rights organisations – which have developed 
and promoted narratives and a sense of grievance that attempt to undermine 
Western values and, by frequently accusing the state of persecuting Muslims and the 
Islamic faith, have sought to set Muslim citizens apart from the rest of society. 
 
9.24. Frequently funded through individual charitable donations, these groups’ 
business model is based on presenting a picture of persecution and oppression of 
Muslims in Britain, with a heavy-handed state blamed for all forms of inequality or 
obstacles faced by Muslims. Their messages push an extremist narrative that the 
West and the UK Government are systematically trying to subjugate and harm 
Muslims, establishing a security state that needs to be opposed at all costs.  
 
9.25. There are a number of extreme right wing groups whose activity consists of 
demonstrations, invasive marches in areas with high concentrations of Muslim 
communities and significant social media activity.  Social media activity in particular, 
for example the use of videos and memes to attract large numbers of ‘likes’ and re-
postings, can create a sense of wider public support than turn-out at demonstrations 
and marches would suggest exists.  While there remain neo-Nazi groups pushing 
anti-Semitic messages, the focus of far right 
groups in recent years has been much more 
directed against Islam and Muslims in Britain, 
where twenty to thirty years ago their messages 
were more generally White supremacist and 
directed at Black and Minority Ethnic communities 
on grounds of race. 
 
9.26. It is a sad irony that Islamist and far right 
extremist groups are seen to be diametrically 
opposed – but in fact advocate the same 
corrosive message.  This is the message that 
Islam and life in the West are incompatible.  The 
existence and interaction of Islamist and far right 
extremists is creating a vicious circle with each 
side’s hate feeding off the other and reinforcing 
tensions between communities, pushing them 
further and further apart, as exemplified in the following diagram: 
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9.27. While we believe from all that we have seen during this review that the 
argument for a stronger approach to integration is justified on a much wider basis 
than counter-extremism – with very significant social and economic benefits for the 
nation – we also believe a more integrated society would reduce hate crime and 
sectarian violence and improve our resilience in responding to extremism and 
terrorism.  Conversely, the less integrated we are, the more vulnerable communities 
and individuals become to the divisive narratives and agendas of extremists and, 
potentially, the greater the likelihood becomes of hate crime, sectarian violence and 
terrorist attacks. 
 
 
 
  
Far right groups 
demonstrate against 
Islamists and point to 
incompatibility of Islam 
and British values 
Resentment and 
suspicion of Muslims 
grows and may lead to 
intimidation or attacks 
Muslims feel blamed 
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actions of a minority 
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Some Muslims feel so 
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Islamist groups 
Islamists 
demonstrate 
against a military 
parade in town 
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10. Past and current approaches 
Chapter Summary 
 
 There have been numerous studies and reports on community cohesion over the 
last fifteen years but a failure to implement practical actions with sufficient 
consistency, persistence or force to keep pace with the rate of change in 
communities over that period. 
 
 Not enough has been done to help the hardest to reach and improve socio-
economic exclusion, nor to address the concerns of ‘host communities’ in areas 
experiencing the highest levels of immigration and change. 
 
 Many well-meaning projects have been supported in recent years but these have 
not been sufficient to tackle the very serious issues we face as a nation. 
 
 Attempts to address concerns about the Prevent programme securitising 
community cohesion have been positive, and the police are delivering ground-
breaking improvements to keep communities safe. 
 
 But the initial criticisms of the programme have not gone away, an anti-Prevent 
lobby has been successful in stirring up anxiety and concern without offering any 
constructive alternatives to protect communities, and even some civic leaders 
have been too ready to condemn the programme.   
 
 Training and other support for teachers and other front-line workers is important 
in better equipping them to implement Prevent alongside their wider 
responsibilities for safeguarding children from all types of harm and building their 
resilience. 
 
 There are lessons to be shared and learned with other countries on approaches 
to integration and community cohesion. 
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Community cohesion  
10.1 Few of the issues raised in this report are new.  Much of this is ground that 
has been covered before – often repeatedly – by previous commissions of inquiry, 
their official reports, government responses to them and departmental strategies that 
have been published as a result.  We have reviewed a selection of these and they 
are at Annex A.  They make sorry reading as the vast majority – if not all – of these 
findings, recommendations and concerns could be or are echoed in this report.   
 
10.2. But the awareness of many of these issues and subsequent failures to 
address them arguably makes the situation worse, 
not better.  The problem has not been a lack of 
knowledge but a failure of collective, consistent 
and persistent will to do something about it or give 
it the priority it deserves at both a national and 
local level.  The work that has been done has 
often been piecemeal and lacked a clear evidence 
base or programme of evaluation.   
 
10.3. This is not a criticism directed at any 
particular administration.  To varying degrees all 
have been at least in part responsible for 
underestimating the emphasis and priority needed 
on integration to match the pace of change in our 
communities.  It is clear that, despite the best 
efforts of some well-intentioned individuals and organisations, successive 
governments have simply got their approach to cohesion, as well as their 
immigration policies, wrong, with a long-standing failure to manage the settlement of 
migrants a particular concern.  
 
10.4. Not enough has been done to help the hardest to reach and most isolated 
communities, nor to address the concerns of existing residents or ‘the host 
community’ in areas experiencing high levels of population change, either through 
bespoke projects and programmes or the mainstreaming of integration objectives 
into public services. 
 
10.5. The first explicit community cohesion policy 
arose under the then Labour Government, 
following the riots across a number of Northern 
towns and cities at the start of the Millennium and 
the subsequent reports by Ted Cantle and others.  
Initial pathfinder projects were established by the 
Home Office and these developed, later under the 
Department for Communities and Local 
Government, into a broader framework which 
included guidance and funding for local authorities 
and others, with a national Public Service 
Agreement target and an ability for local 
authorities to prioritise and receive extra funding 
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for community cohesion work through Local Area Agreements negotiated with 
central Government. 
 
10.6. Progress against the Public Service Agreement target and Local Area 
Agreements was assessed through attitudinal surveys that measured changes in the 
extent to which people from different backgrounds felt they got on well together.  
Projects on the ground tended to focus on community engagement and 
empowerment, bringing young people together, for example, or on activities that 
encouraged mixing and dialogue between people from different faith backgrounds.  
Although in general the attitudinal indicators of community cohesion were moving in 
a positive direction, evaluation work was not able to demonstrate that such 
movement was the direct result either of the overall strategy or of local projects.  
 
10.7. Since 2010, cohesion policy has largely been squeezed out, with Government 
only willing to act exceptionally over the issue, falling well below its stated ambition 
to “do more than any other government before us to promote integration”302.  The 
Coalition Government’s approach in 2012 was set out in its main integration policy 
document ‘Creating the conditions for integration’303 which framed its approach in an 
even more ‘localist’ context, with Government action described explicitly as 
“exceptional” or delivered through mainstream 
policies.  Government’s policy consisted of a 
relatively small pot of funding going towards small-
scale exemplar projects such as inter-faith 
dialogue, training curry chefs or cross community 
social events such as the ‘Big Lunch’ and ‘Our Big 
Gig’.  This has been described to us as amounting 
to “saris, samosas and steel drums” for the 
already well-intentioned.  These are worthy and 
enjoyable projects which should continue but they 
are not enough on their own, nor should they be a 
substitute for tackling difficult issues.  
 
10.8. There appears to have been little strategic thought behind the up to £14 
million per year budget304.  For example, in 2011-12 and 2012-13 the Department for 
Communities and Local Government was spending more on supporting the Cornish 
language than the English language – although it subsequently invested significantly 
larger amounts for community based English language teaching in 2013-14 and 
2014-15.     
 
10.9. Concerns were also expressed to the review team that much of the work 
avoided addressing the more challenging integration issues.  It was put to us that 
some of the interfaith work not only avoided the difficult conversations that were 
needed but had also provided an unchallenged platform or legitimacy to those whose 
views and values actually undermined cohesion.  We were told that the strong desire 
of some in the inter-faith community to be inclusive had left some initiatives feeling 
soft in their impact: “like preaching to the converted” and a “coalition of the willing”. It 
was said that they had been unable to reach more troublesome ends of different 
faiths and seemed unwilling to challenge regressive and intolerant practices.  
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10.10. Submissions to the review, including from several academic experts and 
institutions we spoke to, pointed to social mobility and educational and employment 
opportunity as being the biggest single drivers of successful integration.  As well as 
providing economic advantages, social mobility 
also provides knock-on benefits such as 
reducing grievances, heightening a sense of 
belonging to a country or community and 
increasing geographic mobility and social 
mixing too.  Yet there was very little attention 
paid to these factors in previous Governments’ 
integration or cohesion strategies. 
 
10.11. While there is no explicit community 
cohesion duty on public authorities (apart from 
schools) there is an expectation in equalities 
legislation that they will foster good relations 
and have due regard to the need to, among 
other things: eliminate discrimination, 
harassment, and victimisation; advance 
equality of opportunity between persons who 
share a relevant protected characteristic and 
persons who do not share it; and foster good 
relations between persons who share a 
relevant protected characteristic and persons 
who do not share it305.  No attention seems to be paid to the extent to which this 
obligation is being fulfilled by public authorities. 
 
10.12. Government policy in this space has, to date, lacked the ambition and – more 
importantly – the understanding necessary to make significant change in these 
areas. Well-intentioned but generalised approaches can focus too greatly on 
headline figures and risk leaving behind harder-to-help groups.   
 
Migration, integration and community cohesion 
 
10.13. Various initiatives have sought to provide central dialogue with and support for 
areas experiencing the impact of rapid and/or high levels of migration.  The Labour 
Government in 2007 introduced a Migration Impacts Forum (MIF) designed to listen 
to local views before making further national policy decisions on immigration. 
Alongside this a new Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) was established in 2007 
to provide independent evidence as a non-departmental public body on migration 
issues such as skilled labour shortages.  While the MIF was seen by some who 
submitted evidence to the review as too easily captured and dominated by vested 
interest groups, the MAC was generally considered to be more robust and retains its 
role today.  
10.14. From 2009 to 2011, £70 million was also allocated to a Migration Impact 
Fund306 designed to mitigate the pressures of migration on local public services, 
funded by a £50 levy on migration visas.  Local activities and spending included 
initiatives on registering migrants with GPs to divert pressure away from hospitals, 
improving private sector housing provision, English language teaching and fire safety 
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and prevention advice.  However, no national evaluation of the Fund was completed 
and the Fund was ended (although the £50 levy was not) by the Coalition 
Government in the 2010 Spending Review. 
10.15.  In 2009, the then Labour Government had also sought to address the specific 
issue of the dislocation and underachievement of poor white working class 
communities who had shown a susceptibility to far right causes and beliefs in 
response to local immigration and other 
changes.  It launched a time-limited £12 million 
Connecting Communities programme to 
reinvigorate and connect with those 
neighbourhoods feeling the most acute pressure 
from the recession.  The programme used data 
to identify neighbourhoods most at risk of poor 
cohesion and employed coordinators to develop 
local plans for employment and economic 
opportunities.  Evaluations of four of these 
areas307 suggested that unlocking this capacity 
was possible but that it required active and 
sustained support and should not rely too 
heavily on voluntary activity in areas where 
there are lower levels of social capital at the 
outset. 
 
10.16. The current Conservative Government is committed to implementing its 2015 
election manifesto pledge308:  
 
“To help communities experiencing high and unexpected volumes of immigration, 
we will introduce a new Controlling Migration Fund to ease pressures on services 
and to pay for additional immigration enforcement.”   
 
10.17. The new fund has been confirmed recently but the challenge will be whether 
this can be delivered in a way that matches the scale and pace of the impacts being 
felt in those communities most affected by recent and on-going immigration.  That is 
a wider challenge we also face in any future programme to improve cohesion, 
integration and opportunity, set against the scale and pace of change in our 
communities. 
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Prevent  
 
10.18. Prevent was introduced following the July 7, 2005 attacks on London as part 
of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST309 and is aimed at 
stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting  terrorism.  It was not explicitly a 
programme to improve community cohesion and it 
has been controversial.   
 
10.19. In its early guise the programme was run by 
the Home Office and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government.  The DCLG-
led element focussed on the role of communities in 
preventing violent extremism and set out a 
programme of work under Prevent that intended to 
focus on strengthening local partnerships, 
empowering Muslim women and young people, and 
improving faith capacity and understanding.   
 
10.20. In 2011 the Coalition Government undertook a review of Prevent which 
resulted in a decision to have a more focussed programme aimed solely at 
preventing terrorism and led by the Home Office, while DCLG would separately 
concentrate on support for integration (discussed earlier in this chapter), so as not to 
confuse the two.  
 
10.21. The 2011 Prevent Strategy argued that: 
 
“Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy.  But integration alone will 
not meet Prevent objectives. And Prevent must not assume control of or allocate 
funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and 
counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This 
has been a mistake in the past.” 
 
10.22. The new approach to the Prevent programme aimed to: 
 
 respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from 
those who promote it;  
 
 prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; and 
 
 work with the public sector where there are risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address. 
 
10.23. In July 2015 the Government also introduced a statutory ‘Prevent duty’ for 
schools, colleges, universities, prisons, probation services, local authorities and 
health institutions.  They are now under a legal obligation to “have due regard to the 
need to prevent people [in their care] being drawn into terrorism”.  In the main this 
involves frontline staff in these sectors being aware of radicalisation as a 
safeguarding issue within their wider safeguarding responsibilities, with a duty to act 
appropriately on any concerns. 
Prevent… was not 
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10.24. During the review, we saw a wide range of work being delivered under the 
Prevent programme, much of which was impressive and 
heartening.  We were particularly impressed by the level 
of engagement of Prevent police officers with 
communities in several complex and sensitive areas.  
While the police appear to be further ahead of other 
agencies in developing this work, the recently 
introduced Prevent duty has increased the engagement 
of public sector bodies with Prevent and there are good 
examples of local staff across the public sector who are 
not only engaged but confident in delivering Prevent.  
They should be proud and unapologetic about the 
important work they do to keep us safe. 
 
10.25. Positive achievements of the Prevent programme include: 
 
 delivering 140 community projects in 2015-16, reaching more than 42,000 
people;  
 
 disrupting more than 150 attempted journeys to the Syria/Iraq conflict area, 
including action by the family courts, which protected approximately 50 children 
(from around 20 families) from being taken to the conflict area in 2015; 
 
 providing support through the Channel programme on a voluntary basis for 
more than 1,000 people considered most at risk of radicalisation since 2012, 
with the vast majority of the individuals leaving the programme presenting no 
further terrorist related threat; 
 
 working with industry to remove 200,000 pieces of online terrorist material since 
February 2010; 
 
 supporting civil society groups to deliver counter-narrative campaigns, 
generating 36 million online viewings since January 2014; and 
 
 raising awareness of radicalisation through training of more than 550,000 front 
line staff since 2011, including teachers and health professionals.  
 
10.26. Most of the teachers we spoke to in three different areas we visited had a 
positive perspective on the training around radicalisation.  They highlighted the 
importance of understanding Prevent in the context of safeguarding and resilience-
building – and noted the beneficial support and training staff had received.  
 
10.27. Many mentioned the importance of partnership working, especially the need 
for the police to share information so that realistic risk assessments could be drawn 
up.  Some of the issues raised in discussions with teachers felt symptomatic of the 
development and implementation of Prevent through a broader range of public 
services that are new to this work, for some this included the desire for further 
training. 
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10.28. However, we also found that in some cases the only engagement some 
predominantly Muslim communities felt like they had had with the Government was 
through their interaction with Prevent, or as part of broader counter-extremism 
efforts.  And a few community based organisations said they felt they could only get 
funding for their work if they said it was related to Prevent - even if the benefits were 
much wider and preventing terrorism was not the main driver for their work. 
 
10.29. The commencement of the Prevent Duty last summer has also seen the 
increasing prominence of an active lobby opposed to Prevent.  In some cases, local 
leaders have been too ready to complain about Prevent without any real 
understanding of its work or knowledge of its community-based projects and 
partnership working with local people on the ground. 
 
10.30. More worrying are some elements of this lobby who appear to have an 
agenda to turn British Muslims against Britain.  These individuals and organisations 
claim to be advocating on behalf of Muslims and protecting them from discrimination.  
We repeatedly invited people we met who belonged to these groups, or who held 
similarly critical views, to suggest alternative approaches.  We got nothing in return. 
 
10.31. Opponents of the programme do not appear to have any constructive 
alternative proposals for tackling terrorism and the 
effect they are having is not to improve the life 
chances of British Muslims but to make them feel 
even more alienated and isolated – and therefore 
more vulnerable to extremists and radicalisers.  
 
10.32. In order to undermine Prevent these 
opponents have deliberately distorted and 
exaggerated cases by purporting to show that 
teachers have acted disproportionately.  Media 
coverage has often echoed and distorted these 
criticisms. 
 
10.33. One such case, dubbed the “terrorist house 
case”, gained widespread media coverage in 
January 2016.  Lancashire Police were reported in 
the media to have interviewed a pupil referred to 
Prevent after he had simply misspelled “terraced house” as “terrorist house” in a 
school creative writing exercise, imagining the life of a fictional character.  In fact, the 
pupil had also written that “I hate it when my uncle hits me”.  The teacher quite 
appropriately and acting in the best interests of the child, therefore raised a concern.  
A social worker and neighbourhood police officer then visited the family and 
concluded that no further action was required.  No referral to Prevent was ever 
made.  No Prevent officers were involved and Lancashire Police rightly maintain that 
they and the school acted responsibly and proportionately in looking into a number of 
concerns, using a low key and sensitive approach. 
 
10.34. In an earlier case in May 2015, the parents of a 14 year-old boy started legal 
action after their son was questioned following a French lesson in which he had been 
talking about “eco-terrorists” – something he said he had learned about at a debating 
Opponents of the 
programme do not 
appear to have any 
constructive alternative 
proposals for tackling 
terrorism and the effect 
they are having is not to 
improve the life chances 
of British Muslims but to 
make them feel even 
more alienated and 
isolated… 
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society meeting.  After the lesson, he was reported to have been taken out of class 
and asked whether he was affiliated with Isis.  His parents sought a Judicial Review, 
saying he had been discriminated against because of his Muslim background310. 
 
10.35. In fact the pupil was never referred to Prevent or Child Safeguarding (nor 
removed from the class), and there was no police involvement.  A concern about the 
boy was correctly raised by a teacher to the school’s Designated Child Protection 
Officer, who spoke to the pupil in an interview two days later which included asking 
whether he had “heard of Isis”311.   
 
10.36. The Judicial Review was thrown out of court as totally without merit.  It had 
sought to challenge the lawfulness and rationality of the guidance around the 
Keeping Children Safe in Education policy and the Prevent duty, and made no 
challenge about the way the pupil was treated312.  The Judge who dismissed the 
review in the High Court said: 
 
“In so far as the core proposition is that for the first interested party to have a 
strategy at all that seeks to protect schoolchildren from terrorist propaganda and 
ideology is unlawful because it is more likely that concern may be directed to 
children of Muslim faith, I consider that proposition is wholly unarguable where the 
context is present concern about the effect of the propaganda activity of 
extremists who are purportedly Islamic in faith.”313 
 
10.37. The Government needs to be more robust in countering false perceptions and 
to guard against allowing only critical narratives to dominate in the media.  As Peter 
Neumann, from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence at Kings College London, has said314: 
 
“If they highlighted successful cases too, [then Prevent] would be more plausible 
in the eyes of the community concerned.”  
 
10.38. The Prevent programme is an important part of the Government's wider 
counter-terrorism strategy and needs to build on existing work in engaging 
communities to gain their trust and support and in giving frontline workers the 
capability and support they need to deliver effectively.  There has recently been an 
expansion in the network of voluntary sector and community projects being funded 
through Prevent. This greater reach and impact is to be welcomed. But it would 
benefit from being matched with an increase in the profile of these programmes 
through greater transparency and publicity; the Government needs to do significantly 
more to achieve this. 
 
10.39. Prevent is mainstreaming the aim of safeguarding potentially vulnerable 
people, and allows those involved in its delivery to correctly focus their attention and 
further work with individuals where it is needed most - on the very small minority who 
are at risk of radicalisation or who have already been radicalised.  But the 
programme casts a wider shadow.  In part, this is because of the absence of any 
work on integration on a similar scale.  It is also partly the result of a vocal lobby 
whose aim is to portray the programme at its worst.  But the absence of sufficiently 
consistent and coherent communication by Government of the aims and benefits of 
the programme has also allowed confusion and resentment to persist. 
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International dimensions and experience 
 
10.40. In cities around the world, promoting integration and countering extremism is 
high on the agenda. There is much to learn, share and analyse in issues faced and 
approaches being taken.  Not least in Europe, where migration influxes and recent 
terrorist attacks carried out in Europe by European nationals are shaping the debate 
on integration with a polarising impact on the political discourse.  
 
10.41. Across Europe, there is a long history of established migration flows from 
former colonial countries.  The issues we are facing in the UK on segregation and 
integration are not unique to us and are being faced in other countries in Europe.  
We have set out in Annex B a summary of a rapid assessment of integration across 
a number of European countries, conducted with the assistance of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and our Embassies in the countries considered. 
 
10.42. There is strong evidence in overseas contexts that the drivers of extremism 
correlate to political and social exclusion and marginalisation.  Tackling extremism 
requires promoting inclusion and opportunity, as well as tackling divides on ethnic 
and religious fault lines.  
 
10.43. We live in an inter-connected world, with inter-connected populations.  
Communities in the UK are umbilically linked 
through cultural, economic, social and 
demographic links to different parts of the world.  
What happens overseas impacts directly on UK 
communities, and vice-versa.  We are unlikely to 
achieve integration in the UK if our approach 
does not reflect how people move across 
national boundaries and how their attitudes are 
influenced by others far beyond their home 
locations. 
 
10.44. These international links bring enormous 
benefit to the UK and contribute to the richness and diversity of British society. 
However, they also present challenges to community cohesion and integration in the 
UK, such as where societal norms overseas run counter to British values.  Whether 
this relates to patriarchal norms which discourage the role and achievement of 
women in society, discrimination against minorities or social harms and practices, we 
need to better understand these links and the challenge they present to integration 
and community cohesion in the UK.  We also need to understand the extent to which 
values and practices from countries of origin can be drivers for insularity or barriers 
to integration in the UK.  
 
10.45. This warrants further analysis with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  
 
 
  
There is strong 
evidence in overseas 
contexts that the drivers 
of extremism correlate 
to political and social 
exclusion and 
marginalisation. 
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11. Leadership 
Chapter Summary 
 
 Too many leaders in public and faith institutions and in communities have allowed 
diversity and difference to become separatism and segregation that has divided 
communities. 
 
 Whether the drivers for this have been fear of accusations of racism, of wanting 
to be welcoming, tolerant and accepting of foreign cultures, or concerns about 
disrepute or loss of support, the results have been more harmful than good. 
 
 While these issues may sometimes attract attention as trivial or even ridiculous 
cases of officialdom being overly politically correct, they can soon turn into 
harmful neglect or even legitimisation of very serious issues, like child sexual 
exploitation. 
 
 Some politicians at a local and national level have been guilty of being too willing 
to turn a blind eye to practices that, at best, exacerbate inequality and hold back 
community integration. 
 
 The processes for formal intervention in local government are not sophisticated 
enough to deal with these issues. 
 
 Representation among our political leaders does not reflect our communities 
sufficiently to signal a good level of integration and selection processes feel 
biased, particularly against women from minority communities. 
 
 More needs to be done to restore confidence in public and political leadership. 
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Leadership in communities and institutions 
 
11.1. Many of the problems described in this and the preceding chapters have been 
allowed to happen.  Too many people in communities and in public and faith 
institutions, often with good intentions, have turned a blind eye to practices that, at 
best, are denying individuals – and all too often children and women – their basic 
rights.  Rights that have been hard-fought for and won over the years.   
 
11.2. There are a variety of potential underlying reasons for denial, turning a blind 
eye and, in some cases, condoning unacceptable 
behaviours and practices, rather than 
confronting, challenging and stopping them.  
None are acceptable. 
 
11.3. It might be that, within some communities, 
people are afraid to expose problems because 
they are worried about the impact it will have on 
others’ perceptions of their community; that it will 
feed prejudice and hate; or that the media will 
portray the issues unsympathetically and in ways 
that bring everyone in the community into 
disrepute.   
 
11.4. We heard numerous claims that some 
communities preferred to deal with such issues 
themselves, privately and did not want to ‘wash 
their dirty linen in public’.  But from what we have seen and heard, this too often 
results in problems being ignored or swept under the carpet.  And in a society where 
the rule of law is a fundamental and shared value, it is plainly wrong to try to keep 
illegal acts out of the criminal justice process. 
 
11.5. It might be that, within public institutions, leaders may lack the confidence to 
call out harmful practices or behaviours because they have become excessively 
concerned about being culturally sensitive to different values so as not to offend or 
alienate minority communities; or they may fear crossing a line into racial or religious 
discrimination and not feel well enough informed to make the right distinctions.  Or it 
may be that ignoring and not confronting such problems is the easier path to take.  
But that is a very narrow and short term perspective. 
 
11.6. All too often, the desires of public institutions to respect difference have 
turned into statements and actions that are open to ridicule and cause offence – and 
unnecessary expense – to the wider community.  There is evidence that even 
minority communities believe public institutions are going over the top in some 
instances. 
 
11.7. Some faith leaders have condoned or even promoted interpretations of their 
faiths that have perpetuated discrimination against women, people of different 
sexuality and beliefs, and promoted narrow and in some cases harmful educational 
environments for children. 
 
There are a variety of 
potential underlying 
reasons for denial, turning 
a blind eye and, in some 
cases, condoning 
unacceptable behaviours 
and practices, rather than 
confronting, challenging 
and stopping them.  None 
are acceptable. 
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11.8. There are numerous examples which were brought to our attention during the 
review of local authorities, agencies and individuals bending over backwards to 
‘accommodate’ people from minority faiths or ‘different’ cultures: 
 
 A head teacher took down a poster aimed at protecting and supporting the 
reporting of Forced Marriage concerns, for fear of it upsetting the local 
community. 
 
 Towards the end of 2015, several unions criticised Government proposals 
designed to ensure that public sector workers 
in public-facing roles could speak fluent 
English.  
 
11.9. Perhaps more worryingly, among local 
political leadership, it might be that difficult issues 
are ignored because political leaders are focussing 
on what they think their communities want to hear, 
rather than what they believe is right, for fear of 
losing the support of a particular community.  That is 
an approach that lacks the courage and integrity 
people want from their representatives and which 
are reflected in the Nolan principles of public life; 
and in the worst cases can cause significant harm. 
 
11.10. Local authorities represent the backbone of 
British democracy. Yet across the country, examples 
of councillors and officials bending rules that 
perpetuate discrimination and division have been disappointingly easy to find.  
 
11.11. Ironically, in many cases authorities are acting in a misguided but well-
meaning desire to support and respect cultural differences.  The inability to consider 
the consequences of such actions has caused a great deal of harm and helped to 
reinforce the perception of difference and division between certain groups.  Those 
who do this are not necessarily helping the communities they seek to protect and, in 
some cases, have brought them into disrepute and greater risk of harm. 
 
Child sexual exploitation 
 
11.12. The case of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham was a catastrophic 
example of authorities turning a blind eye to harm in 
order to avoid the need to confront a particular 
community315.  The town saw upwards of 1,400 
children sexually exploited over more than a decade; 
groomed by predominantly Pakistani-heritage men 
offering drugs, alcohol and attention, followed by 
sexual abuse and mental and physical coercion.  
 
11.13. Despite the widespread knowledge of this 
practice across the local authority, statutory 
partnerships and many local residents, those with the 
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power to act chose to defend ‘community cohesion’ and political correctness over the 
vulnerable children in their care.  Destroying evidence of perpetrator ethnicity and 
shutting down services was preferable to confronting criminals from a minority ethnic 
community; such was their fear of offending local cultural sensitivities316.  
 
Legitimising extreme views 
 
11.14. Throughout the review we have encountered repeated examples of 
regressive, discriminatory and harmful attitudes and behaviours being sanctioned by 
authorities in the name of tolerance and multiculturalism.  
 
11.15. In a northern town, the council supported and funded the work of two religious 
representatives, one Muslim and one Christian.  These men very openly held 
unacceptable views, including that: 
 
 All information outlets from the BBC to the UN demonstrated Islamophobia, and 
that accurate information could be obtained only from religious scholars. This 
included promoting the belief that ISIL were not a terrorist organisation, and 
that al-Baghdadi (the ISIL leader) was being misrepresented. 
 
 Religious practice held primacy over rights, equality, and common sense; the 
Imam boasting the ability to marry and divorce people at a moment’s notice 
without registration, and both men actively petitioning a non-faith school to 
provide for Friday prayers and permit staff to wear niqabs.  
 
11.16. Members of a major political party in the North West and West Midlands have 
been accused of allowing political meetings to be organised on a gender-segregated 
basis317. This promotion and legitimisation of division between the sexes was denied 
at the time, but is undermined by photographs of the audience and statements on 
event advertisements318.  
 
11.17. A leading local politician in the West Midlands was allowed to continue in 
post, unquestioned, after making the following (recorded) statement in January 2016: 
 
“It is ridiculous that the Government is saying Muslims are becoming radicalised.  
David Cameron says 500 people have gone to Syria to become radicalised, but 
where is the evidence?  And out of a population of three million Muslims in the 
UK, what kind of percentage is that?319” 
 
11.18. He eventually apologised for his words, but only 
after external pressure led the council to address the 
issue several days later320.   
 
Intervention 
 
11.19. Under the current system, there is very little 
recourse to address inappropriate behaviour by 
councillors; even where this is seen to be damaging or 
divisive.  Councillor conduct is largely self-regulated, 
with local authorities producing their own codes of conduct (based on the broad 
…there is very little 
recourse to address 
inappropriate behaviour 
by councillors… 
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Nolan Principles of Public Life), with no external checks on quality or compliance.  
An “independent person” must be involved in creating the code, and resolving 
related disputes – but there are no external checks on how “independent” this person 
is (only stipulation in legislation that they should not be an employee of, or related to 
an employee of the council).321 322 
 
11.20. There are processes for registering complaints, and pressure can be applied 
to councillors to change their behaviour.  However, such processes are far from 
robust: 
  
 Private individuals can raise complaints with the council’s internal Monitoring 
Officer; though in several authorities this involves their identity being revealed 
to the subject of the complaint, as a matter of course, in all but exceptional 
circumstances323.  
 
 Should this internal complaints system prove unsatisfactory, concerns can be 
raised with the Local Government Ombudsman, who can investigate, with full 
powers to obtain information and documents.  Their findings and 
recommendations will be published, but they have no powers to require the 
council in question to accept them324.  
 
 Political parties can put pressure on councillors to step down, can remove them 
from committees and can expel them from the party.  They do not, however, 
have the power to force a resignation from the council325. 
 
11.21. Ultimately, there are very few points at which a councillor can be removed 
from their post. These are: 
 
 via the ballot box (every 4 years); 
 
 if they receive a custodial sentence for three months or more within the UK; 
 
 if they become employed by the local authority or its contracted services; and 
 
 if they become bankrupt326. 
 
11.22. The requirement for the sentence to be custodial is being reviewed, in light of 
the sentencing of a Parish councillor in the North West327.  The councillor was found 
guilty of possessing indecent images of children and sentenced to a 28-day curfew 
between 8am and 4pm, completion of a treatment programme for sexual offenders, 
signing of the sex offenders register, and Probation Service supervision for the next 
two years.  He refused to resign from his position on the council, saying it was his 
“responsibility” to continue serving his constituents.  The council was unable to 
remove him due to his sentence being non-custodial, and despite multiple requests 
from other councillors for him to resign, he is permitted to continue to hold office until 
the next election328.  
 
11.23. Central Government intervention is available where there are serious 
concerns about councillor conduct.  Central Government can intervene where the 
local authority is deemed to be failing to effectively provide statutory services.  It has 
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no power to intervene on councillor behaviour directly – but can do so where this 
behaviour negatively affects the running of services or governance of an authority to 
the point that the authority is not securing “continuous improvement in the way in 
which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness”329 330.  
 
11.24. Should this happen, Government has the power to investigate a local 
authority if it believes it may fail in its Best Value duty, to direct it to take any 
necessary actions to reach compliance with the law, and/or for the Secretary of State 
or their nominated person to take over one of the local authority’s functions.  
 
11.25. Central Government has used such power only four times since 2010: 
 
 imposition of Commissioners in Doncaster following both a children’s services 
inspection and corporate governance inspection, both finding service failures 
and a breakdown in the relationship between the Mayor, councillors and council 
officers; 
 
 imposition of Commissioners in Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council 
following the Sexual Exploitation of an estimated 1,400 children331; 
 
 imposition of Commissioners in Tower Hamlets following evidence of 
widespread corruption in governance and financial management332; and   
 
 a non-statutory Senior External Review in Birmingham after extensive patterns 
of nepotism, bullying and poor governance were uncovered in Birmingham 
schools by the ‘Trojan Horse’ investigation333. 
 
11.26. Both statutory inspection and intervention and Senior External Reviews are 
used rarely and only in extreme circumstances; they are a very public intrusion into 
local democracy.  But that leaves a void between what can feel like ineffective action 
locally on serious misconduct, and exceptional intervention in cases of widespread 
and serious failure.    
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Representation 
 
11.27. Civic engagement and representation are further indicators of integration and 
vary between different ethnic groups across Britain.  The evidence we have reviewed 
shows a mixed picture, perhaps suggesting lower levels of ethnic minority 
engagement in formal politics and more equal engagement in wider civic 
engagement (for example volunteering or taking part in consultation).  It is interesting 
that – but not clear why – Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are slightly better 
represented in local decision-making bodies than other ethnic groups, but feel least 
able to influence local decisions; while Black ethnic groups have lower levels of civic 
engagement generally but feel most able to influence local decisions334 335.   
 
11.28. We have discussed the gender imbalance in politics earlier in this report.  It is 
also evident that ethnic minorities, and especially Black groups, are under-
represented in the UK Parliament and among local authority councillors.  While 
nearly 20% of the population in England and Wales are from a minority ethnic 
background: 
 
 only 6% of MPs (41 of the 650 MPs in 2015) 
were from minority ethnic groups – up from 
4.2% in 2010336; 
 
 just 4% of councillors were from ethnic 
minority backgrounds in 2013 (0.6% were of 
Black ethnicity and 2.8% were of Asian 
ethnicity)337; 
 
 in Wales, just 0.8% of councillors had an 
ethnic minority background when data was 
last recorded in 2004338; and 
 
 in Scotland, the percentage of non-white councillors, at 3.4%, was closest to its 
population339. 
 
11.29. Issues of block voting within some communities were regularly brought to our 
attention.  The most prominent example of this was through the ‘Biraderi’ 
(brotherhood or clan) networks in Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnic communities, which are used 
to commit multiple votes to one cause through a 
single – male – leader.  The independent 
research organisation, Democratic Audit, based 
at the London School of Economics, noted in 
2015340 341 that Biraderi networks had been 
encouraged to carry out the local campaigning 
responsibilities of political parties who have 
assumed they can mobilise an Asian block vote.  
They went on to say that:  
 
…ethnic minorities, and 
especially Black groups, 
are under-represented in 
the UK Parliament and 
among local authority 
councillors. 
… Biraderi networks had 
been encouraged to 
carry out the local 
campaigning 
responsibilities of 
political parties who 
have assumed they can 
mobilise an Asian block 
vote. 
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 Biraderi politics can also lead to electoral fraud where the line between votes 
cast on the basis of community and ethnic loyalties and vote coercion becomes 
blurred; 
 
 Biraderis are hierarchical and patriarchal, led by male elders, which leaves little 
space for the views and interests of women and young people who are 
particularly vulnerable to pressure; and that 
 
 In their role as middle-men, elders may coerce members of their Biraderi to 
vote for their favoured candidate. 
 
11.30. The Electoral Commission in response to this research and in discussions 
with the review team noted the prevalent perception of electoral fraud in Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi ethnic communities and that such voting networks exist in a 
number of places.  However, they held back from reaching any firm conclusions or 
making hard-edged recommendations to tackle this.  Instead, they concluded that 
such practice was not universal and that vulnerability factors in relation to electoral 
fraud could exist anywhere.  They argued that low levels of awareness about what 
constitutes electoral fraud, as well as low levels of literacy and lack of English skills, 
could exacerbate these vulnerabilities.  In the light of points made to us during the 
review, their own research and the High Court Decision in relation to the 2014 Tower 
Hamlets Mayoral Election, we were surprised that the Electoral Commission had not 
gone further on this, while noting their point that they and other bodies (such as the 
police, Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers) have different roles in 
relation to electoral fraud. 
 
The High Court Decision in relation to the 2014 Tower Hamlets Mayoral 
Election 342included the conclusion that:  
 
“Events of recent months in contexts very different from electoral malpractice 
have starkly demonstrated what happens when those in authority are afraid to 
confront wrongdoing for fear of allegations of racism and Islamophobia. Even in 
the multicultural society which is 21st century Britain, the law must be applied 
fairly and equally to everyone. Otherwise we are lost.” 
 
 
11.31. We also heard repeated concerns that such networks were being used to 
block women attempting to stand as political 
candidates.  In one of many examples, a female 
councillor in the North West of England said that 
she had to stand in a neighbouring town, as she 
would have been prevented from doing so in her 
own local authority.  Her own council was made up 
entirely of male councillors, who took active steps to 
block female candidates from being elected.  This 
extended even to setting up independent candidates 
to stand against her and dilute the vote.  The 
councillor noted that opposition to female 
candidates was common; with many councils fielding only male councillors and men 
deciding the vote in many households.  This was raised with us on many occasions 
…opposition to female 
candidates was common; 
with many councils 
fielding only male 
councillors… 
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by politicians at local and national levels.  The Muslim Women’s Network UK also 
raised concerns about women being blocked by men from becoming councillors, 
calling for an inquiry into what they called the “systematic misogyny” they had 
witnessed in local authority councillors.  
11.32. During the course of the review, an MP in the North of England raised 
concerns in the media that "clan loyalties" within parts of her community were 
resulting in women being blocked from political office.  The MP complained of 
“shocking” levels of misogyny and reported discussions among fellow party members 
about looking for evidence to smear her character.   
 
11.33. While some individual British politicians of 
Asian ethnicity have themselves raised 
concerns, national political parties seem to 
consider such activities outside of their concern, 
related only to local activists and beyond their 
capacity to control or police, and not in their 
interests to curtail where it is not obviously 
illegal or fraudulent, is bringing large numbers of 
votes for minimal effort and is considered 
acceptable practice locally.  Instead, political 
parties’ responses to criticisms have focussed 
on their national policies and wider records in 
attracting women and ethnic minority 
candidates.   
 
11.34. These are serious issues that further erode public trust and confidence in 
public and political leadership.  Much more needs to be done to restore this trust and 
confidence and we need leaders in all public spheres to step up to the challenges 
posed in this review. 
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12. The future 
Recommendations 
 
12.1. This chapter sets out our initial recommendations to Government for a new 
programme to help improve integration and opportunity.  
 
Building local communities’ resilience in the towns and cities 
where the greatest challenges exist: 
 
Recommendation 1:  
 
Central government should support a new programme to help improve 
community cohesion.  This could back area-based plans and projects 
addressing the key priorities identified in this review.  It would see targeted 
support provided for projects, ideally evidence-based, that would help build more 
resilient communities. The Government should agree a final list of project criteria but 
these should include: 
 
 The promotion of English language; 
 
 Emancipating marginalised groups of women; 
 
 Raising employment outcomes among the most marginalised groups; 
 
 Increasing participation of women in the labour market; 
 
 Improving IT literacy among parents in segregated areas; 
 
 Boosting out of school mixing between young people – including through 
sporting activity; 
 
 Other programmes with a clear focus on reducing segregation identified with 
local areas. 
 
Recommendation 2:  
 
It is also vital that all local authorities are able to pick up and act upon signs that 
integration is breaking down at the earliest stage.  Central and local government 
should develop a list of indicators of a potential breakdown in integration.  
These might include incidences of hate crime or deficiencies in English language.  
Local authorities should collect this information regularly. 
 
Recommendation 3:  
 
Drawing on the most effective approaches, central government should work with 
local government to bring together and disseminate a toolkit of approaches 
which have seen success. 
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Improving the integration of communities in Britain and 
establishing a set of values around which people from different 
backgrounds can unite: 
 
Recommendation 4:  
 
The promotion of British laws, history and values within the core curriculum in all 
schools would help build integration, tolerance, citizenship and resilience in our 
children.  More weight should be attached to a British Values focus and 
syllabus in developing teaching skills and assessing schools performance.  
 
Recommendation 5:  
 
The Government should review how those on the visa routes most likely to settle 
permanently in the UK are given support on arrival. The Government should 
consider whether additional integration support should be provided 
immediately post arrival, and how clearer expectations on integration could be 
set, potentially in advance on application for a visa, so that those moving to the 
UK get off to the best start, and know their rights and obligations. 
 
Recommendation 6:  
 
The Government should also review the route to full British Citizenship, which is of 
huge national, cultural and symbolic value.  The Government should look at what 
is required for British citizenship, as opposed to leave to remain, and 
separately consider an Oath of Integration with British Values and Society on 
arrival, rather than awaiting a final citizenship test. 
 
Reducing economic exclusion, inequality and segregation in our 
most isolated and deprived communities and schools: 
 
Recommendation 7:  
 
The report notes how isolation can begin at a young age, with some children’s 
experience of school marked by segregation from wider British communities.  The 
Government has included a social need criterion in the allocation of free 
schools funding and should now move to work with schools providers and 
local communities to encourage a range of school provision and projects to 
ensure that children from different communities learn alongside those from 
different backgrounds, perhaps purchasing sites in the areas of highest 
segregation in advance and encouraging Multi-Academy Trusts to have a 
diverse range of provision. 
 
Recommendation 8:  
 
The introduction of Universal Credit will bring a much wider range of people into 
contact with support in finding work for the first time. The Government should build 
on classes to tackle English language deficiencies with the development of classes 
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to tackle cultural barriers born out of segregation which are identified as a 
barrier to work, supporting both employment and integration goals. 
 
Recommendation 9:  
 
A shared language is fundamental to integrated societies.  The Government should 
supporting further targeted English Language provision by making sufficient 
funding available for community-based English language classes, and through 
the adult skills budget for local authorities to prioritise English language 
where there is a need.  It should also review whether community based and 
skills funded programmes are consistently reaching those who need them 
most, and whether they are sufficiently coordinated. 
 
Recommendation 10:  
 
Where we live can be both a cause and effect of isolation and segregation. The 
Government should work with local government to understand how housing and 
regeneration policies could improve or inhibit integration locally, and promote 
best practice approaches. 
 
Recommendation 11:  
 
It is extremely concerning that children can be excluded from mainstream education 
without sufficient checks on their wellbeing and integration. The Government 
should step up the safeguarding arrangements for children who are removed 
from mainstream education, and in particular those who do not commence 
mainstream schooling at all. All children outside mainstream education should 
be required to register with local authorities and local authorities duties’ to 
know where children are being educated should be increased. It should also 
consider the standards against which home education is judged to be clear 
that divisive practices are not acceptable in any setting.  While every parent has 
the right to choose what is best for their child, local authorities must be satisfied that 
children are not put at risk.  Ofsted and the Charity Commission should be 
resourced to support additional central and local government action to ensure 
the safeguarding of all children in mainstream and supplementary educational 
environments. 
 
Increasing standards of leadership and integrity in public office: 
 
Recommendation 12:  
 
We expect the highest standards in all civic leaders in selflessness and integrity, so 
too we should expect all in public office to uphold the fundamental British values of 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect for and tolerance of 
those with different faiths and beliefs and for those without faith. The Government 
should work with the Committee for Standards in Public life to ensure these 
values are enshrined in the principles of public life, including a new oath for 
holders of public office.  
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Annex A 
 
Past community cohesion reports and programmes 
 
A1. Ted Cantle’s 2001 independent Community Cohesion Review Team report343 
took a national perspective following the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham that year.  It identified the problem of ‘parallel lives’ in some communities 
and called for: 
 
 frank and honest public conversations; 
 
 a rights and responsibilities agenda; 
 
 strong local and localised leadership and communications; 
 
 action to tackle the problem of mono-cultural funding and community facilities, 
‘sweetheart deals’ and ‘back home’ politics; and 
 
 action to promote inter-racial and inter-faith contact and understanding, 
including twinning between schools. 
 
A2. Similarly Lord Ouseley’s 2001 report on the Bradford riots344 sought to reverse 
the trend of ‘them and us’.  Its recommendations included stronger civic leadership 
and new behavioural competencies for all public service employees.   
 
A3. David Ritchie’s 2001 report on Oldham345 worried about: 
 
 youngsters reaching school with limited if any command of English;  
 
 white children not mixing with those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds; 
 
 an overwhelming feeling among young people in all the inner areas of Oldham 
that there are insufficient social and leisure facilities for them; and 
 
 Oldham lacking strategic direction more generally. 
 
A4. Ted Cantle’s final Community Cohesion Panel report in 2004346 noted some 
progress in the northern towns but also many unaddressed wider issues: 
 
 More should be done to ‘manage settlement’ as well as migration. 
 
 Migration must not just be seen as an economic issue. The social and 
psychological needs of communities must be managed with a new approach by 
both central and local government. 
 
 Opposition to migration should not simply be condemned as ‘racist’… The 
‘pace of change’ should take account of the time needed to both adjust to 
newcomers and to settle them in. 
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 There should be clear accountability in government for settlement and 
citizenship; and the leadership role at a local level should be taken by local 
authorities to bring all agencies together and to promote integration and 
tolerance. 
 
 To achieve this everyone must have a real sense of belonging and they must 
share common values... All citizens, whether by birth or naturalised, White or 
from a Black and Minority Ethnic group, whatever their faith, need to be able to 
see themselves as ‘British’, whether or not they add their cultural identity to the 
term. 
 
A5. The then Government responded with its 2005 ‘Improving Opportunity, 
Strengthening Society’ strategy347.  It noted that: 
 
 Many [people from Black and Minority Ethnic communities] still suffer 
particularly poor outcomes in education, employment, health and other life 
chances, for a complex mixture of reasons, including racial discrimination, lack 
of opportunities, inadequate thought in how public services address the needs 
of different communities, the neighbourhoods they live in, longstanding lack of 
skills and cultural factors. 
 
 A cohesive society relies on more than equal opportunities for individuals. It 
also relies on a number of social conditions that help people from all 
backgrounds to come together and develop a sense of inclusion and shared 
British identity, defined by common opportunities and mutual expectations on 
all citizens to contribute to society. 
 
 Those from majority communities can also feel excluded or left behind by social 
change.  
 
A6. It set out a six-point strategy and vision for an inclusive British society in 
which: 
 
i. young people from different communities grow up with a sense of common 
belonging; 
 
ii. new immigrants are integrated; 
 
iii. people have opportunities to develop a greater understanding of the range of 
cultures that contribute to our strength as a country [including through sport 
and the arts]; 
 
iv. people from all backgrounds have opportunities to participate in civic society; 
 
v. racism is unacceptable; and 
 
vi. extremists who promote hatred are marginalised. 
 
 173 
 
A7. Darra Singh’s 2007 Commission on Integration and Cohesion348 picked up on 
many of the same points. It called for: 
 
 a sense of shared futures – with an emphasis on articulating what binds 
communities together rather than what differences divide them; 
 
 an emphasis on a new model of rights and responsibilities – including both a 
sense of citizenship at national and local level, and the obligations that go 
along with membership of a community, both for individuals or groups; 
 
 a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility that recognises that alongside 
the need to strengthen the social bonds within groups, the pace of change 
across the country reconfigures local communities rapidly, meaning that mutual 
respect is fundamental to issues of integration and cohesion; and  
 
 a commitment to equality that sits alongside the need to deliver visible social 
justice, to prioritise transparency and fairness, and build trust in the institutions 
that arbitrate between groups. 
 
A8. It also specifically called for a clear government statement of integration and 
cohesion policy; a shared vision and strong leadership at a local level that matched a 
deep local understanding of each community; the ‘mainstreaming’ of integration and 
cohesion objectives into wider service delivery, particularly for youth provision; and a 
rights and responsibilities agenda. 
 
A9. The final report of the Equalities Review (under Trevor Phillips) in 2007349 
called for: 
 
 Targeted action on persistent inequalities, including those particularly affecting 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women and especially in the areas of: early years 
and education; employment; health; and crime and criminal justice. 
 
 It noted that among ethnic minorities, the situation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women merits particular focus and attention both because of the size of the 
[employment inequality] penalty and its persistence.  The employment penalty 
associated with this group of women, has remained relatively constant over the 
30-year period, in contrast to White women.  Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women, with the same characteristics as White women, are 30 per cent more 
likely to be out of work... Language is also a barrier to employment. 
 
A10. The 2008 Government publication, ‘Face to Face and Side by Side’350, 
promised to “support a stronger dialogue between people of different faiths and 
beliefs in every community and encourage the kind of practical inter faith cooperation 
that can make pleasant and harmonious neighbourhoods for all”.  And, in 2008, the 
Government also issued guidance on the translation of publications351 in a bid to 
curb the number and type of documents that were translated into foreign languages 
and encourage more people to learn English. 
 
A11. Further Government guidance on community cohesion and meaningful 
interaction in 2009352 stressed again the need to mainstream cross-community 
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integration and interaction into services as more effective than running purely 
community cohesion focussed services and events. 
 
A12. Since 2007 there has been a duty on all state schools to promote community 
cohesion.  Prior to 2011 there was also a requirement for Ofsted to report on this 
duty as part of a school inspection.  However, as part of a slimming down of the 
school inspection framework in 2011353, this explicit requirement was removed and is 
likely to have downgraded the importance of the duty for many schools.  However 
Ofsted does retain a duty to consider the impact of provision for pupils’ spiritual, 
moral, social and cultural development as part of standard school inspections.  And, 
since 2014, all schools have had a new duty to promote Fundamental British 
Values354 of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs. 
 
A13. Following the 2011 riots in London and other cities, Darra Singh’s 
Independent Riots Panel report in 2012355 called for a major drive to help build 
character and resilience in young people, particularly among those facing 
disadvantage. 
 
A14. There then followed in 2012 the Coalition Government’s ‘Creating the 
Conditions for Integration’ paper356 which pledged to “robustly promote British values 
such as democracy, the rule of law, equality of opportunity and treatment, freedom of 
speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any 
kind”.  It further noted that “it is these values which make it possible for people to live 
and work together, to bridge boundaries between communities and to play a full role 
in society.  When this is underpinned both by opportunities to succeed, and a strong 
sense of personal and social responsibility to the society which has made success 
possible, the result is a strong society.”  
 
A15. It identified five underlying factors which contribute to integration: 
 
 Common ground – a clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which 
focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences; 
 
 Responsibility – a strong sense of our mutual commitments and obligations, 
which brings personal and social responsibility; 
 
 Social mobility – people able to realise their potential to get on in life; 
 
 Participation and empowerment – people of all backgrounds have the 
opportunities to take part, be heard and take decisions in local and national life; 
and  
 
 Tackling intolerance and extremism – a robust response to threats, whether 
discrimination, extremism or disorder, that deepen division and increase 
tensions.  
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A16. Matthew Taylor’s 2015 Social Integration Commission report357 called, among 
other recommendations, for: 
 
 schools’ intakes to reflect the economic and ethnic diversity of their 
communities; 
 
 schools to provide opportunities for their pupils to interact with children 
belonging to different ethnic groups and income backgrounds; 
 
 people living in diverse areas to be encouraged to get to know their neighbours; 
 
 public services to be designed and managed so as to bring together different 
groups of people; and  
 
 publicly-funded moments of celebration to be open to people from all religions 
and none. 
 
A17. The Woolf Institute’s 2015 Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public 
Life report358, called for: a ‘national conversation’ led by faith communities to create a 
shared understanding of the fundamental values underlying public life; an enhanced 
mutual understanding of religion and belief; more socially representative schools; 
and more and better Religious Education and integration within schools. 
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Annex B  
 
A rapid review of integration in a selection of European 
nations 
 
Population information 
 
B1. While this review focusses on the state of integration in Britain, it is important 
to understand the broader context in which our nation sits.  Conducting a rapid, 
comparative analysis through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s embassy 
network, we have gained an overview of social integration across our European 
neighbours and the issues faced by other nation states.  
 
B2. There are many lessons to be learned from our European counterparts and 
the summary below sets out some of the key points.  In particular, we note the 
similarities around lower education and employment outcomes for ethnic minorities.  
 
Belgium 
 
B3. In Belgium, lack of a shared national language and identity is seen as a 
significant barrier to integration, with ethno-linguistic differences between Dutch-
speaking (Flemish), French-speaking (Walloon) and German-speaking Belgians.  
 
B4. Ethnic minorities suffer poor employment and education outcomes compared 
to the wider population. 
 
 Almost 50% of people with a Turkish or North African background are unable to 
find a job within a year after they graduate, compared to only 14% of Caucasian 
people.  
 
 30% of men and 25% of women from an ethnic minority background leave 
schools without obtaining a high school diploma, compared to 13% and 7% of 
Caucasian men and women. 
 
 For Turkish or North African boys, this figure rises to over 40%. 
 
B5. Geographical segregation is an issue in some areas, such as Molenbeek in 
Brussels, where Belgian sociologist Jan Hertogen estimates nearly 40% of the 
population to be Muslim.  This translates to 36,545 people in a resident population of 
94,653; 90 of whom are believed to have returned from fighting for militant groups in 
Syria and Iraq.  
 
Netherlands  
 
B6. The Netherlands has a history of immigration from former colonial areas, and 
12% of the population is made up of migrants from non-Western countries. 
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B7. Ethnic minorities suffer poor employment and education outcomes compared 
to the wider population. 
 
 Unemployment among minority groups (people born outside the Netherlands or 
with at least one parent born outside the Netherlands) is 15.2%, compared to 
5.6% for the rest of the population. 
 
B8. The Netherlands face geographical segregation in areas of The Hague, 
Rotterdam and Utrecht.  The poorer Schilderswijk neighbourhood of The Hague, for 
example, has a population made up of 90% ethnic minorities – mainly Turkish, 
Moroccan and Surinamese. 
 
France 
 
B9. French law prohibits the collection of data on race, religion and ethnicity.  This 
makes it difficult to accurately analyse the size and nature of integration issues, or 
educational attainment for ethnic minorities.  
 
B10. However, research from non-government sources indicates pockets of higher 
socio-economic deprivation, particularly in the ‘banlieues’ (suburbs or housing 
projects) around Paris. 
  
 More than 4.4 million people are believed to live in ‘priority zones’ within the 
suburbs, facing what President Hollande has reportedly described as 
“unbearable discrimination”. 
  
 The latest (2016) unemployment rate for the department (locality) of Essone is 
7.7%, but this figure may hide the pockets of deprivation within the area.  The 
suburb of Grigny is believed to have shown 23.3% unemployment and a 44.8% 
poverty rate at the latest 2013 Insee (Office for National Statistics equivalent) 
collection.  
 
Spain 
 
B11. Spain has seen a dramatic increase in immigration over the past 16 years, 
with immigration multiplying ten-fold from 2000 to 2010.  
 
B12. Disparities exist in employment attainment rates for immigrant and native 
groups. 
 
 The unemployment rate is higher for immigrant groups (26%) than for the 
population as a whole (18.9%). 
  
 Highly-educated, long-settled non-EU-born immigrants are 10% less likely to 
have a job than native Spanish peers with the same level of education. 
  
 Highly educated immigrants are 50% more likely to be over-qualified for their 
jobs than their native peers.  Non-EU born women are twice as likely to be 
overqualified for their position in comparison to native-born women.  
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Germany 
 
B13. Around 17.1 million of Germany’s 82.2 million population is of immigrant 
background.  Around 4 million are EU citizens and more than 3 million are ethnic 
Germans who have been resettled since the early 1990s, in particular from the 
former Soviet Union.  
 
 Residents from migrant backgrounds have concentrated particularly in cities in 
the west and south of the country such as Frankfurt, Munich and Cologne, as 
well as the capital, Berlin, where they represent over 20% of the population. 
  
 In some town and city districts, immigrants represent the majority of under-18-
year-olds.  
 
B14. Ethnic minorities suffer poor employment and education outcomes compared 
to the indigenous German population. 
 
Policy responses 
 
Germany 
 
B15. Recent years have seen increased efforts to coordinate local and regional 
integration efforts at a national level.  A series of national integration summits 
culminated in 2012 in a National Plan of Action, covering areas such as: 
 
 reforming local Aliens Offices to embody a welcoming culture by offering 
integration-related services to new arrivals; 
  
 a raft of measures to support education and labour market access; and 
 
 boosting opportunities for people of migrant background in the public sector. 
 
B16. In August 2016, Germany passed its first ever national Integration Act, 
designed to manage the influx of recent refugees and migrants, and prevent the 
formation of asylum-seeker ‘ghettos’.  The legislation focuses on a combination of 
incentives and conditionality, including: 
 
 expanding asylum-seekers’ access to – and obligation to attend – integration 
courses, regardless of their prospects of remaining; 
 
 improving their access to the labour market, and legal assurances for 
employers; 
 
 applying sanctions to their refusal to participate in integration measures on offer 
by reducing benefits; and 
 
 designated asylum-seekers’ places of residence to ensure integration and 
avoid social hotspots and ghettos developing.  
 180 
 
 
Belgium 
 
B17. Belgium is also moving towards more national coordination over integration 
issues.  In early 2016 the Flemish Secretary for Migration launched a “newcomers’ 
statement”.  
 
 This is a pledge to accept ‘European values’, which must be taken by any non-
European citizen (except asylum seekers and students) who wishes to remain 
in Belgium for more than three months.  
 
 Refusal to sign the statement results in refusal of entry, and those who cannot 
prove that they are actively working on their integration will be deported.  
 
B18. Citizenship has become stricter since 2013, when the Belgian federal 
government decided that applicants would have to: 
 
 have stayed in the country for at least five years; 
 
 have abided by laws; 
 
 speak one of the official languages; 
 
 have worked at least 468 days; 
 
 be integrated. 
 
Spain 
 
B19. Spain has created a Strategic Integration and Citizenship Plan, based on the 
premise of “convivencia intercultural”, or “intercultural living-togetherness”.  This 
focuses on the idea of mutual adaptation, as opposed to separate and parallel lives.  
The underlying theme of the plan is that integration is a process of mutual 
adaptation, and sets out a policy based on actions that are aimed at all citizens, 
whether immigrant or Spanish nationals.  
 
Denmark 
 
B20. Recent initiatives at the national and local level can be applied to tackling 
parallel societies and bringing people into mainstream community through: 
 
 strengthening association with labour market and educational systems; 
 
 tackling residential segregation through building renovation, refugee 
assignment strategies, and change of rental and tenant prioritisation rules;  
 
 change to school districts, and increased supervision of independent schools. 
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France 
 
B21. The recent terrorist attacks in France have resulted in pressures to address 
integration, through measures such as promoting French values and reducing 
inequality.  
 
B22. For example, in January 2015 the French Education Minister, Najat Vallaud-
Belkacem, announced 11 new measures to instil the values of the French Republic 
in students.  This included measures such as: 
 
 training 1,000 school representatives, such as teachers, directors and 
counsellors, in civic and secular education; and 
 
 more rigorous inspection of home education, with teaching experts 
accompanying inspectors.  
 
B23. At the time of writing, the Sports and Cities Minister, Patrick Kanner, is leading 
a new Bill titled “Project de loi égalité et citoyenneté”.  This aims to tackle what Prime 
Minister Valls has described as the “Territorial, social and ethnic Apartheid” in 
France, with measures including: 
 
 increased access to civic service opportunities for all citizens; 
 
 greater transparency around allocation of social housing; 
 
 greater focus on French language training at all stages of life; and 
 
 strengthened sanctions against acts of racism and discrimination 
 
Lessons for Great Britain 
 
B24. There are a number of similarities between the state of integration in Britain 
and that in other Western European countries.  These are most obvious in terms of 
educational attainment, access to employment, and physical and social segregation.  
 
B25. There is broad acknowledgement of the importance of equality, a sense of 
belonging, and access to opportunities as the means of tackling integration gaps.  
 
B26. There are also some differences, which highlight some relative advantages of 
our position.  In particular, the United Kingdom has no legal restriction on the 
collection and analysis of ethnographic and religious data.  This allows us to analyse 
and track education and employment outcomes – and understand the size and 
nature of the issues we face – in a more scientific and precise manner than some of 
our European neighbours.  
 
B27. We have seen that this country shares a number of problems with its 
neighbours.  However, we are in a strong position to learn from them and to use our 
own assets to forge new and better solutions to segregation.  
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